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The concensus of case authority is that infants may not exercise
powers appendant or in gross; some authorities would impose even
more stringent restrictions. Professor Stoebuck points out that these
restrictions, borrowed from conveyancing law, impinge upon the
basic powers-of-appointment concepts. Moreover, the restrictions
are not applied consistently with the conveyancing law from which
they are taken. The article concludes with a proposalthat an infant's
exercise of a power be held voidable, but not void, to the extent
it would prejudice his owned interest in the property.

M UCH has been said about the literality of the medieval mind and
the inflexibility of old common law. The modem student of
English legal history cannot but marvel at the strictness of the
forms of pleading or the ceremony of livery of seisin. But literalism
has another side, about which far too little or nothing has been said,
a side that invites change - that, paradoxically, promotes flexibility.
A system that conforms to the very letter of the law, where form
surpasses content, bids ingenious men to accomplish by indirection
that which by direct action is forbidden. None doubt that the common-law lawyers were ingenious men. Nowhere was their ingenuity
applied with more success than to the harsh, feudalistic, increasingly
anachronistic land law. Thus, for instance, contingent remainders
could be destroyed by common recovery or merger;' fee tail could be
barred by common recovery.' The greatest of all these evasive devices
was the use, particularly when combined with its frequent comrade,
the power of appointment. Indeed, at an early date there seems to
have been no clear distinction between powers, as known today, and
uses. The inference is plain that legal suspicion directed toward the
use found its way also to powers, because of the connection between
the two. A nascent suggestion of this connection can be found running
back into the 12th century, nearly to the Conquest. By then the use was
being employed to make conveyances that could not be made by livery
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver.
1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS 50-51 (1951).

2Id. at 11.
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of seisin. For instance, sokemen and villeins, who could not convey in
their own names, would circumvent this restriction by surrendering
to their lords "to the use of" those persons to whom they wished to
pass title.' Though the lord as a strawman bears some resemblance
to the donee of a power, still he is not, because his function cannot
be separated from legal title. The first record of a true power is in
the 13th century, around Bracton's time (d. 1268). At that date,
until the Statute of Wills4 in 1540, land could not be devised. But
the practice developed of a feoffor's conveying land to a feoffee
to the use of such persons as the feoffor should appoint in his will.'
When the feoffor appointed by will, the land was viewed as passing,
not as a devise under the will, but by force of the original conveyance,
a concept that will take on ultimate significance later in this article.'
Powers of appointment were born as an evasion of the rule
against devising land and continued in the capacity of evaders of
the land law. Conveyances could be made without livery of seisin by
conveying to another "upon such trusts as should afterward be
appointed." 7 The Statute of Wills allowed the devise of only a twothirds interest in lands held in knight service, but by giving himself
the power to appoint by will, the owner could in effect, if not in
name, devise his whole interest.' A married woman, though she
lacked capacity to convey land without her husband's concurrence
or capacity to make a will, might execute a power of appointment
inter vivos or by an instrument effective upon her death.' Powers
have a well-known utility in avoiding the rights of creditors.10 Finally,
infants having no capacity to make a binding conveyance, might,
to the limited extent to be examined in detail later, appoint land.
Thus, the subject of this article is in part a study of one evasion of
the common law.
We might suppose there would be a counteraction to all this
3PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 577 (5th ed. 1956); 2
POLLOCK & MAITLAND,

THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 228 (1895).

4 32 Hen. 8, c. 1.
5 PLUCKNETT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 577; SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 872
(2d ed. 1956) ; 1 SUGDEN, POWERS 1-4 (1856). Good brief discussions are found in

Berger, The General Power of Appointment as an Interest in Property, 40 NEB. L.
REV. 104 (1960), and Bolich, The Power of Appointment: Tool of Estate Planning
and Drafting, 1964 DUKE L. J. 32.
6 Sir Edward Clere's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1599) ; SIMES &
SMITH, op. cit. supra note 5, § 872.
7 1 SUGDEN, POWERS 1-4 (1856) ; Halbach, The Use of Powers of Appointment in
Estate Planning,45 IowA L. REV. 691 (1960).
8
Sir Edward Clere's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1599).
9
E.g., Osgood v. Bliss, 141 Mass. 474, 6 N.E. 527 (1886); Deffenbaugh v. Harris,
6 At. 139 (Pa. 1886) ; Woodson v. Perkins, 5 Grat. (Va.) 345 '(1849) ; Grange v.
Tiving, 0. Bridgman 107, 124 Eng. Rep. 494 (C.P. 1665). The practice of givina a
married woman power to appoint lands came to be a standard feature of marriage
settlements.
144 (1881) ; SIMES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 187-90.
10E.g., Gilman v. Bell, 99 Ill.
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circumvention of the rules, and such has been the case. Two of the
theoretical characteristics of powers have been the battleground: first,
the concept that a power is akin to an agency and is not an interest
in property, and second, the related concept that upon exercise of a
power the interest created flows from the donor, not from the donee.
By way of example, consider some of the counteractions that have
broken in upon these concepts.' It has been held, at least as to general powers, that when a power is exercised by will in favor of
appointees who predecease the testator-donee, there is a lapse, even
though the appointees were alive when the power was created."2
The insolvent donee's creditors, while they cannot reach the property
as long as the power is unexercised, may, in the case of a general
power, do so in most jurisdictions if he chooses to exercise it." Also,
statutes have made inroads upon the theory of powers; the federal
estate tax on powers is one such inroad." A final example of great
consequence to our discussion, was the classification of powers as
collateral, in gross, and appendant, a development traceable back into
the latter half of the 16th century. With this classification came the
realization that powers appendant, and to some extent those in gross,
"savoured and tasted of the land."" The restrictions on infants' exercise of powers are connected with this realization and seem to be a
part of it historically. 6
As we now turn to a detailed examination of infants' exercise
of powers, one great refrain underlies all. Powers were first used
to evade rules of law, a function which has continued ever since.
Attempts to control their use or abuse have led to infringements
upon basic concepts of their nature. The history of powers is thus a
turbulent one, in large part a struggle between contending forces.
This fact is to be continuously borne in mind.
13

POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 300-01 (1954), is a handy reference listing several areas
in which the concepts of powers have been violated.
12Marlborough v. Godolphin, 2 Ves. Sr. 61, 28 Eng. Rep. 41 (Ch. 1750); Oke v.
Heath, 1 Ves. Sr. 135, 27 Eng. Rep. 940 (Ch. 1748) ; SIMES, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 238. But see Daniel v. Brown, 156 Va. 563, 159 S.E. 209 (1931), to the effect
that there would be no lapse when the power was special.
13 E.g., Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200 (1879) ; Johnson v. Cushing, 15 N.H. 298
(1844) ; Thompson v. Towne, 2 Vern. 319, 23 Eng. Rep. 806 (Ch. 1694) ; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 330 (1940). A minority of jurisdictions is contra. Johnson v.
Shriver, 121 Colo. 397, 216 P.2d 653 (1950) (dictum) ; and see the logical, telling
argument of Gibson, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. St. 277 (1849).
14 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041, taxes all general, and some special, powers as
though they were ownership interests. Berger, The General Power of Appointment as
an Interest in Property, 40 NEB. L. REV. 104 (1960), advocates several statutes that
would equate a general power with ownership.
5
1 Albany's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 110b, 76 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1586), has been cited as
the genesis of these notions. 7 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 165-70

(1926). However, it contains no clear recognition of them. Such recognition and development can be found in Digge's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 173a, 76 Eng. Rep. 373 (K.B.
1598-1600), and Edwards v. Sleator, Hardres 410, 145 Eng. Rep. 522 (Exch. 1665).
16 This is brought out in Hearle v. Greenbank, 3 Atk. 695, 26 Eng. Rep. 1200 (Ch.
1749).
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STATE OF THE AUTHORITIES

A. English Authorities
While there is no large body of English cases on the subject
of the exercise of powers by infants, the cases are reasonably consistent. The 1665 case of Grange v. Tiving"7 held that an infant
might exercise a power. The power was collateral, but the case goes
on the broader ground that, since infants are to be protected only
against harming themselves, an infant should be allowed to exercise
a power if its exercise could not prejudice any interest the infant
might have in the appointive property. A subsequent case, 8 though
sketchily reported, seems to have held that a minor could exercise a
power cutting off her own life estate; however, the case was criticized
as "an idle case and not law."' " It obviously has not been followed,
for the later case of Hearle v. Greenbank" held an infant could not
exercise an appendant power that would cut off his own life estate.
No direct English authority has been found on infants' exercise
of powers in gross. Various secondary sources seem to say or assume
they could not do so in England. 2 This might be questioned, in view
of the reasoning in Grange v. Tiving. Suppose an infant had only a
life estate with a power to appoint the remainder. How could exercise of the power prejudice his interest unless possibly, by unlikely
coincidence, the remainder would otherwise pass to his heirs?
Comparatively recent English cases have engrafted two liberalizing qualifications onto the above rules. First, it has been held that,
as to personal property only, an infant may exercise even appendant
powers unless the donor expresses a contrary intent.' Second, if the
donor of a power over real property manifests an intent he should
do so, an infant may exercise an appendant power.'
B. American Authorities
A handful of American cases have held that infants cannot
exercise appendant powers. Of these, Thompson v. Lyon 24 is prob170. Bridgman 107, 124 Eng. Rep. 494 (C.P. 1665). The facts are singular. A decedent

had conveyed to himself for life, then to the use of his wife and her heirs, reserving
to himself and his heirs the power to revoke the uses. His only heir was his infant
daughter, who exercised the power of revocation, thus causing the fee to vest in
herself.
18Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, Gilb. Rep. 167, 25 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1708).
19 16 Viner's Abridgment 486 (1793).
20 3 Atk. 695, 26 Eng. Rep. 1200 (Ch. 1749).
21SIMES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 201; 1 SUGDEN, PowERs 212 (1856); 3 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY 35 (1939).
22In re D'Angibau, 15 Ch. D. 228, 246 (1880).
(manifestation of intent found
23in re Cardross's Settlement, 7 Ch. D. 728 (1878)
simply from fact that instrument creating power recited donee's age as 17 years)
6 THOMPSON,REAL PROPERTY 29-30 (1962).
2420 Mo. 155, 61 Am. Dec. 599 (1854).
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ably best known, but because of unusual circumstances" of the case,
Hill v. Clark " is stronger authority for the proposition. A pair of
Kentucky cases, while not excessively clear, appear to hold to the
same effect. 7 All the cases cited thus far in this paragraph contain
dictum, usually attributed to English authorities, that minors may
exercise collateral powers. One 1845 New York case purports to
hold alternatively that an infant could exercise a power in gross;
that kind of power was involved, but it is doubtful that the facts of
the case support such a holding.28 Two other cases, containing offhand statements of little significance, have been discovered."
Secondary sources more obfuscate than illume the American
law. The Restatement of Property, with which Simes and Powell
agree, takes the position that an infant can appoint property only if
he can make an indefeasible transfer of similar owned property."
On the other hand, Tiffany and Chancellor Kent assert that infants
may exercise collateral powers and these only." In this confusing
state of the secondary authorities, the reader may wish to review the
previous discussion of English and American authority to summarize for himself the common-law rules.
C. Effect of Statutes
Some jurisdictions, such as Michigan and Wisconsin, have
statutory restrictions upon infants' exercise of powers.32 The statutes
25 The owner conveyed in trust for an infant, directing the trustee to convey to such

persons as the infant should appoint. Infant and trustee joined in executing a deed,
and the action to cancel the deed was brought by the former after she attained majority. The court held she might elect to cancel the deed (n.b. that the court treated
it as voidable, not void), but the force of the holding is weakened by the court's
statement that, upon remand, the plaintiff might be estopped if the defendant showed
he was a bona fide purchaser.
264 Lea (Tenn.) 405 (1880) (9-year-old girl could not appoint property which she
held as life tenant).
27
Owens v. Owens, 305 Ky. 460, 204 S.W.2d 580 (1947) (infant lacked capacity to
change beneficiary of his life insurance policy); Sewell v. Sewell, 92 Ky. 500, 18
S.W. 162 (1892) (infant could not exercise "power to convey;" court confusingly
seems to equate appointments with conveyances).
28
Strong v. Wilkin, 1 Barb. (N.Y. Ch.) 9 (1845). An 18-year-old girl, having a
power to appoint the remainder following her life estate, executed it by will and died
15 years later. The court said, in the alternative, that an 18-year-old person could
execute a will at the time she made hers and that, in any event, the instrument operated as the exercise of a power. If it was the latter, it seems it would not have been
effective until her death, at which time she was 33 years old.
29
Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 121 F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1941) (dictum that
infant could not exercise testamentary power in North Carolina); Sheldon's Lessee
v. Newton, 3 Ohio 494 (1855) (rank dictum that infant could exercise power "as
fully and effectually as an adult person").
30 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 345 (1940); SIMES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 201; 3
POWELL, REAL PROPERTY (1954).
31 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 325'(12th ed. 1873); 3 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY 35 (1939).
32
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.127 (1957) ; Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 232.36 (1957).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 43

referred to allow persons to exercise powers only if they are capable
of alienating land and appear to be modeled after an 1829 New
York statute which has been repealed. 3 It should be observed that
the statutes do not say indefeasibly alienating land, for as we shall
see, infants may generally make avoidable conveyances. However, the
statutes presumably must be read together with other statutes prescribing the minimum ages for doing the acts necessary to alien land.
Similarly, when the donor has required the power to be exercised by "will," it seems a person below the statutory age for making
a will cannot exercise the power.34 Even at common law, where
boys could execute wills at age 14 and girls at age 12," there was at
least a theoretical age limit on testamentary powers.
D. Do Appendant Powers Exist in America?
Upon the basis of a small amount of authority, it appears
doubtful that appendant powers are recognized in the United States.3
The reason for this has been put on two grounds: that the power
merges into the fee, and that the power to appoint is a superfluous
addition to the power to convey that is an incident of the fee. The
latter reasoning is sensible and ought to be followed. When the
holder of a life estate has a power presently exercisable, the result
should be that he has a power in gross as to the remainder but no
power to appoint the life estate. So, if he purports to make an inter
vivos appointment of the fee, we could analyze this as being a
conveyance of his life estate and an appointment of the remainder. 7
To the extent these principles are or will be followed, our discussion
can be centered upon infants' exercise of only powers collateral and
in gross. However, perhaps it should be pointed out that the
analysis which will be suggested at the conclusion of this article will
operate without determining whether powers are collateral, in gross,
or appendant.
E. Married Women's Capacityto Exercise Powers
At an earlier time, when married women could not devise land
or convey it without their husbands' concurrence, it was well settled
Y. REAL PROPERTY LAw § 141, originally enacted in 1829, was repealed in 1964.
re Maxhimer's Est., 139 Ohio St. 444, 40 N.E.2d 941 (1942); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 346(a) and Comment b; Cf., Oke v. Heath, 1 Ves. Sr. 135, 27 Eng.
Rep. 940 (Ch. 1748).
3 Deane v. Littlefield, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 239 (1822) ; Davis v. Baugh, 33 Tenn.
(1 Sneed) 477 (1853); Strong v. Wilkin, 1 Barb. (N.Y. Ch.) 9 (1845).
36 Browning v. Blue Grass Hardware Co., 153 Va. 20, 149 S.E. 497 (1929) (owner of
fec cannot have concurrent powrer to a
9,
'(1940); SIMES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 274-75; Bolich, supra note 5, at 38; Tillett
v. Nixon, 180 N.C. 195, 104 S.E. 352 (1920) (seems to say inconsistent for owner
of fee to have power to appoint) (semble).
37 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 325 (1940), supports this analysis.
3 N.

34In
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that they could exercise all kinds of powers." As has been noted,
powers had great utility as devices for evading the incapacity of
married women. With the emancipation of married women, this
utility has disappeared.
It might seem that allowing married women freely to exercise
powers was inconsistent with any restrictions upon infants' exercise,
since both classes of persons were under similar incapacities to convey
or devise. However, their respective incapacities arose out of significantly different causes. The feme covert's "disability doth not arise
for want of reason" but out of the legal nature of the marriage relationship. 9 Of course the infant's incapacity did arise "for want of
reason," and, as will be seen presently, the restrictions on his exercise
of powers were designed to protect him from his own foolishness.
Thus, the cases on married women's powers are not authority in cases
involving infants, nor do the two classes of cases ever seem to have
been cited interchangeably.
F. Theory of Restrictions on Infant's Powers
We will presently examine in detail two concepts of powers,
that they are not an interest in property and that the exercise of a
power relates back to the instrument creating it so as to make the
property pass by that instrument. In pure theory a minor's exercise
of a power would cause title to pass, not by his act, but by the
donor's. Theoretically, then, we should not concern ourselves with
whether the donee happened to be an infant. Yet, we have seen the
courts do so concern themselves. Why?
A partial answer is that the courts have purported to treat the
exercise as though it were a conveyance by the infant." Thus, the
infant's disability in making conveyances is transferred to his exercise
of powers. Obviously, this violates the concepts of no interest and
38

E.g., Kennedy v. Ten Broeck, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 241 (1875) (collateral power);
Ford's Ex'r v. Ford, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 418 (1866) (testamentary exercise of power
in gross) ; Armstrong v. Kerns, 61 Md. 364 (1884) (power to mortgage) ; Osgood
v. Bliss, 141 Mass. 474, 6 N.E. 527 (1886) (testamentary power) ; Lippincott v.
Wikoff, 54 N.J. Eq. 107, 33 At. 305 (1895) (executrix's power of sale) ; Bunce v.
Vander Grift, 8 Paige (N.Y.) 37 (1839) (executrix's power of sale) ; Taylor v.
Eatman, 92 N.C. 601 (1885) (dictum); Deffenbaugh v. Harris, 6 At. 139 (Pa.
1886) (power appendant to life estate); Woodson v. Perkins, 5 Gratt. (Va.) 345
(1849) (power in gross) ; Grange v. Tiving, 0. Bridgman 107, 124 Eng. Rep. 494
(C.P. 1665) (collateral power) ; Hearle v. Greenbank, 3 Atk. 695, 26 Eng. Rep. 1200
(Ch. 1749) (dictum); Oke v. Heath, 1 Ves. Sr. 135, 27 Eng. Rep. 940 (Ch. 1748)
'(testamentary power).
39 Hearle v. Greenbank, supra note 38.
40
This factor is emphasized in Thompson v. Lyon, 20 Mo. 155, 160, 61 Am. Dec. 599
(1854), where the rationale is: "A beneficial power, being in the nature of property,
which an infant cannot by law alienate, it would be strange that an incapacity which
the law imposed should be evaded, by means of a power ,.. " This approach is also
emphasized in RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 345 (1940), and SIMES, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 201.
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relation back. Still we must ask ourselves why the courts violate these
concepts. What overriding policy of the law calls for this?
One reason advanced, seemingly only by American authorities,
is that an infant should not, by the guise of an appointment, be
allowed to evade the rule disabling him from making conveyances. 1
There are two faults with this reasoning. First, if the purpose is to
equate the exercise of powers with conveyances, it would follow that
an infant could exercise a power to the same extent he is permitted to
convey. As we shall establish, infants' conveyances are merely voidable, not void; yet, to the extent infants' exercises of powers are restricted, they are held void. Second, we should ask, to what purpose
do these courts reason that a minor should not evade the restrictions
on his making conveyances? What underlying policy requires that
the rule on conveyances should override the powers concepts of no
interest and relation back? Our investigation will show that the
restrictions on conveyances exist to protect the infant himself but not
to protect others. With a conveyance the minor is of necessity disposing of his own interest and so always has the potential of harming
himself. Not so with the exercise of powers except for appendant
ones. And if we follow the Restatement's analysis that appendant
powers do not exist,42 a minor could never appoint an owned interest.
In any event, the conveyancing rule ought to intrude upon the powers
concepts only so far as its policy reason would take it, i.e., only to the
extent to which an infant could appoint away his owned interest.
The early English cases seem more satisfactory in their reasoning.
They restrict infants' exercise of powers directly on the policy ground
that the courts will protect an infant from unwisely disposing of his
own interest.43 Still, the English authorities are not wholly consistent
with this reasoning. For one thing, where infants were restricted,
their attempted exercise was held void instead of only voidable. For
another, later cases allowed infants to exercise powers affecting their
interest in land if the donor indicated they might, 4 and those affecting
interests in personalty if the donor failed to indicate they might not.'
These holdings are inconsistent with the principle of protecting the
infant. In fact, the courts in those cases expressed a distaste for
restrictions of any kind.
Have we not reached the point where it can be said that the au41

Ibid.

4

See note 36 supra.

43 Nowhere is this clearer than in the original case, Grange v. Tiving, 0. Bridgman 107,

124 Eng. Rep. 494 (C.P. 1665). Hearle v. Greenbank, 3 Atk. 695, 26 Eng. Rep. 1200
(Ch. 1749), is to the same effect, though not as clearly so. 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 35 (1939), appears to adopt the English reasoning.
44
In re Cardross's Settlement, 7 Ch. D. 728 (1878).
45
In re D'Angibau, 15 Ch. D. 228 (1880).
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thorities are incomplete and at odds? Their reasoning lacks a wholly
consistent analysis. This suggests that we should make a thorough
investigation of the principles underlying infants' exercise of powers.
As was pointed out in the introduction to this article, the problem
consists of balancing the concepts of a power's not being an interest
in property and of relation back over against the rules for protecting
infants by restricting their capacity for making conveyances. These
three factors will now be examined, to the end that their limits may
be determined and a balance struck between the contending forces.
II.

POWERS OF APPOINTMENT CONCEPTS

A. Is a Power an Interest in Property?
A most basic concept in the theory of powers of appointment
is that a power is not an interest in the appointive property." The
exercise of a power is viewed as an event causing the appointed
interest to move from the former owner to the new one, much in
the fashion of a shifting use limited after a fee upon condition
subsequent.47 This similarity is not surprising, considering the early
connection between powers and uses. Further, the donee of the
power is spoken of as a "mere instrument or conduit pipe" for passing the interest." Thus, the power of appointment looks much like
an agency and the donee, like an agent.
We have already seen that in a number of areas inroads have
been made upon these pure concepts." To the extent a minor's
exercise of a power is restricted by its being equated with the conveyance of an ownership interest and his conveyancing disability applied,
the above concepts are breached."0
B. The Doctrine of Relation Back
If the donee has no interest in the appointed property, it must
follow that upon exercise of the power title passes from some person
other than him. That person is the donor of the power."' This doctrine
must have been established no later than the 13th century, because,
before the Statute of Wills, it was a necessary part of the reasoning
allowing conveyances to such uses as the grantor should appoint by
will. " Clear statements of the doctrine are common after Albany's
46 SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 942 (1956) ; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 2-4
(1939).
47Ray v. Pung, 5 B. & Aid. 561, 106 Eng. Rep. 1296 (K.B. 1822).
48
Hearle v. Greenbank, 3 Atk. 695, 26 Eng. Rep. 1200 (Ch. 1749) ; 1 SUGDEN, POWERS
211-12 (1856).
49 See notes 11-16 supra and the textual references thereto.
50 Nowhere is this more apparent than in Thompson v. Lyon, 20 Mo. 155, 160, 61 Am.
Dec. 599 (1854), where a power is said to be "in the nature of property...."
51 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 297 (1954)

; SIMES & SMITH, op. cit. supra note 46 § 912

(1956).
52 See notes 4-6 supra and their textual references.
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Case in 1586.:1 Oke v. Heath in 174854 explained the matter by saying
that an appointment relates back to the creation of the power, so
that the appointee takes as if his name were inserted in the instrument
creating it. This has remained the picturesque expression. It should be
observed that relation back does not refer to point of time, so that
the appointee takes as of the time of the appointment.55
Examples of encroachments upon the doctrine of relation back
have been given.56 We saw that restrictions upon infants' exercise
of powers are among these encroachments, since these restrictions
treat the exercise as though it were the infant donee's conveyance.
III.

CAPACITIES OF INFANTS

A. Capacityto be Agent
Powers of appointment are sufficiently analogous to agencies
that an infant's capacity to appoint should not exceed his capacity to
be an agent. It seems to be a settled rule of the law of agency that an
infant may be an agent, his acts binding his principal to the same
extent as they would have if done by the principal.57 Blackstone
indicates this was also the rule in England.5 8 Moreover, the infant's
capacity to convey land as agent or under a power of attorney seems
as great as his agency capacity in other connections.59
The argument could certainly be made, though little attention
has been given it, that infants should be able to exercise powers to
the extent they can be agents. Where the exercise would prejudice
the infant's interest in the land, the policy of protecting infants might
cause the argument to lose force; in other situations it has considerable logical appeal. In any event, insofar as infants are restricted
in exercising powers, this seems inconsistent with settled agency law.
B. Infants as Trustees
Infants may be trustees and may receive and hold the trust
property. However, their discretionary acts in pursuit of their trustees'
duties, such as transferring property and making contracts, are
53 Albany's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 110b, 76 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1586) ; Sir Edward Clere's
Case, 6 Co. Rep. 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1599) ; Viscount Montague's Case, 6
Co. Rep. 27b, 77 Eng. Rep. 294 '(Exch. 1600).
54 1 Ves. Sr. 135, 27 Eng. Rep. 940 (Ch. 1748).
55 Marlborough v. Godolphin, 2 Ves. Sr. 61, 28 Eng. Rep. 41 (Ch. 1750).

56 See notes 11-16 supra.
57 E.g., Cornelius v. Moore, 211 Ala. 544, 100 So. 895 (1924); Sims v. Gunter, 201
Ala. 286, 78 So. 62 (1918) (dictum) ; Des Moines Ins. Co. v. McIntire, 99 Iowa 50,

68 N.W. 565 (1896); Talbot v. Bowen, 8 Ky. (1 A. K. Marsh.) 436, 10 Am. Dec.
747 (1819) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 21 (1958) ; SEAVEY, AGENCY 27
(1964) ; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 13 (3d ed. 1959).
58 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *466, n. 27.

59 Cornelius, McIntire, and Talbot cases cited note 57 supra, all of which so hold. Also,
see the secondary authorities cited in that note, none of which make a distinction between agencies to convey and those for other purposes.
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effective only to the extent they would be if the minor had been
acting as to his own property or affairs.6" We shall find that, generally speaking, his own conveyances and contracts are voidable but
not void. A minority of courts has gone so far as to hold that infants'
acts as trustees are binding.6
Apparently the reason the agency rule is not applied to trusts
is that while a trustee has powers similar to those of an agent, he
also has legal title to the trust corpus. Because of this latter fact,
a power of appointment is closer in nature to an agency than to a
trusteeship, indicating that the agency rule of conveyances should
have more application to powers than should the trust rule.
C. Transfers of Property
By the decided weight of authority both in the United States
and since medieval times in England, minors' conveyances of land
are voidable but not void.6" At their election infants may avoid conveyances before63 or after64 reaching majority; in the latter case,
some jurisdictions hold the election must be made within a "reasonable" time,65 and some hold it may be made any time before the
running of the statute of limitations on real property actions.66 As
for transfers of personal property, they also are voidable, not void.67
As previously discussed, in restricting minors' exercises of powers,
courts are engrafting onto the pure theory of powers, concepts of
60

Fibikowski v. Fibikowski, 185 Okla. 520, 94 P.2d 921 (1939) (oral trust to hold land
for another); Hooton v. Neeld, 12 N.J. 396, 97 A.2d 153 (1953) (minors could
hold stocks in trust, but transfer avoidable) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 91
(1959); BOGERT, TRUSTS 65 (4th ed. 1963); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS 701-03 (2d ed.
1956).
61E.g., Hughes v. Hughes, 221 S.W. 970 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920). Cf., Clary v.
Spain, 119 Va. 58, 89 S.E. 130 (1916) (court of equity may appoint commissioner
to issue binding deed when minor trustee has previously conveyed land held in trust).
62
Shepherd v. Shepherd, 408 Ill.
364, 97 N.E.2d 273 (1951) ; Klapka v. Shrauger, 135
Neb. 354, 281 N.W. 612 (1938) (argument supporting result but not holding);
New v. H. E. Harman Coal Corp., 181 Va. 627, 26 S.E.2d 39 (1943); 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *465-66; COKE, FIRST INSTITUTES * 51b (statement attributed
to Littleton); 6 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY 26-27 (1962 repl. vol.) ; 5 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY 197 (3d ed. 1939); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 21 (3d ed. 1959).
But see Weinlein v. Bedford, 138 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio C.P. 1955), which says a
minor's deed was a "nullity"; however, the parties had taken the question out of
issue by conceding the deed was void.
63
Smith v. Wade, 169 Neb. 710, 100 N.W.2d 770 (1960).
64
Coleman v. Coleman, 51 Ohio App. 221, 200 N.E. 197 (1935) ; COKE, op. cit. supra
note 62, at *171b; 6 THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 62, at 26-27.
65
E.g., Shepherd v. Shepherd, 408 Ill. 364, 97 N.E.2d 273 (1951) ; Sprecher v. Sprecher,
206 Md. 108, 110 A.2d 509 (1955).
66
E.g., Gibson v. Hall, 260 Ala. 539, 71 So.2d 532 (1954); Elkhorn Coal Corp. v.
Tackett, 261 Ky. 795, 88 S.W.2d 943 (1935) (court said time of 10-year statute of
limitations was "reasonable" time) ; Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 185, 181 Atl. 689
(1935) ;New v. H. E. Harman Coal Corp., 181 Va. 627, 26 S.E.2d 39 (1943).
67
Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Hurley, 202 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1953) (stock transfer);
Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 168 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1948) (stock transfer)
COKE, op. cit. supra note 62, at *171b; 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 62, at 21
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disabilities derived from conveyancing law.68 One would assume
then, that when the exercise is restricted, it will, like a conveyance, be held merely voidable. That it has been held void suggests
an illogical internal inconsistency in the restrictions themselves. And,
as a matter of policy, it is hard to see why, when an infant's exercise
of a power does cut off some interest of his, the exercise should be
void, whereas if he chose to cut off the same interest by conveyance,
the act would simply be voidable.
D. Infants' Contractual Acts
Consistent with his capacity to transfer property, a minor's
contractual undertakings are generally valid but voidable at his
election.69 In the case of obligations arising out of his obtaining
necessaries, the minor's agreement is binding, though he may avoid
paying any sum beyond the reasonable value of necessaries." The
exception for necessaries is consistent with the principle underlying
infants' disabilities that the infant should be protected by the law.
If his contract for necessaries were voidable, tradesmen would hesitate to supply him, and his shield would become a burden to bear.
Some cases have held that a minor's attempt to appoint an agent
is void.7' These, however, appear to represent an older line of
authority, and the law now seems to regard the appointment as
merely voidable and the agent's acts valid to the extent they would
have been if performed by the infant."
To be sure, the rules regarding minors' contractual capacity,
like those having to do with trusts, are not as closely related to their
exercise of powers as are the capacities for being agents and making
conveyances. However, our examination of the principles governing
all these areas demonstrates that they follow a consistent, harmonious pattern. Yet, when we come to powers of appointment, we find
the courts restricting infants in a manner not within this pattern.
E. Underlying Policy
Blackstone captured the law's purpose when he wrote: "Infants
have various privileges, and various disabilities; but their very dis68 See notes 40-43 supra and the textual discussion referring to them.
69 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *465-66; 1 COKE, FIRST INSTITUTES *171b; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 13-14 (1963); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 2 (3d ed. 1959).
701 BLACKSTONE, Op. cit. supra note 69, at *465-66; 1 COKE, Op. Cit. Supra note 69,

at *172a; 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 69, at 49-52. Williston says, at 14-17,
that the following agreements are, on public policy grounds, also binding: marriage
(but not an agreement to marry), enlistment in the armed forces, an agreement to
support a bastard child, and the obligation on a bail bond.
71 Rocks v. Cornell, 21 R.I. 532, 45 Atl. 552 (1900); SEAVEY, AGENCY 27 (1964)

; 2
WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra note 69, at 9-12.
72 Coursolle v. Weyerhauser, 69 Minn. 328, 72 N.W. 697 (1897) ; SEAVEY, op. Cit.
supra note 71, at 27; 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 71, at 9-12.
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abilities are privileges; in order to secure them from hurting themselves by their own improvident acts.'"'" This is the principle that
explains why an infant may, as agent, bind his adult principal, but
at the same time could make only a voidable contract or conveyance
for himself. We seek to protect the infant himself, not adults; they
can look out for themselves. Perhaps this also explains why his
conveyances have come to be voidable instead of void.
The original English cases on infants' powers of appointment
went back to this principle. Grange v. Tiving, where the infant had a
power to revoke another's fee, said the end to be served was "not in
respect of the person whose estate is to be revoked, but of the
prejudice to the person revoking .... ." Hearle v. Greenbank struck
down a power but indicated the power would have stood if the
infant's own interest were not prejudiced. 5 It is true that that case
and subsequent ones, when they have restricted infants' powers, have
held the exercise void. A case can be made that Hearle did so without any consideration of the extent of the protective limitations
normally placed on infants." Whatever the reason, that case and
others like it are subject to the criticism that, while they attempt
to serve the policy of protecting the infant from his own folly, they
have acted beyond the scope of the policy. The infant is most fully
protected when his acts are merely voidable; that way he can enjoy
the benefits of any good bargains he makes.
CONCLUSIONS

In pure theory, a power of appointment is no interest in
property, and upon exercise, the appointed interest passes from the
donor, not the donee. If we followed these concepts faithfully,
infants would be untrammeled in exercising any kind of a power.
However, the courts have, to the limited extent there is case law on
the subject, generally, restricted infants by not allowing them to
exercise appendant powers, i.e., powers, the exercise of which would
cut off interests they have in the property. Some American authorities
would go further and in effect allow infants to exercise no powers
by not permitting them to exercise a power unless they could make
a binding transfer of the same kind of property.
To the extent they have restricted infants' exercise of powers,
the courts have done so by superimposing rules of conveyancing law.
These rules in turn spring from a policy of protecting infants from
the consequences of their own folly. The conveyancing rule is that
73 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*464.

740. Bridgman 107, 118, 124 Eng. Rep. 494 (C.P. 1665).
75 3 Atk. 695, 710, 26 Eng. Rep. 1200, 1207 (Cb. 1749).
76

Ibid.
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infants' conveyances are voidable at their election but not void; this
protects them to the fullest by allowing them to avoid bad bargains
but affirm good ones. However, in holding the exercise of some
powers to be utterly void, the courts have gone beyond the conveyancing law, which seems like an illogical and unnecessary position.
Further, the American authorities referred to in the last paragraph
would not only go beyond the conveyancing rule but would also
violate the underlying policy of protecting the infant, by prohibiting
his exercising powers even when he had no owned interest at stake
in the appointed property.
We need to return to basic principles and start afresh. One way
would be simply to reason that a power is like an agency; an infant
has full capacity to act as an agent; therefore, he could exercise
all powers. But this is unrealistic in certain situations where, by
virtue of the peculiar nature of powers, an infant's exercise would
appoint away an interest he owned in the property. This is the nub
of it: we want to protect him, not because he is exercising a power,
but because he is cutting off his interest. So, it seems desirable to
infuse some of the protective policy of conveyancing law. In doing
so, we should balance three factors: there should be as little disruption as possible of normal powers concepts, we should protect the
infant only where he has the capacity to prejudice his own interests,
and the protective rule should make his act voidable only.
The following formulation, deceptively simple, is suggested as
achieving these ends: an infant may exercise all powers of appointment, but to the extent an exercise prejudices an interest he or his
heirs have in the appointed property, such exercise is voidable at
his election. Indeed, this seems to have been the meaning of Grange
v. Tiving 300 years ago.

GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION
LOAN POLICY UNDER THE
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ACT
By ROBERT T.

CONNERY*

Mr. Connery's topic is the controversial policy used by the
Rural Electrification Administration in making loans under the
Rural ElectrificationAct. The discussion presents the historicalproblems giving rise to the act and the solutions contained therein. The
author then traces the transformation of formerly rural areas into
urban areas which brought the rural cooperatives into direct conflict
with investor-owned utilities. This change resulted in a loan policy
designed to protect areas the cooperatives were already serving from
intrusion by the utilities. The utilities challenge the validity of this
policy as being outside the purpose of the act. The dilemma is
exemplified by examination of two jurisdictions wherein the state
courts reach conflicting results in situations where the utility was
competing with the cooperative for the same territory.
INTRODUCTION

F EW Americans are not familiar with the continuing feud between
the investor-owned electric power companies and the rural electric cooperatives. Full-page ads in almost every major publication in
the country solicit the public's support for either the power companies or the cooperatives. Headlines above the picture of a rural
couple in an investor-owned companies' ad read, "These People
Don't Want To Be Used By The REA Or Anyone Else."' The text
of the ad queries "whether there is a planned attempt to use rural
electric cooperatives for developing a nationwide Government power
system,"' which would destroy the power companies. Another couple
appear in a cooperative ad which declares "These people don't want
to be 'taken' by the power company - or any other monopoly.' " A
cooperative spokesman testifying at a Congressional hearing says
that "these companies have been conducting a well-planned and carefully coordinated program to destroy the electric cooperatives in
Louisiana .... [Their] goal is the ultimate destruction of any and
all competition .... .Concerning
the nation's power companies,
*B.A., magna cum laude, Yale University, 1962; LL.B., Harvard University, 1966.
1 Hearings on Agricultural Appropriations for 1965 before the Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 419 (1964) (hereinafter cited as 1965 Senate Hearingson Agricultural Appropriations).
2 Ibid.
3 National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, RURAL ELECTRIC FACT BOOK, p. 72
(Wise ed. 1965).
4 Statement of Theo. Cangelosi on behalf of the Association of Louisiana Electric Cooperatives, 1965 Senate Hearings on Agricultural Appropriations, supra note 1, at
386-87.
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the head of the cooperatives' national lobby has said: "Their object
is to take over the government. They are public enemy No. 1 - more
dangerous than Communists because Communists are no longer a
threat, but dictatorship is a threat.' The mutual paranoia apparent
in these pronouncements pervades and distorts the debate between
the power companies and the cooperatives over the main issues which
divide them, namely, (1) the policy followed by the federal Rural
Electrification Administration (REA) in making loans at a subsidized
interest rate and (2) whether or not the cooperatives should be subjected to state regulation in states where they are presently exempt.
I.

HISTORY

A. Background
As early as 1915 engineers had discovered how to transmit electricity over distances of up to one hundred miles and most of the nation's farmers, even then, lived within one hundred miles of central
station electric generators.6 Yet twenty years later, at a time when
ninety per cent of the farms in Germany, France, and Japan were
electrified,7 only eleven per cent of America's farms were receiving
central station electric service.8 The cost of distributing electricity
to areas with only a few consumers per mile was prohibitive for commercial power companies. Farmers consumed very little electricity
and simply could not afford rates adequate to attract the capital necessary for the construction of lines to their farms. In addition, the
farmer was among the first and hardest hit by the Great Depression.
The prospects that the "over-producing" farmer of the Twenties and
Thirties would be able to afford the equipment which would make
him a consumer of electricity and able to pay electric rates which
would provide an after-tax rate of return sufficient to attract capital
were dim indeed. No more than fifty per cent of the few non-profit
rural electric cooperatives which had been formed were able to succeed.' As a business proposition rural electrification was a bad risk,
if not an impossibility.
But while costs and good business judgment weighed against
rural electrification, many benefits such as lighting, plumbing, and
communication were to be derived from it. These and countless other
5 Quoted from an October, 1963, Portland Oregonian by Kay, There's No Stopping
REA - Or Is There?, Fortune, Feb., 1963, p. 170.
6 Rural Electrification Administration, Rural Lines • USA, The Story of Cooperative
Rural Electrification, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Misc. Publication No. 811, p. 3
(Rev. ed. 1966).
780 CONG. REc. 5279-80 (1936).
8 Rural Lines • USA, supra note 6, at 3.
9 Rural Electrification Administration, Rural Lines • USA, The Story of the Rural
Electrification Administration's First Twenty-Five Years * 1935-1960, U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture, Misc. Publication No. 811, p. 9 (1960).
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benefits provided the social and economic justification for rural electrification. But even after political support for the idea had been
mustered, the question of how to accomplish the task remained.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt answered this question by creating the Rural Electrification Administration by executive order and
giving its administrator one hundred million dollars to "initiate, formulate, administer, and supervise a program of approved projects
with respect to the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric energy in rural areas .
'10 An electric utilities industry committee proposed spending the one hundred million dollars, plus a
13,685,000 dollar utilities industry contribution, on line construction
and further recommended that other federal agencies provide 124
million dollars in credit to rural people for wiring and electric appliances. 1 The offer was rejected and the one hundred million dollars
was thrown open "for loans for rural line construction from public
and private agencies."12 Other disputes between the power companies and the federal government, notably TVA, were simmering
and before long cooperation with the power companies completely
terminated.
B. The Rural ElectrificationAct of 1936
The statutory tool for performing the task of rural electrification was provided by the Rural Electrification Act of 1936.13 Administrative method and purpose were well-defined. Under Section 4 of
the act, which remains essentially unchanged, the Administrator was
authorized
to make loans to persons, corporations, States, Territories and subdivisions and agencies thereof, municipalities, peoples' utility districts and cooperative, non-profit, or limited-dividend associations
...for the purpose of financing the construction and operation of
generating plants, electric transmission and distribution lines or systems for the furnishing of electric energy to persons in rural areas
who are not receiving central station service."1
"Rural areas" were those "not included within the boundaries of any
city, village, or borough having a population in excess of fifteen
hundred inhabitants."' 5 Loan funds were also made available to assist persons in rural areas in obtaining and installing electrical equipment and appliances."6 The act thus encompassed financing the gen10

Person, The Rural Electrification Administration In Perspective, reprinted from 24
AGRICULTURAL HISTORY 70 (1950).

'Id.

at 4-5.

' 2 1d. at 5.
1349 Stat. 1363 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1964).
14 49 Stat. 1365 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 904 (1964). The words "for rural
electrification" were added after "to make loans" in 63 Stat. 948 '(1949).
1549 Stat. 1367 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 913 (1964).
1649 Stat. 1365 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
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eration, transmission, distribution, and consumption of electricity by
persons in rural areas not receiving central station power. The loans
were to be made at the same interest rate which the government paid
for long-term securities and for periods of up to twenty-five years."
A preference was given to cooperatives and other eligible borrowers
over persons and corporations. 8
During the floor debate in both the House and Senate, apprehension was expressed that the funds might be used to sponsor competition with power companies for customers already receiving central
station power or used in other ways to displace the existing electric
utility industry. But in the words of the bill's House sponsor, Representative Rayburn, "we are not... intending to go out and compete
with anybody. By this bill we hope to bring electrification to people
who do not now have it.''19 Senator Norris, the Senate sponsor,
agreed with Senator McNary's interpretation that the act did not
provide funds to build a duplicate plant in an area being adequately
served.2 The REA's Administrator stated that generation and transmission (G&T) loans would be made only if it were
shown conclusively: (1) that energy is not available from any existing source; (2) that the proposed generating plant can produce energy at a lower cost than it could be obtained from any other source;
(3) that the output of such plant will be used mainly for supplying
21
energy for use in rural areas.

The economic problem in 1936 was distribution, not generation
or transmission. As the Administrator told the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Coimnerce, "In 99 instances out of 100 they
[the cooperatives] are going to buy current from existing plants. "22
C. The Cooperatives
While the Rural Electrification Act provided clear loan authority
for financing all phases of electrification for those in rural areas not
receiving central station power, a viable business organization had to
be found to accomplish the job and repay the loans and interest. As
has been noted, relations between the electric utility industry and the
government had broken down.2 ' The REA decided that the best device for rural electrification would be the non-profit cooperative asStat. 1365 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 904 (1964).
18 Ibid.
1749

19 80 CONG. REC. 5283 (1936).
'080 CONG. REC. 2751 (1936).
2180 CONG. REc. 2823 (1936).
2

Garwood and Tuthill, The Rural Electrification Administration, An Evaluation,

23 See text following note 11 supra. The power companies did continue to extend serv-

ice to rural areas. Today they serve 43 percent of the nation's farms, 1965 Senate
Hearings on Agricultural Appropriations,supra note 1, at 263.
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sociation. A Model Electric Cooperative Corporation Act was drafted
giving the cooperatives power to organize and build and exempting
them from state public utility commission jurisdiction.24 The model
act had been passed by twenty-three states in 1940.25
Demand for electricity on the farm was high, but the legal,
technical, and management know-how required to make a successful
system was usually lacking. In an attempt to meet this problem the
REA, with enthusiastic farmer support, helped organize, design systems, and train personnel for the fledgling cooperatives. Nevertheless, progress was frustratingly slow. As soon as the program began
to operate, World War II intervened. REA appropriations were reduced during this period" while farm energy was devoted to furthering the war effort.
With the end of the war in sight, Congress turned a sympathetic
ear to the REA. In 1944 it amended the Rural Electrification Act to
provide a fixed statutory interest rate of two per cent.2" The difference between two per cent and the cost of money to the U.S. Treasury,
in 1966 four to four and one-half per cent,28 was to provide a small
but important subsidy. Further, the repayment period was extended
from twenty-five to thirty-five years.2" Although the original act envisioned the completion of rural electrification in ten years, the new
amendments gave the REA an unlimited period of time to finish the
job." REA appropriations jumped to 500 million dollars in 1950, as
the program moved into high gear. 1
With only a few setbacks during the Korean War years, the
program has remained in high gear, its 1964 authorization being 425
million dollars.12 By 1965, ninety-eight and two tenths per cent of the
nation's farms had central station electricity. 3 The gain in farms
electrified each year since 1961 has been only a few tenths of a per
24

Rural Lines * USA (1960), supra note 9, at 10.

25 Ibid.
26 Person, The Rural ElectrificationAdministration In Perspective, supra note 10, at 10.
27 58 Stat. 739, 740 (1944), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 904 (1964).
28 U.S. TREAs. BULL. (Dec., 1965-March, 1966), average yield on long-term treasury
bonds. Ann. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury at 585 (July 1, 1963-June 30,
1964).
29 58 Stat. 739 (1944), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 904 (1964).
30 ibid.
21 National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, Rural Electric Financing Study Re4
port, p. 5 (1965).
32 Kuhn, Loeb & Co., A Survey of Methods for Financing Rural Electric Cooperatives
In the Capital Market, published in Rural Electric Financing Study Report, 133, at
140 (July, 1965) [hereinafter cited as Kuhn, Loeb Report).
33 1965 Report of the Administrator of the Rural Electrification Administration, Table
4 (mimeograph edition).
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cent.34 Five out of every six new customers added by REA borrowers
have been non-farm rural customers."
D. The NRECA
In 1942 the cooperatives formed a national "service organization," a lobby, the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
(NRECA) to preserve the program and organize the political support necessary for its success. By tightly integrating local, state, and
regional electric cooperative organizations, the NRECA gave the cooperatives unity and developed their policies and purpose. The Administrator, of necessity, works with and through the NTRECA. Far
more than the REA itself, the NRECA has been responsible for the
dynamism and expansion of electric cooperative activitiy into new
areas, such as industrial recruiting for rural areas and competition
for new urban areas. REA loans have been employed in this expanded activity and these uses are the objects of bitter attack from
concerns affected by the competition of the cooperatives.
II.

THE UNFORESEEN CONFLICT

By 1965 the task of extending central station electric power to
those in rural areas not receiving it was essentially complete. Less
than one-half of current REA loans to cooperatives, totalling 300 to
350 million dollars a year, go for that purpose.36 Most of the present
loans are for construction of cooperative G&T facilities and are made
under a policy promulgated in 1961 by the current Administrator,
Norman M. Clapp. This new policy requires only that the loan be
"necessary to protect the security and effectiveness of REA-financed
systems. ' 37 The statutory validity and economic wisdom of this administrative policy is being challenged by the power companies.
At the heart of the problem is the lucrative new market for electricity being created by the growth of cities. Each year hundreds of
square miles of formerly rural areas are annexed by existing municipalities or incorporated into separate new cities. Under a literal reading of the statute these areas, no longer being rural, are ineligible
for REA loans. It can be said with some assurance that the purpose
of the Rural Electrification Act was not to make loans at a subsidized interest rate for extending electricity to burgeoning, prosperous
suburbs which power companies will serve as quickly as they are built.
In many areas, however, the suburbs are sprawling into sparsely
settled rural areas where the cooperatives have built lines to serve,
34 1961-1965 Reports of the Administrator of the REA, Table 4.
35Kuhn, Loeb Report, supra note 32, at 147.

36 1961-1965 Reports of the Administrator of the REA, Table 2.
37 REA Bulletin 20-6, May 31, 1961, published in 1965 Senate Hearingson Agricultural
Appropriations,supra note 1, at 145.
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typically, three to four consumers per mile. 8 Having extended service to the few in the area when it was rural and unprofitable for the
power companies to do so, the cooperatives claim that the area is
their "territory," not by virtue of any governmental franchise or
public utility commission certificate of public convenience and necessity to serve a defined area, but solely by reason of original service to
what was once a rural area. The right to maintain their "territorial
integrity" against the incursions of the power companies and thus to
serve the expanding urban market has become the primary policy objective of the cooperatives, the NRECA, and the REA." Some cooperatives regard any extension of power company service into these
ill-defined territories as clear evidence of an intent to destroy the cooperatives" and claim that if they are not allowed to serve the prof itable new loads in their territories, they will eventually perish. The
new criterion for G&T loans, "protecting the security and effectiveness of REA-financed systems," is aimed specifically at protecting the
"territorial integrity" of the cooperatives.
On the other hand, the power companies, being almost universally under state regulation and usually having a franchise from the
city which has recently annexed the cooperative's "territory" or a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the state regulatory
body to service the area, regard the area as theirs. Indeed, in most
states the state regulatory commission has statutory power to compel
the companies to extend service on request so long as the extended
service will produce a fair return on the investment required to make
the extension.41 Despite the cooperative's non-profit form of operation, exemption from federal and usually state and local taxes, subsidized capital, preference in purchasing power provided by federal
installations, and absorption of many administrative costs by the
REA, electric power distribution in rural areas still costs more than
it does in urban areas. Rates charged reflect this cost difference on the average, consumers on REA-financed systems pay nineteen
per cent more for their electricity than do consumers in adjacent
towns and cities.' Power company service is thus often preferred by
consumers on the expanding edge of the city and even existing cooperative customers sometimes succumb to the cheaper rates and request or even compel company service.
38 1965 Report, supra note 33.
39 Each report of the REA Administrator for the past few years contains a section de-

voted to progress in "territorial integrity," and REA Bulletin 3-3, Feb. 12, 1962,
published in the 1965 Senate Hearings on AgriculturalAppropriations, supra note 1,
at 141, makes it official policy. See also, RURAL ELECTRIC FACT BOOK, supra note
3, at 114.
40 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
41 See e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45:122 (1950).
411965

Report of the Administrator, supra note 33, at 1.
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The REA has declared that "parity of rural service with city
service" is an important element of its broad objective of "social and
economic parity of country with city."4 One way of achieving parity
in cost of service, and the one which the cooperatives and the REA
seem to be pursuing under the policy of "territorial integrity," is to
draw territorial lines around historically rural areas, include the city
as it grows into the territory, and equalize rates between the city and
the rural sectors of the territory." Under the public utility laws of
most states, however, extracting a higher profit or "margin" above
fully-allocated cost from one group of customers in order to defray
the cost of service to another group of the same class of customers
may constitute an illegal discrimination.45 If a non-profit cooperative
were to charge the same rate to its rural and city residential customers
when the cost of serving its city customers was twenty per cent less
than the cost of serving its rural customers, an illegal discrimination
might well be found. But in twenty-one of the forty-six states in
which they operate, the cooperatives are not subject to state public
utility commission regulation and in four other states are not subject
to rate regulation. 6 Thus, in most of the states in which cooperatives
operate they are not prevented by state commissions from discriminating between customers in the same category of service. In those states,
if the cooperatives can exclude power company service from their
territories, legally they should be able to establish parity of rates between rural and adjacent urban areas within cooperative territory.
Under the cooperatives' and the REA's policy of "territorial integrity," the consumers in newly urbanized rural areas which are less
expensive to serve might have to bear the cost of achieving parity between rural and urban consumers. The act contains no language to
indicate that rural customers were not to pay the full cost of their
electricity. Loans under the act are and have been available to power
companies and there is no requirement that their rates reflect anything less than fully-allocated cost. Since a power company serving
a city might obtain a loan from the REA to serve the adjacent countryside and might be required under state law to reflect the greater
cost of rural distribution in its electric rates to rural consumers, it
would seem that some disparity between rural and city rates was
clearly contemplated by the act. Thus, achieving "parity" in electric
431d. at 1-2.
44Any increment over marginal cost from urban fringe consumers would, of course,

help reduce the rates of the cooperative's other members. But for equalization to take
place it seems that urban fringe consumers would have to pay well above their share
of fully-allocated cost.
45 Hale and Hale, Competition or Control V: Production and Distribution of Electric
Energy, 110 U. PA. L. KEV. 57, 70 (1961) (citing cases).
46U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, STATE COMMISSION JURSDICTION, RURAL ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVES

(1964).
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rates through "territorial integrity" does not seem within the purpose
of the REA's enabling act.
III.

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY: AN ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE?

The cooperatives, the NRECA, and the REA do not regard the
fight for "territorial integrity" as determining only whether rural
electric rates in the future will be on a par with urban rates. They
view it as their Armageddon - a final fight for survival against the
power companies - and claim that the cooperatives will fail if their
territories are not secured. Keeping the cooperatives, which furnish
electricity to fifty-four per cent of the nation's farms, afloat and capable of serving rural areas which would not otherwise receive central
station power would clearly seem to be a corollary of the Administrator's power under the act to make loans establishing them. The validity of the exercise of this correlative power hinges on whether or
not the cooperatives face an economic crisis without such maintenance.
Cooperatives are thriving in both states which do, as well as in
those which do not, provide them with territorial protection. Each
year the number of consumers per mile is larger 7 and the amount of
electricity used by each consumer increases.48 As a result, the revenue
per mile of line has grown."' The cost of wholesale power has also
decreased."0 Out of 1,104 electric borrowers, about 1000 of which
are cooperatives, only five are delinquent in repayment." Far from
being driven out of the market, cooperatives have been steadily increasing their share of the nation's total energy sales.5 2 Their growth
rate in kilowatt hour (KWH) sales and in revenues has been greater
than that of the investor-owned utilities in recent years.5 3
The cooperatives began with almost no equity. Aside from a
nominal membership fee from each consumer, almost all the cooperatives' capital was debt. As of December, 1964, however, 976 REA
borrowers had amassed a net worth, largely in the form of general
funds, of over one billion dollars. 4 The typical cooperative's net
55
worth was twenty-seven and nine tenths per cent of its total assets
of which only a small fraction comes from membership fees. The
great bulk of net worth has come from "net margins," revenues above
annual operating costs and debt retirement, which are credited to the
47 1965 Report, supra note 33, at 21.
48
4

Id., Table 6.

50

Id. at 7.

9Id. at 22.

51 Id., Table 8.
52 Kuhn, Loeb Report, supra note 32, at 148.
5

3 Id. at 149.
54 1965 Report, supra note 33, Table 10.
55
Id. at 4.
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members' patronage capital account." Thus out of the equivalent of
retained earnings the cooperatives have built, on the average, the
equivalent of an equity of twenty-seven and nine tenths per cent of
total assets. " This commercial success of the rural market appears
inconsistent with the cooperatives' demand that integration of the
urban and rural market is necessary for their survival .
Survival, indeed, is not the real issue. The real question seems
to be whether the capital which the cooperatives have accumulated
along with that which Congress is willing to provide will be sufficient to supply the projected capital growth which the cooperatives
believe necessary to serve their territories." The capital requirements
of the electric utility industry are growing at an accelerated pace; consumption has been doubling approximately every ten years6" causing
a costly "heavying up" of lines, transformers, and all other utility
components. The NRECA estimates that the capital requirements of
the rural electrification program will reach 675 million dollars a year
by 198061 and that Congress will be unwilling to supply more than
the current 300 to 350 million dollars per year at the low two per
cent interest rate.6" The net worth of the cooperatives has grown by
about ninety million dollars a year over the last five years;63 some of
that total might be used to meet capital requirements. Despite this
fact, some 235 to 325 million dollars annually will have to be borrowed in the private capital market by 1980 if the NRECA's estimates are correct. These estimates seem to be based on the assumption that the cooperatives have a right to and will be serving the urban market, with its much heavier capital needs, which spreads into
the territories they claim.
Although at present the cooperatives are able to meet their operating costs, interest, and principal payments and also accumulate
substantial amounts of capital, it must be kept in mind that their cost
of capital is two per cent. It is doubtful that they would be able to
56 Ibid.
57 There has been some criticism of the cooperatives for investing their retained "net
margins" in government bonds, savings and loan associations, and other forms of
investment which bear 4 to 41/2% interest, while borrowing money from the REA
for expansion at 2% interest.
58
Views of Clyde T. Ellis, General Manager of the NRECA, 38 CONG. DIG. 123 (1959).
59 It should be noted that the question of whether or not the need for supplemental
capital would disappear if the cooperatives continued to restrict themselves to rural
areas only, has not been examined.
60 1965 Report, supra note 33, Table 8.
61 Rural Electric Financing Study Report, supra note 31, at 44.
62 Letter from Charles A. Robinson, Jr., Staff Engineer and Staff Counsel, NRECA, to
the authnr Feb 28, 196'; "The Congress appears willing to make available only
approximately $300 to $350 million per year of two per cent, 35-year loan authorizations. Beyond that, it appears that supplemental financing will be required."
631965 Report, supra note 33, Table 10.
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attract capital in the open market without paying at least four to five
per cent interest. With two per cent capital, the interest coverage
- revenue available for payment of interest after payment of all operating charges - of the composite group of cooperatives was 2.97
times the interest payment required or 2.97x.6" At a four per cent interest rate the cooperatives' interest coverage would be 1.48x; at five
per cent, 1.18x. 6' The only source which could provide funds in the
required quantity would be the institutional investors, such as mutual
funds, trusts, or insurance companies. They generally require a mini7
6
66
mum interest coverage of 2.Ox, often due to state investment laws.

In addition, the issuer of bonds must generally be subject to the jurisdiction of a state or federal regulatory agency if it is to be treated as
a public utility for the purpose of financing.68 At present the cooperatives are subject to state commission jurisdiction to the same extent
as the investor-owned utilities in only fifteen states."" In other states
the cooperatives would have to qualify their bonds as general corporate obligations. Investors would probably also require that the
REA's first mortgage with its "after acquired" property clause be
subordinated and that members of the cooperative not withdraw their
patronage capital before the loan is repaid. Further, according to a
recent investment study, the fact that investor-owned utilities might
serve rural areas that become increasingly urbanized is a risk to the
investor." The lack of a clearly defined service area is a distinct limitation to private financing of the cooperatives. 1 Territorial protection and state regulatory jurisdiction are apparently necessary for the
cooperatives to acquire private financing.
Thus it seems clear that at the present time the cooperatives are
not prosperous enough to secure their future capital requirement
through private financing." In fact, to attract private financing, their
areas will have to become nearly as dense and lucrative as the areas
investor-owned utilities serve if, as is often asserted,73 utility commissions set rates just high enough to attract investment. Since cooperaKuhn, Loeb Report, supra note 32, at 166.
ld. at 167.
6
Id. at 153.
7
6 1d. at 158-59.
68 Id. at 159.
69
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, op. cit. supra note 46, at 2.
70
Kuhn, Loeb Report, supra note 32, at 161.
64
65

71

Ibid.

72 The NRECA has several alternative plans under study for securing private financing

for the cooperatives as a group, the most promising of which is the creation of a
federal bank which, with initial federal capital, could borrow in the private capital
market. The NRECA supports the federal bank idea. Part of the plan is for the cooperatives to buy the federal government's initial capital eventually and operate independently thereafter.
73 Hale and Hale, supra note 45, at 69-70.
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tives pay no federal income tax and are exempt from many state and
local taxes, they could more easily afford to pay the going rate to attract investment at a lower level of revenue than could the power
companies.
One objective of the policy of "territorial integrity" appears to
be assisting cooperatives in acquiring private financing, thus eventually establishing them as independent utilities which can obtain their
capital requirements in the private market and prosper without government assistance. Since one purpose of the Rural Electrification
Act seems to be permanent provision of central station service to those
in rural areas, territorial integrity, which contemplates that end, may
fall within that purpose.
By the foregoing rather tortuous justification, the objective of
"territorial integrity" can be fit within the statute's possible purposes.
But the definitive powers of the Administrator under the act almost
belie a construction that they could be used to protect "territorial integrity." His power to finance G&T facilities through loans cannot,
of itself, protect a cooperative's territory. If the cost of electricity
produced by a new generating and transmitting system is greater than
the cost of purchasing from the power companies at wholesale, the
result of the G&T loan may be to weaken the cooperative's competitive and financial position. Cooperatives presently buy much of their
power from the same power companies which might spread into their
territories. The loss of a co-op's wholesale power business would
cause great loss to the power companies by idling generating and
transmitting capacity built to supply cooperative distribution systems.
Cooperatives can threaten power companies with that loss only if an
alternative source of power is available. The REA makes that alternative source available through its G&T loans. In a recent case74 the
cooperatives - with the Administrator's support - insisted that a
territorial protection clause be inserted in their wholesale power contracts, threatening to build their own G&T facilities if the power companies would not comply, even though the cost of supplying their own
electricity would be greater than buying it from the power companies.
Thus under the new criterion, which grants G&T loans to protect the
security and effectiveness of REA-financed systems, the cooperatives
and the REA are seeking the power to displace an existing facility
adequately serving an area - a power which congressional sponsors
agreed was not contained in the Rural Electrification Act - in order
to protect "territorial integrity."
Practical considerations cast further doubts upon the advantages
74 Rural Electrification Administration v. Central La. Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859 (5th
Cir. 1966). See textual discussion at note 104 infra.
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of exercising the G&T loan power to preserve existing territories. In
the example posed in the last paragraph, higher rates may result to
customers of the cooperatives and the power company, which may be
allowed to write off its losses and charge them to its customers. Further, the G&T loan may fail to protect the co-op's territory; for
while a power company may be deterred by the threat of losing
wholesale power sales before the loan is made, once it is made, competition should be stimulated. In addition, the cooperative formed
to receive the protective G&T loan, usually an association of distribution cooperatives, is generally weaker financially than the distribution
cooperatives. Its probable interest coverage at two per cent interest
is 1.86x7" and it requires far more capital. Creation of weaker G&T
cooperatives requiring more capital seems to defeat the Administrator's avowed objective in protecting the cooperatives' territories by
prolonging the period of REA support necessary to enable the cooperatives to acquire their independence. In view of the dubious effectiveness and possibly paradoxical results, the wisdom of making
G&T loans to protect "territorial integrity" seems as doubtful as the
statutory authority to make loans for such a purpose.
IV.

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS

A more forceful argument against the legitimacy of the Administrator's use of G&T loans to force power companies to agree
to territorial protection clauses is that such agreements are illegal
under the antitrust laws. In Montana-Dakota Utilities v. Williams
Elec. Cooperative," a cooperative and a power company had entered
into a contract containing a territorial agreement delineating the
area to be served by each party. The contract was meant to resolve a
dispute over which party had the right to serve consumers on a city's
expanding edge.7 The Court of Appeals held that the territorial
agreement was "absolutely void, untempered by any application of
the 'rule of reason.' "" The decision was based on the principle that
"parties engaging in performing a duty or rendering a service which
is public in nature . . . cannot disable themselves by contract from
performing the public duties which they have undertaken. ' 7 If the
Public Service Commission had approved the contract, the agreement
75

Kuhn, Loeb Report, supra note 32, at 153.

76 263 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1959).
77 Under North Dakota's Public Service Commission's regulations the company could

have been compelled to extend service if the extension would produce a 6% return
which the cooperative conceded it would. See also text at note 41 supra.
Montana-Dakota Utils. v. Williams Elec. Coop., 263 F.2d 431, 434 (8th Cir. 1959).
79
1d. at 435. (Court quoting from Gibbs v. Baltimore Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396 (1889)).
78
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would probably have been saved from the Sherman Act violation."
More recent cases are split on the issue of the legality of territorial divisions between electric utilities under the antitrust laws.
Due to extensive state and federal regulations, many states grant
utilities broad exemptions from the antitrust laws. 1 But cooperatives
in many states are not subject to regulation.' Even in states where
cooperatives are not subject to regulation, contracts between power
companies and cooperatives defining service areas have been upheld
though not approved by the state regulatory commission.83 Perhaps
a better method of applying the antitrust laws would be to determine
whether the evils of a particular anti-competitive practice are prevented by direct or indirect state regulation, rather than refusing, as
the court in Williams Elec. Cooperative did, to examine the amount
or effect of the restraint.
A special problem is presented where a power company which
is fully subject to rate and other regulation enters into a territorial
division agreement with a cooperative which is exempt from regulation. The cooperative, being free from competition, then becomes an
unregulated monopoly, a result which might be repugnant to the antitrust laws. In response to such arguments the cooperatives have said
that they are self-regulating and therefore presumably need neither
competition nor regulation to ensure that their conduct will be in
the public interest. By self-regulation, the cooperatives mean that
the interests of their consumers are identical with those of the cooperative since it is consumer-owned and non-profit.
The rationale of self-regulation is not, however, persuasive in all
cases. It assumes that the consumers of the cooperative are the only
group meant to be protected by regulation. The issue before most
regulatory commissions in authorizing construction is what is in the
public interest - the interest of the general public and not of a particular class. Quite possibly an action a cooperative deems in its own
80 "There is an almost universal trend among public service commissions to approve

contracts for division of territory if the interest of the public is thereby served."
Note, Division-of-Territories Agreement Between Electric Power Company and
Power Cooperative Void as Restraint of Trade Regardless of Reasonableness, 36 U.
DET. L.J. 626, 630 (1959). See also cases collected in note 25 supra at 630; Annot.,
70 A.L.R.2d 1326, 1331 (1959). In particular see Ohio-Midland Light & Power Co.
v. Columbus & Southern Ohio Elec. Co., 123 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Ohio 1954), and
People's Gas Sys. Inc. v. City Gas Co., 167 So. 2d 577, 584 (Fla. App. 1964).
81 Hale and Hale, supra note 45, at 75-76 (cases collected). See e.g., Idaho Power &
Light Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho 222, 248-49, 141 Pac. 1083, 1091 (1914). Under
state regulation, the court said, "there is no longer any justification whatever for
competition or the duplication of utility plants under the pretense of preventing
monopoly."
823T.S. DEP'T oF AGRICULTIURE, op. cit. supra note 46. The cooperatives are exempt

from commission in 21 states, and subject to varying degrees of limited commission
in 11 states.
83 Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n v. Colo. Cent. Power Co., 135 Colo. 42, 307 P.2d
1101, 18 P.U.R.3d 41 (1957).

1966

RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ACT

best interest, such as building a G&T facility, would have an adverse
impact on its present wholesale supplier and the supplier's other consumers. The adverse consequences of its action on such a supplier
may outweigh the benefits to its own consumers. In such a situation
the interest of the public as a whole would be contrary to the cooperative's self-interest, an opposition which state regulation was
obviously designed to resolve. The cooperatives have maintained
their exemption from general regulation in thirty-three states84 on
grounds of self-regulation and presently are bitterly contesting the
assertion of Federal Power Commission jurisdiction over them on
the same ground."
But while consumer-ownership and non-profit operation may be
insufficient grounds for exemption from regulation, at least in the
case of a territorial division between a regulated power company and
an unregulated cooperative, they seem to remove most of the evils
which the antitrust laws were designed to forbid. No danger exists
that monoply profits will be exacted from cooperative customers since
any margins earned by the cooperative are either returned to members or credited to their patronage capital account, which usually can
only be distributed on a majority vote of consumer-members. Since
the state regulatory commission is responsible for allocation of resources in the rest of the state and the cooperative's consumer-owners
presumably act in their own self-interest, there would seem little
room for the evils of anti-competition. It seems possible, however,
that consumers on the fringe of an urban territory could be deprived
by a territorial agreement of the lower rates which competition with
the power company would provide. Being, perhaps, in a minority
within the cooperative such consumers could be subjected to a discriminatory rate and effectively deprived of their portion of margins
above cost by a rural majority. " The rural majority may, indeed, believe in using discriminatory rates to equalize the cost of electricity
between rural and urban areas, and the cooperative may need to use
its accumulated margins for capital expansion. Even though the
urban fringe consumer owns his proportionate share of accumulated
margins, he could not withdraw them. The possible existence of
such a case serves as a strong argument for either the extension of
commission jurisdiction to cooperatives or the preservation of the
defense of invalidity under the antitrust laws when territorial agreements are used to discriminate against and extract monopoly profits
84

U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, op. cit. supra note 46.

85 National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, RURAL ELECTRIC FACT BOOK, p. 127

(Wise ed. 1965).
86 An equitable action against the cooperative for discriminating against one group of

its owners might be possible.
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from a group of consumers. But the possibility of such a case does
not seem to demand the "absolutely void, untempered by any application of the 'rule of reason'" approach of the Williams Elec. Cooperative case.
Considering the dubious validity under antitrust laws of territorial division agreements, the cooperatives' insistence on their inclusion in wholesale power contracts seems unreasonable. From
the point of view of the Administrator and the cooperatives, however, a deadly duel for survival is taking place. Without "territorial
integrity" the power companies will be free to "pirate" customers
from the areas to which the cooperatives have laid claim by first service. And since many of the statutes under which the cooperatives are
incorporated confine them to rural areas, they are not free to "pirate"
power company customers - a most inequitable situation. The Administrator unfortunately has only one cumbersome blunderbuss in
his administrative arsenal with which to defend his flock - the G&T
loan. Such is the dilemma of the REA's G&T loan policy.
V. THE DILEMMA
Two recent controversial cases 87 contesting the legality of REA
G&T loans, currently on appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
provide examples of the myriad economic and legal issues which
cluster around the dispute. The particular cases were chosen because
they arise in states whose theories of electric public utility regulation
are at almost opposite ends of the spectrum which runs from nonregulation to total regulation of cooperatives.
In Colorado, the cooperatives are subject to Public Utility Commission (P.U.C.) jurisdiction to the same extent as are investorowned utilities.88 The Commission's regulation is extensive, covering
rates, " issuance of securities," the systems of accounts,9 ' and including the power to change a utility's "rules, regulations, practices,
equipment, appliances, facilities or services ...or methods of manufacture, distribution, transmission, storage or supply" if it finds them
"unjust, unreasonable, unsafe, improper, inadequate, or insufficient."92 Before constructing any new facility, plant, or system the
utility must obtain from the commission a certificate of public con87Rural Electrification Administration v. Central La. Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859 (5th
Cir. 1966); Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n., 411 P.2d 785
(Colo. 1966).
88
COLO. REV. STAT. § 115-1-3(2) (1963).
"COLO.RE.
90
91

STAT. §

115-3-3 to.11

(1963.

CoLo. REV. STAT. § 115-1-4 (1963).

COLO.REV. STAT. § 115-4-11 (1963).
2
9 COLO. REV. STAT. § 115-4-1 (1963).
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venience and necessity. 3 A finding upon its own motion or on complaint that "there is or will be a duplication of services" gives the
Commission the power to issue the certificate "assigning specific
territories" to eliminate the duplication and otherwise prescribe conditions of operation for the future. Transfers of certificates are
also regulated. 5 A scheme of regulation which so pervasively controls every aspect of the utility's activities is described as operating
under the doctrine of "regulated monopoly."
A very different regime of regulation is applied in Louisiana.
The cooperatives are exempt from the Louisiana Public Service Commission's jurisdiction "" and from the state's securities laws on indebtedness issued to the United States or an instrumentality thereof." In
short, the theory of "cooperative self-regulation" is accepted fully.
Moreover, electric utilities which are subject to Commission regulation need not obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity
to construct facilities and expand their systems. The only instance in
which a certificate must be obtained is when one electric public utility
extends service "to customers already receiving electric service from
another electric public utility."98 Rates, " service,' 00 and to some extent the issues of securities,10' are regulated.
In many recent suits' by cooperatives seeking to restrain power
companies from extending service into areas which they claim sometimes on the basis of a single line to one customer - the Louisiana courts have consistently held that the Public Service Commission
has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute, despite the fact that it has
no jurisdiction over the cooperatives. Moreover, the Louisiana Court
of Appeals has said of the cooperatives' territorial claim that "the
effect of this argument would be to create a monopoly in the electric
utility industry through allocation of areas. The laws of Louisiana
specifically preclude such exclusive franchises."'0 3 Competition for
new customers, even in areas served by other electric utilities, is ob93

COLO. REV. STAT. § 115-5-1(1)

(1963).

94 COLO. REV. STAT. § 115-5-1(2)

(1963).

9

5COLo. REV. STAT.

§

115-5-5 '(1963).

96LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:326 (1950).
97
98
99

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
LA.REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 12:327
§ 45:123

(1950).
(1950).

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45:1163 (1950).
100 Ibid.
101 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1168 to 45:1175 (1950).
102 South Louisiana Elec. Coop. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 161 So. 2d 413 (La.
App. 1964) ; South Louisiana Elec. Coop. v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 140 So. 2d
687-88 (La. App. 1962). The power companies have likewise been remitted to the
P.S.C. in such disputes, see e.g., Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Dixie Elec. Membership
Corp., 172 So. 2d 116 (La. App. 1965) ; Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. South La.
Elec. Coop., 169 So. 2d 181 (La. App. 1964).
103 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Charpentier, 165 So. 2d 614, 617 (La. App. 1964).
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viously contemplated. This loose combination of regulation, selfregulation, and competition is sometimes referred to as "regulated
competition."
Cooperatives in both Colorado and Louisiana are exempt from
the state income tax, though in Louisiana they pay an annual tax of
ten dollars per one hundred members served. 114 Since cooperatives
are technically without earnings, they are not subject to federal income tax, and seem to be specifically exempted under Section 502 (c)
(12) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. In neither Colorado
nor Louisiana are the cooperatives limited to operation in rural
5
areas.

10

A. Rural Electrification Administration v. Central Louisiana Electric
Co.106

The dispute between the cooperatives and the power companies
in Louisiana arose out of competition for new customers. Since the
Louisiana courts struck down earlier cooperative attempts at territorial protection," the cooperatives have sought to maintain their
"territorial integrity" by other means. The state's thirteen co-ops
banded together to form a super-cooperative 0 8 and threatened to
generate their own power by obtaining a loan from the REA - thus
putting the power companies out of the wholesale power business
and inflicting multi-million dollar losses - if the power companies
would not respect their "territorial integrity."" 9 The power companies insisted that a territorial protection agreement would violate
state public utility laws and the state and federal antitrust laws."1
Despite state and federal decisions favoring the power companies' position, the Administrator supported the cooperatives and
indicated that the loan would be approved. A furor over the granting of the loan took place in the Congress, the courts, and the Commission, with the power companies hotly contesting the Administrator's authority to make the loan."'
104
0

COLO.REv. STAT. § 138-1-8 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 12:325 (1950).
; LA. REV. STAr. ANN. § 12:301 (1950).

1 5 COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-19-1 (1963)

10 354 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966).

See text accompanying note 102 supra.
108 One of the thirteen has since quit the super-cooperative and accepted the company
wholesale power offer.
109 Findings 4 through 8 of the District Court (W.D. La.) in granting its preliminary
injunction, Appendix to the Opinion in Rural Electrification Administration v. Central La. Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859, 867 (5th Cir. 1966).
"o Id. at 862-63.
Ibid. The utilities and the NRECA have both presented their cases on the Louisiana
I1
dispute, annually, for the past few years to both l-iouse and Senatc Appropriations
Committees. A rather complete presentation by both the companies and the cooperatives is contained in Hearings on Agricultural Appropriations for 1965 before the
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
283-464 (1964).
107
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Details of loan applications justifying the need for proposed facilities are secret, but the plaintiff, Central Louisiana Electric Co.
(CLECO), suing in federal district court for a preliminary injunction, made a prima facie showing that the proposed G&T facility
would result in higher cost electricity for the cooperatives and their
consumers than that offered by the power companies."' In addition,
CLECO alleged that writing off 5,600,000 dollars worth of duplicated generating and transmitting capacity would result in higher
rates for its own customers."' Moreover, CLECO urged that the
service to the cooperatives by the new G&T facility would be less
reliable than the presently available service, due to a lack of interconnections with other power grids." 4
Previous disputes over similar G&T loans had resulted in instructions from the House and Senate Appropriations Committees
on the procedure to be followed in making G&T loans."' These instructions, embodied in REA Bulletin 111-3, declared that the Administrator would not grant any G&T loan until completion of a
power survey showing that the loan was,
(c) needed because existing and proposed contracts to provide the
facilities or service to be financed were found to be unreasonable,
each supplier was so advised, REA attempted to have such contracts
made reasonable, and the existing or other proposed supplier had
failed or refused to do so within the time set by the Administrator. 116

Exhaustive inquiries made by the Louisiana power companies clearly
determined that, according to the Administrator, the sole feature of
the power supply which made it unreasonable and justified the G&T
loan to replace it was the lack of a guarantee of "territorial integrity"
to the cooperatives. Since territorial agreements are illegal under
Louisiana law and probably legal under the federal antitrust laws
only if approved by the state regulatory commission," 7 the only way
in which the power companies could make their contracts reasonable
was to change Louisiana law to allow exclusive franchises, for cooperatives at least, and to subject the cooperatives to Commission
jurisdiction for the approval of territorial agreements. Even if it
could be assumed that the power companies have the ability to make
state law, it seems doubtful that the Rural Electrification Act authorizes the use of G&T loans for that purpose. On the contrary, it would
seem that the G&T loan power was meant to be subordinate to state
112 Central La. Elec. Co. v. Rural Electrification Administration, 236 F. Supp. 271, 274

(W.D. La. 1964).
113 Id. at 279.
114 Id. at 275.
115 Rural Electrification Administration v. Central La. Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859, 866-67
(5th Cir. 1966).
116 29 Fed. Reg. 2765-66 (1964).
117

See note 80 supra.
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law. A proviso to Section 4, under which G&T loans are made,
states that "no loan for the construction, operation, or enlargement
of any generating plant shall be made unless the consent of the State8
authority having jurisdiction in the premises is first obtained.""
While the cooperatives are exempt from Commission jurisdiction in
Louisiana, the courts, which might be said to have "jurisdiction in
the premises," have explicitly rejected exclusive territories." 9 But
even if the Louisiana courts do not have "jurisdiction in the premises"
within the statute's meaning, it is a fair inference, consistent with
basic ideas of federalism, that Congress did not delegate to the Rural
Electrification Administrator the power to change state law by a
means as awkward, indirect, and in this instance, wasteful as the
G&T loan. More explicit wording and more intelligible standards
would seem required to authorize the exercise of such a power.
The federal district court issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Administrator from making the loan.' The Court of
Appeals, however, dissolved the injunction, but partially stayed its
dissolution pending appeal to the Supreme Court.'2' The Court of
Appeals based its decision on the fact that the Rural Electrification
Act contains no provision for judicial review, and, that being so, no
right of review is granted independently by Section 10(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act." m The court found that the companies' only interest was in preventing "mere economic competition
made possible by governmental action"' 23 and this was insufficient to
give the power companies standing to sue.' 2"
A last effort by the power companies failed when the Public
Service Commission determined that a Louisiana statute requiring a
showing of inadequacy of present service or unreasonable rates for
such service before allowing another utility to replace the existing
one12 applies only to duplication of service to ultimate consumers,
and not to wholesale sales. 26
as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 904
(1964).
119 See cases collected note 102 supra and Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Charpentier, 165 So. 2d 614, 617 (La. 1964).
120 Central La. Elec. Co. v. Rural Electrification Administration, 236 F. Supp. 271
(W.D. La. 1964).
121 Rural Electrification Administration v. Central La. Elec. Co. 354 F.2d 859 (5th
Cir. 1966).
12 Id. at 863, 865. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), as
amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964).
123 Id. at 864.
124 Id. at 866.
125 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:123 (1950).
126 Central La. Elec. Co. v. Louisiana Elec. Coop. (La. P.S.C. 1965), quoted in U.S.
DEP'T. OF AGRICULTURE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TERRITORIAL PROTECTION FOR REA118 Rural Electrification Act § 4, 49 Stat. 1365 (1936),

FINANCED COOPERATIVES, 14 (1965).
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As a result of the REA G&T loan under Louisiana's regime of
"regulated competition," power company consumers will likely pay
for the write-off of 5,600,000 dollars in duplicated generating and
transmitting facilities and cooperative consumers will be forced to
pay higher rates or their cooperative will accumulate less patronage
capital. It is hard to see what has been won. The fight over territory has, if anything, been exacerbated. Power companies, with excess generating power and transmission lines on their hands which
formerly supplied cooperative distribution systems, may be expected
to compete all the more vigorously with the cooperatives for new customers in the cooperatives' territories. Though the cooperatives will
acquire fifty-six million dollars in new capital, their cost of power
will be greater, and without rate increases, their margins will decline. Overall, the cooperatives will have weakened their competitive and financial position and probably lengthened the period of
their dependence on government support. Such foreseeably paradoxical results from making good on a threat to make a G&T loan
if "territorial integrity" is not secured should perhaps lead to the
conclusion that such use of the G&T loan power is not authorized
to begin with; for the probable results of actually making the loan
surely bear no relation to any statutory purpose of the Rural Electrification Act, whatever may be the hoped-for efficacy of the threat
of the loan.
B. Western Colorado Power Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n and
Colorado-UteElec. Ass'n. 27
While generating and transmitting facilities may be duplicated
under Louisiana's "regulated competition," the practice is strictly
prohibited under the theory of "regulated monopoly" in Colorado.
In order to begin a new facility in Colorado, the P.U.C. must be
shown that existing facilities are or will be inadequate." 8 Since 1961,
when the cooperatives were brought under the P.U.C.'s jurisdiction,129
"territorial integrity" has not been a problem for Colorado's cooperatives. Like the state's other certified, regulated monopolies, the
cooperatives have something akin to an exclusive franchise in the
areas they presently serve as long as they maintain adequate service.
Acting under statutory authority to eliminate duplication of service, 3 '
the Commission has settled company-cooperative disputes by (1)
assigning exclusive service areas, (2) defining non-exclusive areas in
which Commission approval was required for any extension, and (3)
2

P.2d 785 (Colo. 1966).
128Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 411 P.2d 785, 791 (Colo. 1966).
2
9 COLO. REV. STAT. § 115-1-3(2) (1963) was added in 1961.
1 7411

0

13 COLO. REV. STAT. §

115-5-1(2)

(1963).
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ordering sale of the facilities of one supplier in an area which the
Commission considers generally served by another supplier.' Thus,
"territorial integrity" and the right to grow to meet the needs of cooperative service areas have been firmly secured under the doctrine
of "regulated monopoly."
Nonetheless, the Administrator has recently announced that the
future of rural electrification in Colorado has been placed in "critical
jeopardy"'' 3 by the very theory of regulation which makes "territorial
integrity" possible. The Colorado Supreme Court has disallowed the
grant of a certificate of public convenience and necessity for construction of duplicate generating capacity in a decision.. which, the
Administrator said, "was the most stringent and drastic application
of the regulated monopoly doctrine that has hit the rural electrification program in its 30-year history."'3 4
The case which gave rise to these grave intonations was Western
Colorado Power Co. v. Public Utility Comm'n and Colorado-Ute
Elec. Ass'nY 5 Colorado-Ute had been a G&T cooperative with five
member distribution cooperatives for whom it produced power. Its
facilities had been obtained with a previous REA loan. Six other
existing distribution cooperatives, an Arizona irrigation agency, and
another G&T cooperative, later joined Colorado-Ute, which had applied for another REA G&T loan, and, having come under P.U.C.
jurisdiction since its first loan, sought a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a new thirty-one million dollar generating
plant at Hayden, Colorado. The P.U.C. granted the certificate for
the new plant, 6 largely on the theory that the cooperatives could
buy their power from any source they chose, despite the resulting
duplication. Due to exemption from federal and state income taxes
and a statutory preference in buying inexpensive power from a nearby federal project, Colorado-Ute could buy and produce power for
its eight new members for less than the present suppliers could afford to sell it to them. 7 There was no finding that the price of
power charged by the existing suppliers of the eight new members
was in any way unreasonable or that the service of the suppliers was
inadequate or undependable. 8 The Commission did find that there
131 U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRICULTURE, op.

cit. supra note 126, at 16, 44.

332 N.Y. Times, March 24, 1966, p. 30, col. 2 (city ed.).
133 Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 411 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1966).
134

N.Y. Times, supra note 132.

135411
13

P.2d 785 (Colo. 1966).

6 Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, 48 P.U.R.3d 113 (Colo. P.U.C. 1963).

1 37

Id. at 126.

138 REA BULL. 111-3, 29 Fed. Reg. 2765 (1964), requiring that the Administrator find

the existing power supply contract unreasonable before granting a G&T loan, was
not, of course, yet in existence.

1966

RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ACT

would be a market for all the new generating capacity and that the
plant would speed the development of an adjoining federal river
storage project.'39
Pending appeal from the district court's approval of the Commission's decision, the Administrator made the loan. Construction
of the Hayden plant was completed seven months before the Colorado Supreme Court decided the case. In a six to one decision, the
court reversed the district court and the Commission.'
The court
found that Colorado-Ute sought to provide service to an area it had
not previously served and which was being adequately supplied by
other sources.' Service from the Hayden plant, the court said, would
only be substituted for that already being rendered.' 42 Permitting
the construction of these facilities was in direct conflict with the doctrine of regulated monopoly, which "was designed to prevent duplication of facilities and competition between utilities, and to authorize
new utilities in a field only when existing ones are found to be inadequate."''
Although the validity of the Administrator's actions are immune from any form of state or federal judicial review,'44 the court
did note that when state litigation over construction was in progress,
the state consent requirements of Section 4 of the Rural Electrification Act had not been met.' Section 4 also requires the Administrator to certify the adequacy of loan security and the likelihood of
timely repayment.'" The court commented that no reasonable person
could "believe that security for the proposed loan is adequate and
that the loan will be repaid in due course when the very right to construct the plant is still in litigation.' '"c'
The Colorado-Utedecision does not establish, as the Administrator has said it does, that "the rural electric cooperatives serve only
at the sufferance of the commercial companies.' 4 Indeed, some of
the existing sources of supply which the court found it illegal to duplicate without a finding of inadequacy were cooperative generating
and transmitting facilities,'49 not those of commercial companies.
139 Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, 48 P.U.R.3d 113, 127-29 (Colo. P.U.C. 1963).
140Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 411 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1966).
141Id. at 789.
142 Ibid.

1I d. at 791.
144See text accompanying note 122 supra.
'5Rural Electrification Act § 4, 49 Stat. 1365 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 904
(1964). Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 411 P.2d 785, 798
(Colo. 1966).
'"Rural Electrification Act § 4, 49 Stat. 1365 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 904
(1964).
147
Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 411 P.2d 785, 798 (Colo. 1966).
148
N.Y. Times, March 24, 1966, p. 30, col. 2 (city ed.).
149
Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 411 P.2d 785, 789 (Colo. 1966).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 43

The decision does, however, establish implicitly that cooperative generating and transmitting facilities will not be allowed to displace
existing sources of supply solely on the basis of cost advantages derived from government assistance and tax-free status. The court repeatedly emphasized that Colorado-Ute was not seeking to extend its
facilities to serve its existing service area - which surely would have
been allowed - but rather was seeking "to expand its service from a
small area in southwestern Colorado to cover substantially all [the]
Western Slope as well as many thousands of square miles in the
southeastern portion of the state."'""
The fact that cooperative G&T facilities can produce electricity
more cheaply than power company facilities, due to government assistance and tax-free status, would not seem to be a sound basis for
holding that the public convenience and necessity require they replace utilities whose cost of power is higher only because they do not
have those governmentally-granted advantages. Those advantages
were, in part, originally accorded to make rural electrification possible, not to enable one form of utility operation to displace another.
The court, while not treating the factors of government assistance or
tax status, seems to hold that those factors do not demonstrate the
inadequacy of existing facilities, for it was clear from the Commission's opinion that those factors alone produced the cooperative's
cost advantage'' - an important factor in granting the certificate of
public convenience and necessity.
The opinion in Colorado-Ute may be criticized for narrowly
equating its "absolute requirement that the Commission find inadequacy of service before granting a new certificate"'' with the public
convenience and necessity which the statute requires. There may be
instances in which the reasonable cost of adequate power under commercial conditions would be too high to permit its distribution even
under the cooperative form of operation. In such a case the interest
of consumers in receiving electricity may outweigh the regulated
monopoly's interest in not having its generating capacity duplicated.
However, such a factual situation was not before the court and hopefully an exception to its "absolute" rule could be made if it arises.
Also the fact that the construction of the Hayden plant may have
made possible accelerated river basin development in conjunction
with a federal project should have been a weighty consideration to
temper an absolute rule.
With respect to the end result achieved, however, Colorado's
'

50

15'

152

Id. at 796.
Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, supra note 139, at 126.
Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 411 P.2d 785, 793 (Colo. 1966).
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system of "regulated monopoly" seems preferable to Louisiana's
system of "regulated competition" and self-regulation. The Colorado P.U.C. and courts are open to hear, weigh, and resolve the
merits of constructing G&T and other facilities for the broad "public
convenience and necessity." Colorado consumers, from power companies or cooperatives, do not have to bear the cost of duplicate facilities, and Colorado power companies and cooperatives can better
plan their future facilities with the assurance that they will not be
displaced if adequately maintained and developed, thus significantly
reducing the risk, and probably the cost of utility investment.
CONCLUSION

As conceived in 1936, the task of the Rural Electrification Administration was to finance the extension of electricity to those in
rural areas who did not have it. To accomplish that task, loans were
made available, first at the same rate of interest which the government paid for its long-term funds and later at a fixed statutory rate
of two per cent, for everything from generation to consumption.
The REA has adopted the broad objectives of "parity" of urban
and rural electric rates and "equal opportunity" for rural people.
Its only means of accomplishing those objectives are the rural electric cooperatives which the REA brought into being and continues
to finance. The cooperatives are often in direct competition with
investor-owned utilities particularly in areas where the cities are
spreading into previously rural regions which the cooperatives serve.
In that conflict the Rural Electrification Administrator has sided
with the cooperatives and used the G&T loan to defend their "security and effectiveness."
The G&T loans made on the new "security and effectiveness"
ground are generally justified in terms of the cooperatives' need to
maintain their "territorial integrity" and include in it the expanding
city with its more profitable loads if they are to survive and grow to
meet the needs of the areas they serve without additional government
assistance. The need for exclusive territories is based upon a projected need for increased margins, which are, in turn, necessary to
obtain private financing. Private financing will be necessary, it is
said, because of the increasing capital needs of cooperative territories,
over and above what Congress will supply. But much of the capital
"need" over and above what Congress will supply will be caused by
inclusion of the expanding cities in the territories the cooperatives
claim. To the extent that the need for "territorial integrity" and inclusion of the expanding city are based on the capital needs of the
expanding city, the argument assumes its conclusion.
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The experience and present financial condition of the cooperatives indicate that there is little reason to fear for their "security and
effectiveness." Their growth rate in sales of electricity and in revenues has exceeded that of investor-owned utilities in recent years
and, as a group, their net worth, which presently exceeds one billion
dollars, has been growing by about ninety million dollars a year.
Congress has been willing to supply all of the capital needs of the
cooperatives to date. Thus survival seems certain. The need for
more capital than Congress will provide is in part a product of the
cooperatives' and the REA's own assumptions and G&T loan policy.
Much of the need might disappear if the cooperatives were to give
up their claim to urban areas growing into their territories. Private
financing will probably not be available to meet this projected capital need even if "territorial integrity" were secured. In view of these
considerations the justification for the REA's use of the G&T loan
to protect "territorial integrity" is indeed open to serious doubt.
And, apart from the Administrator's justifications, the use of G&T
loans to secure territorial protection bears no discernible relation to
a statutory purpose of furnishing electricity to "those in rural areas
who are not receiving central station service."
In addition, the G&T loan is an administrative tool ill-suited
for the task of protecting a cooperative's territory. While the threat
of its use to deprive a power company of its wholesale power sales
to cooperatives may have some force, actually making the loan would
only seem to aggravate the territorial conflict. Furthermore, territorial protection may be illegal under state and federal antitrust law.
Making G&T loans because a power company refuses to enter an illegal agreement is a clear abuse of the Administrator's power. Yet,
since the Administrator is not subject to state or federal judicial review, his actions may not be questioned in court, no matter how evidently illegal or harmful the result.
The rural electric cooperatives may, however, be subjected to
state regulation. Particularly in the case of G&T loans, where the
consent of the state authority having jurisdiction in the premises is
required before a loan can be made, the Rural Electrification Act
seems to have contemplated that the states would regulate and control the construction of facilities. Those states which have exempted
the cooperatives from regulation on the ground that they are selfregulating seem to have done so on the theory that consumer-owned,
non-profit organizations could not exploit their consumer-members.
That may be true. But the impact of cooperative operations on the
state's regulated electric utilities and their consumers was not, it
seems, anticipated. A cooperative's interest and that of its consumers
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may, indeed, conflict with the public interest, as it seems to have in
the Colorado-Ute case. The many states which have not extended
public utility commission jurisdiction to resolve the conflicts which
have arisen under the inadequate theory of self-regulation share at
least equal responsibility with the REA for the waste, duplication,
and often higher rates which consumers of both cooperatives and
power companies must bear as the result of REA G&T loans.
The most appropriate resolution of the multiple problems which
are involved in REA G&T loan policy would seem to be the extension of state regulation over the cooperatives. A highly complex
economic decision is required to determine whether a particular G&T
facility is needed and which concern should build it. The adequacy
and dependability of existing sources of supply, the geographical
configuration and proximity of existing transmission and distribution lines, the location of offices, service facilities and personnel,
outstanding franchises, the financial health of the concern, resulting
duplication, serving the entire area, and a host of other considerations
should be weighed in making that decision. Many of these same
considerations would be relevant in determining whether company
or cooperative should serve the new customers in a particular area.
Certainly far more is relevant than which concern strung the first
line in an area. Hearings at which affected parties may be heard
would also be helpful in determining what is truly in the interest of
the public as a whole. The Administrator does not have this information available to him in making his decision and has no procedure
for obtaining it, as the state regulatory commissions generally do.
In an industry where competition and duplicated facilities are enormously wasteful, the rational allocation of the resources of the utility
industry, including the cooperatives, under commission stewardship,
such as that which exists in Colorado, would seem far preferable to
the unresolved chaos which prevails on the Louisiana countryside.
A valuable by-product of extending commission jurisdiction would
be the prevention of the harmful effects of a generation and transmission loan policy gone awry.

AN ASPECT OF
ESTATE PLANNING IN COLORADO:

THE REVOCABLE INTER VIVos TRUST
BY WILLIAM S. HUFF*

Professor Huff discusses the nature, creation, and validity of
the revocable inter vivos trust, together with the problems that may
arise upon creation and its use as an estate planning device.
INTRODUCTION

T

HE trust is exclusively the creature of equity.1 Because of its separation of legal and equitable title,2 it provides an unique3
method of property disposition4 which is both broad and flexible.'
Its use in modern times in diverse contexts' is living proof of its utility. This Article will treat a particular type of trust, the revocable
inter vivos trust, used as an estate planning device.
If the owner of property does not dispose of it during his lifetime by gift or otherwise, he may by will, provide for its dispositiona
at his death or, he may allow the law to dispose of it for him by operation of the statute of intestate succession. 7
The obvious drawback of the owner's making outright gifts during his lifetime is that he parts with possession, control and enjoyment of his property. The man of modest means cannot seriously
*Member Arkansas Bar; Member Colorado Bar; BS.L., LL.B., University of Arkansas,
1957; Rhodes Scholar, 1957, Oxford University; LL.M., Harvard University, 1962;
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
'Melville v. Weybrew, 106 Colo. 121, 124, 103 P.2d 7, 9 (1940) (jurisdiction over
trusts is always within the domain of a court of equity) ; Bowes v. Cannon, 50 Colo.
262, 266, 116 Pac. 336, 338 (1911) (a true trust is enforceable solely in equity).
2 Botkin v. Pyle, 91 Colo. 221, 14 P.2d 187 (1932) ; Bowes v. Cannon, 50 Colo. 262,
116 Pac. 336 (1911) ; Cree v. Lewis, 49 Colo. 186, 112 Pac. 326 (1910) ; 1 SCOTT,
TRUSTS § 2.3 (2d ed. 1956).
3 The trust is known only to the common law system, though there are analogous arrangements in other legal systems. 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 2 (1965) ; 1
SCOTT, TRUSTS § 1.9 (2d ed. 1956).
4Because the law of contracts is as broad and flexible, Professor Scott points out that
the trust would not be unique were it not for the fact that the trust is a means of
disposing of property. 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 1 (2d ed. 1956).
5
MAITLAND, EQUITY 23 (1936); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 1 (2d ed. 1956).
6 The historical and most common use of the trust is making family settlements. However, in modern times the trust is used in many business contexts, such as holding
title to real estate in situations in which it would be difficult to divide the legal
title, 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 1 (2d ed. 1956), and pooling of voting rights to stock,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-4-17 (1963). For a comprehensive discussion of trusts used
in business contexts, see Isaacs, Tru~ieeshiP in odern Busincss, 42 H4Dv. L .EV.
1048 (1929).
7
COLo. REV. STAT. § 153-2-1 (1963).
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consider inter vivos giving and the man of greater wealth will not
consider it as his principal estate planning device.8
The use of a will, though historically the most commonly used
device for estate planning,' has inherent drawbacks. By statute
in every state, a will must comply with certain formalities."0 If
these absolute requirements are not met in the carefully prescribed
manner, 1 ample opportunity is provided for attack upon the will by
disgruntled heirs of the testator. 2 If the will is successfully attacked,
it fails as a dispositive instrument. The property attempted to be
passed under the will devolves according to the laws of intestacy, 3
thereby frustrating the testator's intent and substituting therefor a
rather stereotyped, and often inadequate," estate plan created by
operation of law." In addition to the invitation to attack latent in the
strict requirements of the statute of wills, there is another rather important drawback to the use of a will. The property devised or bequeathed must go through the process of probate,16 with its attendant
costs."
Caught between the extreme choice of outright gifts and the
rather undesirable attributes of testamentary disposition (or intestacy), an arrangement is needed which would allow the owner to retain control and enjoyment of his property during his lifetime while
at the same time allowing him to make provision for its passing to
his selected recipients after his death. If a disposition is deemed testamentary, the statute of wills must be followed." "A testamentary
8 This is not to say that under certain circumstances, with specific property and for
appropriate reasons, some inter vivos gifts will not be a useful and appropriate part
of an estate plan, but only that such gifts could not serve as the estate plan. For a
discussion of non-trust gifts, see CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING, Ch. VI (3d ed. 1961).
9SHATTUCK & FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK § 13 (2d ed. 1953).

10 ATKINSON, WILLS § 62 '(2d ed. 1953). In Colorado a will must be: (1) in writing;
(2) signed by the testator; (3) signed in the presence of two or more credible witnesses; (4) declared by the testator to be his last will and testament; and (5) attested by the witnesses by subscribing their names to the document at the testator's
request and in the testator's presence and in the presence of each other. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 153-5-2 (1963).

"In re McGary's Estate, 127 Colo. 495, 258 P.2d 770 (1953) ; Ireland v. Jacobs, 114
Colo. 168, 163 P.2d 203 (1945) ; International Trust Co. v. Anthony, 45 Colo. 474,
101 Pac. 781 (1909) ; ATKINSON, WILLS § 62 (2d ed. 1953) ("[N]o will is valid
unless there is compliance with all of the statutory requirements.") ; see Deering,
Some Problems Relating to Testamentary Witnesses, 23 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 458
,(1951).

12 Meyer, Non-Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust, 37 DICTA 333, 335 (1960).
13 In re McGary's Estate, 127 Colo. 495, 506, 258 P.2d 770, 775 (1953) ; cf. Colorado
v. Rogers, 140 Colo. 205, 344 P.2d 1073 (1959) (lapsed legacy) ; Gibson v. Hills,
84 Colo. 596, 272 Pac. 660 (1928) (lapsed legacy).
'4 CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 10 (3d

ed. 1961).

15 COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-2-1 (1963)

(intestate succession).

8

1 ATKINSON, WILLS § 96 (2d ed. 1953).
7
' Meyer, Non-Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust, 37 DICTA 333, 336 (1960).
IgUrbancich v. Jersin, 123 Colo. 88, 92, 226 P.2d 316, 319 (1950); Johnson v.

Hilliard, 113 Colo. 548, 554, 160 P.2d 386, 389 (1945); Smith v. Simmons, 99
Colo. 227, 230, 61 P.2d 589, 590

(1936).
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disposition is one which is to take effect upon the death of the person
making it and as to which he has substantially entire control until his
death, that is, a disposition which is ambulatory."' 9 Therefore, the
solution must be an arrangement in which the transfer does not take
effect upon death in a technical sense, but which does, nevertheless,
take effect on his death in a very practical sense. If this can be accomplished, a will may be dispensed with, while retaining the advantages
of a testamentary-like disposition.
There are a number of arrangements, varied in scope and design,
which are deemed to have a present effect, and thus not testamentary,
but which suffice to send the property to another only upon the owner's death. The owner of property might, for example, transfer presently a future interest therein to another, reserving a life estate."
One might acquire property, holding it in joint tenancy with another, or transfer presently owned property into joint tenancy, so that
upon death the property automatically becomes the sole property of
the surviving joint tenant.2 One might create a tentative trust, or
so-called Totten trust, of funds in a savings account by denominating
himself trustee of the funds for another. By this means the depositor
reserves the right to use or consume the money in the account during
his lifetime, but at his death the remaining funds become the property of the designated beneficiary.22 A life insurance contract has
certain testamentary characteristics in that the owner may retain control, possession and the beneficial interest in the policy during his
lifetime. Yet it creates a valid transfer of property upon his death
without compliance with the statute of wills. The courts have had
little difficulty with life insurance, consistently holding it nontestamentary in nature, either on a contract 2 or trust 24 theory. A gift
19 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 53, at 361 (2d ed. 1956).

20Million v. Botefur, 90 Colo. 343, 9 P.2d 284 (1932); ATKINSON, WILLS § 43, at
186 (2d ed. 1953) ("It is agreed that a deed in usual form except for the fact that
it reserves a life estate to the grantor is a valid conveyance and not testamentary.") ;
see Trautman v. Kranz, 63 Colo. 297, 165 Pac. 764 (1917) (transfer of a life estate,
with a contingent remainder also in the transferee did not convert deed into attempted will).
21 COLO. REV. STAT. § 118-2-1 (1963) (joint tenancy valid, but the common law presumption that a joint tenancy is created unless otherwise indicated, is reversed).
22
Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904) ; 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 58-58.6
(2d ed. 1956). No cases in Colorado dealing with the tentative trust were found.
2 Olinger Mutual Benefit Ass'n v. Christy, 139 Colo. 425, 342 P.2d 1000 (1959) ; In
re Hamilton's Estate, 113 Colo. 141, 154 P.2d 1008 (1945); Martin v. Modern
Woodmen, 253 Ill. 400, 97 N.E. 693 (1912) ; Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Rainey,
353 Mo. 477, 182 S.W-2d 624 (1944) ; Johnston v. Scott, 76 Misc. 641. 137 N.Y.S.
243 (1912) ; Hooker v. Sugg, 102 N.C. 115, 8 S.E. 919 (1889) ; Toulouse v. New
York Life Ins, Co., 40 Wash. 2d 538, 245 P.2d 205 (1952); ATKINSON, WILLS §
39 (2d ed. 1953).
24
VANCE, INSURANCE § 107 (3d ed. 1951).
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causa mortis is a variant of a transfer effective at death which is not
5
deemed testamentary.2
All the above, however, are limited either in scope of planning
available or in the nature of the property with which they deal. 6
None affords a comprehensive arrangement by which the owner
might establish an effective plan for the disposition of his property.
Even the use of several of the devices would not provide an overall
estate plan. Herein lies the great utility of the revocable inter vivos
trust. Any type of transferable interest that might be dealt with in a
will may be treated in a revocable inter vivos trust. 7 The limitations
on planning are only the skill, imagination and ingenuity of the
drafter of the trust.
The nature of the trust with which this Article will be concerned is one created during the lifetime of the settlor and made for
the purpose of avoiding the necessity of a will to the extent of the
property involved; wherein the settlor retains a beneficial life interest, with power to revoke, modify or amend the trust and with control
over the trustees in the administration of the trust, with disposition
to others upon the settlor's death. The object of analysis will be to
determine if such an arrangement is valid, and if so, whether it can
provide a satisfactory substitute for a will, without the disadvantages
of a will.
In modern times revocable living trusts have not been free from
attack and scrutiny in all of their aspects. In fact, there has been almost ceaseless litigation concerning their validity. However, in all
courts, no trust has been held invalid because of the reserved power
to revoke, 8 and in a majority of courts such trusts have been declared
valid even where more extensive powers are reserved to the settlor
I.

VALIDITY OF THE REVOCABLE INTER Vivos TRUST

A. Generally
Without doubt the revocable inter vivos trust which is designed
to continue after the settlor's death has some testamentary aspects."
Brind v. International Trust Co., 66 Colo. 60, 179 Pac. 148 (1919) recognizes gifts
causa mortis but demands strict compliance with common law requisites of having
made the gift in contemplation of death; death from the peril feared; and delivery
with intent that title vest only in the event of death.
26 See 24 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 365 (1952) for a discussion of these and other dispositions, nontestamentary, but effective at death.
27 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 74.1 (2d ed. 1956) (whatever can be given away or passed by
will can be placed in trust).
28 Id. § 57.1.
25

29 Id. § 57.2.
30

It is interesting to note that one of the principal purposes for the development of
uses, from which our modern doctrine of trusts grew, was to evade the rule of law,
before the enactment of the Statute of Wills in 1540, that land could not be devised.
So, an owner would make a feoffment to another to the owner's use. He could then
devise the use. SCOTT, CASES ON TRUSTS 220, 321 (4th ed. 1951).
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Such trusts often appear to pass interests to the beneficiaries only at
the settlor's death. The settlor's retention of many incidents of ownership, through a retained beneficial life estate, the power to revoke
and amend, and control over the administration of the trust, makes
the disposition seem of a testamentary genre. These aspects have
caused some courts to look with suspicion upon them."'
There would be no question of validity if the trust were drafted
and executed in accordance with the statute of wills. It would be
valid as a will."2 But since it would be a will it will not provide a
solution because it would have all of the previously discussed disadvantages, including sending the property held in trust through probate."
The courts have had no difficulty with the validity of the irrevocable inter vivos trust. The irrevocable trust at its creation indefeasibly vests in the beneficiary an interest. Thus, the irrevocable trust is
effective upon creation and not upon the death of the settlor3 4 This
is true even if the settlor reserves a beneficial life interest, because
the beneficiaries still have indefeasibly vested present interests with
only possession and enjoyment postponed.3"
The problem then is to determine whether the beneficiary under the trust receives a present interest at the time of the creation of
the trust. If so, the transfer is not testamentary. If the beneficiary receives no interest until the settlor's death, the disposition is
testamentary and invalid unless there is compliance with the statute
of wills.3 6
The beneficiaries may fail to acquire any interest in the trust
property during the settlor's lifetime, either because the conveyance
is ineffective to transfer title to the trustee,3 7 in which case neither
the trustee nor the beneficiary acquire an interest; or, because, though
the conveyance is effective to vest title in the trustee, the settlor
made no disposition of the beneficial interest before his death. 8
In determining whether the trustee acquires legal title during
the settlor's lifetime, the rules applicable to effective conveyances
generally are controlling. Whether a transfer to the trustee is effec"1Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins, 121 Ohio St. 159, 167 N.E. 389 (1929) ; Worthington v. Redkey, 86 Ohio St. 128, 99 N.E. 211 '(1912).
32 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 56.7 (2d ed. 1956).
33
ATKINsoN, WILLS § 42 (2d ed. 1953). For this reason, it is wise to avoid an attestation clause, since the court might seize on this to construe the trust as a will.
34
Fonda v. Miller, 411 111. 74, 103 N.E.2d 98 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS § 56 (1957) ; 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 56.5 (2d ed. 1956).
35
Williams v. Evans, 154 Ill. 98, 39 N.E. 698 (1895) ; Hines v. Louisville Trust Co.,
254 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1953) ; In re Curry, 390 Pa. 105, 134 A.2d 497 '(1957).
36 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 56 (2d ed. 1956).
7
3 Smith v. Simmons, 99 Colo. 227, 230, 61 P.2d 589, 590 (1936) (to create a valid
express trust it is necessary to do all things essential to pass legal title to the trustee).
38 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 56.1 (2d ed. 1956).
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tive to convey a present interest depends upon the intention of the
grantor,39 as manifested by the instrument of conveyance or the circumstances attending its execution and delivery."'
If the owner of land executes a deed which purports to convey
the land to another, but manifests an intention that no interest vest
in the grantee prior to the grantor's death, the conveyance is incomplete." Thus, the conveyance of land is ineffective where there is no
delivery of the deed. 2 If the grantee is a trustee for a third person,
no trust arises. 3 If the deed provides that it shall have no effect until
the grantor's death, it is testamentary, even though it was executed
and delivered during the grantor's lifetime." The result is the same
where the deed is absolute on its face but is delivered pursuant to an
agreement with the grantee that it shall not be effective until the
death of the grantor.
The same principle is applicable to personal property. If the
conveyance to the grantee is incomplete for lack of delivery, or because the grantor does not intend it to be effective until his death,4"
the grantee takes nothing. If the conveyance were upon trust, no
trust arises."
On the other hand, the disposition is not testamentary if the
donor surrenders all control, even though the legal title to the property does not pass until his death. Thus, a valid conveyance may be
made by the irrevocable delivery of the property or deed to a third
person in escrow, the property or deed to be delivered to the grantee
on the death of the grantor.
39

Johnson v. Hilliard, 113 Colo. 548, 554, 160 P.2d 386, 389 (1945); Dunham v.
Armitage, 97 Colo. 216, 219, 48 P.2d 797, 798 (1935) ; Barnes v. Spangler, 93 Colo.
254, 257-58, 25 P.2d 732, 733 (1933) ; Larison v. Taylor, 83 Colo. 430, 443, 266
Pac. 217, 222 (1928); Taylor v. Taylor, 79 Colo. 487, 489, 247 Pac. 174, 175
(1926) ; Phelps v. Phelps, 71 Colo. 343, 345, 206 Pac. 787, 788 '(1922) ; Taylor v.
Wilder, 63 Colo. 282, 284, 165 Pac. 766, 767 (1917).
40 However, it has been stated that the court will attempt to construe the instrument
valid if possible. Million v. Botefur, 90 Colo. 343, 345, 9 P.2d 284 (1932) ; Clark
v. Bouler's Estate, 62 Colo. 465, 468, 163 Pac. 965, 966 (1917).
41 1 ScOTT, TRUSTS § 56.1 (2d ed. 1956).
4
2Griffith v. Sands, 84 Colo. 456, 271 Pac. 191 (1928); Larison v. Taylor, 83 Colo.
430, 266 Pac. 217 (1928) ; Childers v. Baird, 59 Colo. 382, 148 Pac. 854 (1915).
43 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 56.1 (2d ed. 1956).
44
Dunham v. Armitage, 97 Colo. 216, 48 P.2d 797 (1935) ; Taylor v. Wilder, 63 Colo.
282, 165 Pac. 766 (1917).
45
Barnes v. Spangler, 93 Colo. 254, 25 P.2d 732 (1933).
46Smith v. Simmons, 99 Colo. 227, 61 P.2d 589 (1936); Clarke v. Commerce State &
Savings Bank, 68 Colo. 401, 189 Pac. 842 (1920). For a discussion of valid inter
vivos gifts in trust of funds in a joint bank account, see Comment, 33 RoCKY MT.
L. REv. 246 (1961); Comment, 24 RocKY MT. L. REv. 133 (1952).
47 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 56.1 (2d ed. 1956).
481d. at 424-25.
49
Kauffman v. Kauffman, 130 Colo. 583, 589, 278 P.2d 179, 182 (1954) (where
deed delivered in escrow was without qualifications, exceptions or reservations, it
constituted an absolute conveyance in praesenti) ; Thuet v. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 260
P.2d 604 (1953). But see, Barnes v. Spangler, 93 Colo. 254, 25 P.2d 732 (1933).
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Assuming a valid present transfer is made to a trustee during
the settlor's lifetime, the trust is invalid if the trust deed indicated
that the beneficiaries were to receive no interest until the death of
the settlor.'0 However, it would not affect the validity of the trust
if the beneficiaries' rights to possession and enjoyment were postponed until the grantor's death as long as they received a presently
vested future interest upon the creation of the trust."'
Assuming effective conveyance of the property to the trustee
and present vesting of future interests in the beneficiaries, various
aspects of such a trust must be considered which might lead to the
conclusion that it is testamentary in nature.
It is well settled today that the power to revoke an inter vivos
trust does not render the trust testamentary."2 This view is supported by the theory that the beneficiary receives a vested interest
upon creation of the trust. The death of the settlor is not a condition precedent to the vesting of the interest, though the interest received is subject to being divested by subsequent revocation of the
trust by the settlor during his lifetime.
Some cases have suggested that the intent of the settlor to evade
compliance with the statute of wills by the use of a revocable trust
might affect its validity. 3 It is difficult to see how such an intent,
even if expressed in the trust instrument, could affect its validity.
Any inter vivos transfer necessarily has the effect of obviating the
need for a will with respect to the property transferred. A person is
presumed to intend the obvious consequences of his acts ;54 thus, literally applying this concept, any inter vivos transfer would be invalid
because it must of necessity be intended to evade the statute of wills.
Rather, the statute applies, in the interest of preventing frauds, only
to regulate the formalities of those dispositions which are in fact
50 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 56 '(2d ed. 1956).
51

Hignett v. Sherman, 75 Colo. 64, 75, 224 Pac. 411, 415 (1924) (an estate is vested
when there is an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present fixed right of
future enjoyment, quoting from 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES (14th ed.)); Taylor v.
Wilder, 63 Colo. 282, 286, 165 Pac. 766, 768 (1917) (it is unnecessary that the
deed pass an immediate interest in possession, but it must be effective to pass the
interest or estate at execution) ;cases cited note 38 supra.
52
Miles v. Miles, 78 Kan. 382, 96 Pac. 481 (1908) ; National Shawmut Bank v. Joy,
315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944) ; Ridge v. Bright, 244 N.C. 345, 93 S.E.2d
607 (1956). Only one case expressed the view that the mere power of revocation
would have made the trust invalid (had it not been for a local statute), Union Trust
Co. v. Hawkins, 121 Ohio St. 159, 167 N.E. 389 (1929), and this language was
later repudiated in Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N.E.2d 627
(1938).

53Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N.E. 716 (1925); McEvoy v.
Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, 201 Mass. 50, 87 N.E. 465 (1909) ; National Newa & Essex Bank Co. v. Rosahl, 97 N.J. Eq. 74, 128 At. 586 (19o9
The first
and last cases upheld the trusts, finding no intent to evade the statute of wills; the
trust fell in McEvoy, but this case was severely criticized and overruled in National
54

Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 478, 53 N.E.2d 113, 126 (1944).
Ellis v. Jones, 73 Colo. 516, 517, 216 Pac. 257, 258 (1923).
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testamentary. Either the disposition is testamentary in nature, in
which event compliance with the statute of wills is mandatory; or,
it is not and the statute of wills need not be followed. It is immaterial that the settlor's motive in creating the trust was to avoid the
necessity of complying with the statute of wills. As Mr. Justice
Holmes said:
We do not speak of evasion, because, when the law draws a line, a
case is on one side of it or the other, and if on the safe side is none
the worse legally that a party has availed himself to the full of what

the law permits. When an act is condemned as an evasion what is
meant is that it is on the wrong side of the
line indicated by the
policy, if not by the mere letter of the law. 55
Professor Scott suggests what is really meant when a court speaks of
the importance of the settlor's intent is that the transaction creating
the trust must be real and not merely colorable. " Generally courts
have proceeded on the more logical basis that the intent of the settlor
to use the trust as a substitute for a will, i.e., to evade the statute of
wills, is immaterial to the validity of the trust. 7
Thus, a power of revocation, a reserved life estate in the settlor,
or the intent to avoid the use of a will, will not render an inter vivos
trust testamentary. The remaining area of contention and the prime
problem today is the amount of control which the settlor retains over
the administration of the trust. The question presented by reserved
control is whether it, in fact and law, renders the trustee nothing
more than the mere agent of the settlor. The Restatement of Trusts,
section 57, adopted in 1935, provided:
Where the settlor transfers property in trust and reserves not only
a beneficial life estate and a power to revoke and modify the trust

but also such power to control the trustee as to the details of the
administration of the trust that the trustee is the agent of the settlor, the disposition so far as it is intended to take effect after his
death is testamentary and is invalid unless the requirements of the
58
statutes relating to the validity of wills are complied with.

This, of course, made the validity of the trust depend on the extent
of control reserved by the settlor 9 The theory behind this provision
is that the very essence of the principal and agent relationship is that
the agent acts in behalf of and subject to the control of the princi55Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1916). In Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1930), Mr. Justice Holmes said: "The fact that it desired to evade the law, as it is called, is immaterial, because the very meaning of a
line in the law is that you intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you do
not pass it."
56 1 ScolT, TRUSTS § 57.1 (2d ed. 1956).
57 National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 471, 53 N.E.2d 113, 122 (1944);
Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 376, 9 N.E.2d 966, 967 (1937); Windolph v.
Girard Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 366, 91 Atl. 634, 639 (1914).

58

RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 57(2)

(1935).

59 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 57.2 (2d ed. 1956).

VOL. 43

DENVER LAW ]OURNAL

pal.6" If the trustee is also the agent of the settlor, the rules of agency
prevail,6' and thus the relationship would terminate on the death of
the settlor (as principal) 62 and would be ineffective insofar as designed to continue after his death."
If the owner simply gave possession of his property to another,
instructing him to deliver it to a third person upon the owner's
death, certainly the holder of the property would be a mere agent
of the owner. No interest would have passed to the third person during the owner's lifetime. The attempted disposition to the
third person upon the owner's death would be testamentary in nature and invalid for failure to comply with the statute of wills."
Professor Scott feels that if a transaction is essentially of this nature,
with the only change being the vesting of legal title in the agent (so
that he also becomes a trustee), the result should be the same."
A number of trusts have been held invalid on the ground of reserved control by the settlor. " A greater number of cases, however,
have held that reservation of control by the settlor does not render
the trust testamentary.67 The Restatement of Trusts adopted in 1957
took a stronger stand than that of 1935, in favor of the validity of
trusts over which the settlor has reserved control, providing:
Where an interest in the trust property is created in a beneficiary
other than the settlor, the disposition is not testamentary and invalid
for failure to comply with the requirements of the Statute of Wills
merely because the settlor reserves a beneficial life interest or because
he reserves in addition a power to revoke the trust in whole or in
part, and a power to modify the trust, and
a power to control the
68
trustee as to the administration of the trust.
Professor Scott favors upholding such trusts, even where extensive
powers of control are reserved to the settlor, stressing the fact that
where the trust is represented by a formal trust instrument the pur60

RESTATEMENT

61

Id. § 14B.

62

Id. §

(SECOND),

AGENCY § 2 (1958).

120.

63 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 8 (2d

ed. 1956).

6

4 ATKrNSON, WILLS § 42 (2d ed. 1953) ; 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 57.2 (2d ed. 1956).
65 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 57.2 (2d ed. 1956).
66

Betker v. Nalley, 140 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1944) ; Atlantic Bank v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., 357 Mo. 770, 211 S.W.2d 2 (1948) ; Burns v. Turnbull, 294 N.Y. 889,

62 N.E.2d 785 (1945) ; In re Shapley's Trust, 353 Pa. 499,
67 Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955)
Co., 336 Ill. 366, 168 N.E. 349 (1929) ; Kelly v. Parker,
(1889) ; Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326 Mass. 49,

46 A.2d 227 (1946).

; Bear v. Millikin Trust
181 Ill. 49, 54 N.E. 615
93 N.E.2d 238 (1950) ;

National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944) ; Rose v.
Rose, 300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W.2d 458 (1942) ; Goodrich v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co.," 270Mich.x

2

.0°N.W. 253 (

•
...

e Mason'sEstate,

9 .Pa.

485 0

A.2d 542 (1959) ; Alexander v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 4 Utah 2d 90,
287 P.2d 665 (1955) ; In re Estate of Steck, 275 Wis. 290, 81 N.W.2d 729 (1957).
6
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 57 (1957).
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pose behind the statute of wills, to prevent frauds, is not violated. 9
Also, the formal instrument would seem to evidence something more
than a mere casual handing over of property to another for disposition on the owner's death to a third person.
B. Colorado's Position
The revocable inter vivos trust had an inauspicious beginning
in Colorado. Apparently the first case in which the Colorado court
had occasion to deal with such a trust was Dunham v. Armitage." In
that case property was purportedly conveyed to another as trustee,
with the grantor reserving possession and the right to the rents and
profits from the property for life. The trust was subject to an express power of revocation. The trust provided that "upon the death"
of the settlor, revocation not having occurred, the property was to
become that of the beneficiary. The court held that the reservation
of the power to revoke and the reservation postponing vesting of title
until the death of the grantor were fatal to the trust because they
demonstrated an intent of the grantor that the trust was not to be
effective for any purpose prior to his death.'
Since 1954 there has been a trilogy of unrelated cases' dealing
with the revocable trust, culminating in a landmark decision in favor
of the validity of the revocable trust."
In the first case of the series, Brown v. InternationalTrust Co.,'
the court dealt with a revocable life insurance trust. The trust company as beneficiary of the policy was to collect the proceeds of the insurance on the settlor's life and hold them as trustee for designated
beneficiaries of a trust agreement. By the trust instrument, the settlor
retained for his life all of the incidents of ownership, including the
right to pledge the policy, the right to borrow on the policy, the
right to receive the dividends and refunds of the policy, and the right
to change the beneficiary of the policy. The settlor also reserved the
right to revoke or amend the trust instrument during his lifetime.
With regard to the power of revocation reserved in the trust instrument, the court quoted from Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers
which said there was a well established rule of law as follows:
The power of revocation is perfectly consistent with the creation of
69 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 57.2 (2d ed. 1956) ; United Building & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett,
64 F. Supp. 460, 465 (D. Ark. 1946). Contra, 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

§§ 103-04 (1935).
7097 Colo. 216, 48 P.2d 797 (1935).

71 Id. at 219, 48 P.2d at 798.
72
Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667 (1958); Richard v.
James, 133 Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956) ; Brown v. International Trust Co., 150
Colo. 543, 278 P.2d 581 (1954).
7 Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, supra note 72.
74130 Colo. 543, 278 P.2d 581 (1954).
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a valid trust. Title passes to the donee, and remains vested for the

purpose of the trust, even though there be a right to revoke it. The
power to revoke is not evidence of an intent to postpone the legal
enjoyment, existence, or effect of that which may perhaps be thereafter brought to an end, for the reason that the enjoyment and possession actually passes to the beneficiaries. Until the right to revoke
is exercised, an estate exists by virtue of the transfer.75
While definitely a step in the direction of upholding revocable inter
vivos trusts, this case was somewhat limited in its value as a precedent because it involved an insurance trust upon which the courts
have always looked favorably while holding them nontestamentary in
nature, " and because not all of the factors which had been raised concerning the validity of such trusts were present, particularly, control
over the administration of the trust.
The next case involving the revocable trust was Richard v.
James.' The power to revoke in this case was not express, but was
argued from a construction of the trust instrument. The trust on its
face purported to be irrevocable . The settlor, dying of cancer,
created a trust for the purpose of research into its cause and cure.
The only factor which raised a question as to its not being the
normal irrevocable trust which it purported to be was a provision
in the trust instrument making the trust property subject to the debts
of the settlor at his death. It was contended by the plaintiff in attacking the trust that this provision amounted to a power to revoke,
since the settlor might by incurring debts, in effect, revoke or defeat
the trust. The court did not cite Brown v. InternationalTrust Co.
which apparently would have been dispositive of that objection.
Rather, the court contented itself with examining the evidence and
stating there was no indication the settlor had intended to use the
debt clause to defeat the trust.78 It would seem the court was influenced in this approach by the fact that the plaintiff was the wife
of the settlor and was attempting to assert her marital rights against
the trust property. The court wanted to make it clear that the transfer was not merely "colorable" as against her. Because of the court's
approach this case added little, if anything, to Colorado's position on
the testamentary aspects of the revocable inter vivos trust.
The final case of the trilogy, and the one providing a landmark
in Colorado in favor of the validity of such trusts, is Denver Nat'l
Bank v. Von Brecht.7" In this case the settlor transferred stock to a
75 Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 29 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1928).

76Sigal v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 119 Conn. 570, 177 Atd. 742 '(1935);
In re Albert Anderson Life Ins. Trust, 67 S.D. 393, 293 N.W. 527 (1940) ; see 46
HARv. L. REv. 818 (1933).
77 133 Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956).
78 Id. at 185, 292 P.2d at 979.
79 137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667 (1958). This case was noted in 35 DicrA 146 (1958)
and 30 RocKY MT. L. REv. 517 (1958).
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bank as trustee. The trust provided that the income should be paid
to the settlor for life and that the settlor might have all or part of the
corpus upon written request. Provision was made for the care of the
settlor from the trust property in the event of his illness, and the
trust property was subject to the expenses of the settlor's last illness.
A provision was made for distribution to others after the settlor's
death. The settlor retained the power during his life to add property
to the trust, to revoke, modify or amend the trust agreement, and the
power to pass on any sale or disposition of trust property by the
trustees when the value of the property involved exceeded $1,000.
Despite these extensive powers reserved by the settlor, there
were many powers granted to the truste concerning the management
of the trust property. The lower court, relying on the case of Dunham
v. Armitage," concluded the trust was testamentary in nature and void
because not executed in compliance with the statute of wills. The
lower court felt the trust was intrinsically an agency, since the settlor
retained virtual control and dominion over the trust property.8' The
Colorado Supreme Court distinguished Dunham on the ground that
there, possession had been retained by the settlor, while in the present
case the bank had possession of the stock. While it seems the cases
are distinguishable, possession does not seem the point, but rather
the fact that in Dunham the trust deed provided that the beneficiaries
were to have no interest until the death of the settlor, whereas here
the trust instrument had no such language. 2 In upholding the trust
the Colorado Supreme Court said:
Where as here, the property involved in a trust is assigned, transferred and set over to the trustee and remains in the name of the
trustee, the interest of the settlor therein passes to the trustee in
presenti and while the settlor remains alive the transfer is inter vivos
and not testamentary. Hence, if an owner of property can dispose of
it inter vivos and thereby render a will unnecessary for accomplishment of his practical purposes, he has a right to do so. The motive
in making such a transfer may be to obtain the practical advantages
of a will without the necessity of making one, but the motive is
immaterial.83
The case was ideal because all of the aspects about which questions
of validity had been raised were presented at one time; it settled
many questions theretofore unanswered for Colorado attorneys and
8097 Colo. 216, 48 P.2d 797 (1935).
81

Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 93, 322 P.2d 667, 669 (1958).

82 It has also been suggested that the Dunham case can be distinguished not only on

the basis of the reservation postponing the vesting of interests in the beneficiaries
until the death of the settlor in that case, but also on the basis that in the Dunham
case the grantor had no fiduciary duties to perform, whereas in the Von Brecht case
the trustee bank had a great many duties despite the veto power over investments in
the settlor. See 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 517, 518 (1958).
3 Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 99, 322 P.2d 667, 672 (1958).
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their clients. The summary at the close of the court's opinion provides a concise outline of Colorado's present position:
To recapitulate: The settlor specifically reserved to himself three
matters, viz. (1) The income from the trust estate; (2) the right
to change or entirely revoke the trusts, and (3) the right to disapprove investments of more than $1,000 suggested by the trustees.
It is agreed by counsel on both sides that a settlor may reserve a life
income for himself, together with the right to revoke the trust, and

he may reserve additional powers if he does not go too far. We are

satisfied that settlor did not go too far in reserving the so-called
veto power concerning investments proposed by the trustee. Restatement of Trusts, § 57 states: 'The intended trust is not testamentary merely because the Settlor reserves power to direct the
trustee as to making of investments or the exercise of other par-

ticular powers, or power to appoint a substitute trustee.' 84 (Emphasis added.)

Of course, the case is limited by its facts as to how far the settlor may
go in controlling the trustee, but certainly the breadth of control over
the trustee in the facts of this case would satisfy most settlors. The
court's opinion contains a warning about control in the language "if
he does not go too far."85 It is difficult to theorize where the line
will, or should, be drawn in the permissible amount of control which
the settlor may retain. Surely a distinction cannot be drawn on the
amount or value of property involved. A veto power over every investment is no more harmful to the nature of the arrangement than
one only on those investments over $1,000, for the trustee would
still, in the first instance, perform his duties of management.
The court's stress of the fact that possession of the trust property
had passed to the trustee" could not be carried out logically as a test
of validity. For example, assume that real estate, used as a home,
were placed in trust; the only manner in which the settlor might retain a beneficial life interest would be by retaining possession of the
property. 7 The Restatement of Trusts, adopted in 1957, would seem
to deem such a trust with retained possession valid.8
Employing a conceptualistic approach, once legal title has passed
from the settlor to the trustee, and the beneficiaries have acquired
vested future interests, the transfer would seem to be inter vivos and
not testamentary. Retention of control by the settlor scarcely increases
the testamentary nature of the transaction beyond what the retained
life estate and the power to revoke accomplish.
Perhaps the most stringent test would arise if the trust agree84

1d. at 101-02, 322 P.2d at 674.

8

5id.at 102, 322 P.2d at 675.

86 d, at 93, 322 P.2d at 669.

87Williams v. Evans, 154 Il1. 98, 39 N.E. 698 (1895) (trust valid though property
in possession of settlor).
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 57, comment b, illustration 2 (1957).
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ment provided that the trustee should have legal title, but that the
possession and power to manage the trust property would remain in
the settlor until his death; that upon his death the trustee would take
possession of the property and manage it for the benefit of the ultimate beneficiaries. This situation is no more objectionable than that
created by the powers which are presently permitted to the settlor. If
land were involved," the statute of uses" might operate to leave a
legal life estate in the settlor because of the passive nature of the
trust during iis lifetime.9 But he would have made a nontestamentary disposition in trust of the remainder interest.
In attempting to find the real import of the transaction, one
may approach the question of validity from a less conceptualistic direction. A consideration of the dichotomy between agent and trustee covers this approach. While the difference between the two
is one of degree,92 it would seem that the theory of the beneficiaries'
having received vested future interests, and Professor Scott's pragmatic approach of stressing a formal trust instrument93 should be
sufficient to overcome any possible objection to extensive control reserved by the settlor.
II.

PURPOSES FOR WHICH A REVOCABLE TRUST MAY BE CREATED

As a general proposition a trust, like a contract, may be created
for any lawful purpose." The same proposition is, of course, true of
the revocable trust. However, experience has shown there will be
difficulty when the purposes of the trust run contrary to established
public policy. Two areas of persistent difficulty have involved the
rights of creditors and the rights of the settlor's spouse to claim
against the trust property.
A. Creditor's Rights
The settlor may desire to protect the beneficiaries of the trust
from their own indiscretion. To accomplish this purpose he may
make their interest in the trust property subject to a spendthrift provision - providing that a beneficiary may not voluntarily anticipate
his interest under the trust, and that creditors of the beneficiary shall
not have a right to reach the trust property. The majority of juris89
90

Id. § 70.
See O'Reilly v. Balkwill, 133 Colo. 474, 297 P.2d 263 (1956); Ohio and Colorado
Smelting & Refining Co. v. Barr, 58 Colo. 116, 144 Pac. 552 (1914).

91 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND),

TRUSTS § 69, comment c (1957)

(where the duties of

the trustee may not begin until after the expiration of a limited period, the statute
of uses may execute the trust for the limited period).
92 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 57.2 (2d ed. 1956).

93 Ibid.

MId. § 1.
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dictions, 5 including Colorado,16 recognize the validity of spendthrift
provisions. The theory supporting their validity is that the owner
might not have made the transfer to the beneficiary, and had he not
done so, the creditors would have had no complaint. Thus the owner
may limit his gift in this manner." No particular form of words is
required to create a spendthrift provision," but it is necessary that
the provision be set forth in the instrument in clear and unequivocal
language or that the intention to create the provision appear clearly
from a reading of the entire instrument.99
There is a split of authority, even in states which recognize valid
restraints on the right to income for life, concerning restraints on
alienation of the equitable fee.' This could be of importance in the
typical trust where the settlor retains the income for life, with the
equitable remainder in fee in the beneficiaries. However, in Colorado
if the settlor retained the income after his death payable to the beneficiaries for life or for a term of years, the restraint on the beneficiaries' right to receive income after the settlor's death would be
valid under the authority of Snyder v. O'Conner."
If the interest of the beneficiary is limited to the amount needed
for his support, he may not assign his interest nor may his creditors
reach it, even in the absence of an express restraint on alienation."H
It is held otherwise if the interest is not measured by a standard for
support, but is a fixed amount or the entire income, with an indication in the trust that the funds are for "support."'' ° If the trust is a
discretionary trust- one in which the beneficiary has no absolute
95

GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 58 (2d ed. 1947) ; 2 Scorr, TRUSTS § 152 (2d
ed. 1956).
9
6Newell v. Tubbs, 103 Colo. 224, 84 P.2d 820 (1938); Snyder v. O'Conner, 102
Colo. 567, 81 P.2d 773 (1938); see Estate of Nicholson, 104 Colo. 561, 569, 93
P.2d 880, 883 (1939).
97
Snyder v. O'Conner, 102 Colo. 567, 570, 81 P.2d 773, 774 (1938) ("The testator

could lawfully have willed his property away from his children entirely, and he had
a right to limit his gift in the way he did.") ; cf. Johnson v. Shriver, 121 Colo. 397,
409, 216 P.2d 653, 659 (1950) (with regard to a power of appointment; "We recognize the right of a donor of a power of appointment to condition his bounty as he
sees fit, and creditors of the donee of the power have no reason to complain that the
donor did not give his bounty to them.").

98

GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 264 (2d ed. 1947) ; 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 152.4
(2d ed. 1956). See Newell v. Tubbs, 103 Colo. 224, 227, 84 P.2d 820, 821 (1938),

where the court said: "Without setting out any formal definition, we may state that
it is only by the use of language similar in meaning and legal import to that contained in the recent case of Snyder v. O'Conner, 102 Colo. 567 [5693, 81 P.2d 773
[774 (1938)] that such a trust may be established ....
"
" Newell v. Tubbs, 103 Colo. 224, 84 P.2d 820 (1938); GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT
TRUSTS § 264 (2d ed. 1947) ; 2 ScoTT,TRUSTS § 152.4 (2d ed. 1956).
100GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS §§ 84-91 (2d ed. 1947).
101 102 Colo. 567, 81 P.2d 773 (1938).
102GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 430 (2d ed. 1947) ; 2 Scorr, TRUSTS § 154 (2d

ed. 1956).
103GRISWOLD, Id. § 433; ScoTT, Ibid.
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right to income but is entitled only to so much as the trustee in his
discretion determines to pay - the beneficiary may not assign, nor
may his creditors reach, his interest.104 If the trust does not contain
a spendthrift provision, is not a trust for support, or a discretionary
trust, then the beneficiary may transfer his interest and his creditors
may reach it."
A different question is presented when dealing with the settlor's
creditors. If the settlor has creditors existing at the time of the transfer creating the trust, the creditors may avoid the transfer as a fraudulent conveyance. 0 ' This would be true whether or not the settlor had
reserved a beneficial interest or a power to revoke."°' The remaining
questions assume that there is no fraudulent conveyance, since if
there were a fraudulent conveyance, it would be dispositive of the
issue. If the settlor retains no life interest, but merely the power to
revoke the trust, his creditors may not force him to exercise the power
in order to reach the property which would then return to him. 8
When the settlor does reserve an interest under the trust, the existing
creditors of the settlor are protected by a Colorado statute, beyond
the protection provided by the statute pertaining to fraudulent conveyances, which provides:
All deeds of gift, all conveyances and all transfers or assignments,
verbal or written, of goods, chattels, or things in action, or real
property, made in trust for the use of the person making the same,
shall be void, as against the creditors existing of such person. 09
This statute does not cover the position of creditors who became such
subsequent to the transfer creating the trust. However, it is uniformly held, without benefit of statute, that the creditors of the settlor
may reach his reserved interest, although an attempt is made to protect his interest by a spendthrift provision."0
Where the settlor reserves a beneficial life interest and a power
to revoke the trust, the question arises whether his creditors may
reach his remainder interest as well as his life estate. It might be
argued that since the settlor retains most of the incidents of ownership, he should not be allowed to retain these incidents and at the
104 GRISWOLD,
105

GRISWOLD,

Id. § 425; ScOTT, Id. § 155.
Id. § 10; ScoTr, Id. § 132; see Newell v. Tubbs, 103 Colo. 224, 84 P.2d

820 (1938) (beneficiary made an assignment of his interest; court found no spendthrift provision and allowed the assignment to stand).
106 COLO. REV. STAT. § 59-1-17 (1963) (made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors); GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 472 (2d ed. 1947).
107 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 330.12 (2d ed. 1956).
1o8 Ibid.
10 COLO. REV. STAT. § 59-1-11 (1963).

110 GRISWOLD,
ed. 1956).

SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS

§

474 (2d ed. 1947) ; 2 ScOTT, TRUSTS § 156 (2d
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same time keep "his" property from his creditors."' However, on
the theory that the remaindermen have a vested future interest, it is
held that the creditors of the settlor may reach only the settlor's life
estate, unless there was a fraudulent conveyance.1
B. Spouse's Rights
The common law rights of dower and curtesy have been abolished by statute in Colorado."' The husband's. 4 property is free of
any vested interest of his wife, and he may dispose of it during his
lifetime without his wife's knowledge"1 or consent."1
Like most states,"' Colorado has an election statute. It provides
that a wife may renounce her husband's will and elect to take the
statutorily prescribed fraction of her husband's "property or estate."'118
If the husband has made an outright and absolute disposition during
his lifetime, then, of course, his wife cannot successfully assert her
rights against the property transferred. What constitutes an effective
conveyance, in the sense that the wife's rights would be foreclosed,
is governed by the same rules of conveyances, whether or not the
transfer was in trust. If the transfer by the husband were ineffective
for want of delivery of the deed or property,' or for an intention
that title was not to pass until his death,' then such property would
still be a part of his probate estate. As such, it would be subject to
the wife's claim.''
Colorado has a number of cases dealing with the wife's rights in
property transferred or purportedly transferred by the husband during his lifetime." The cases have not always been consistent. The
1113

SCOTT, TRUSTS § 330.12 (2d ed. 1956).
§ 475 (2d ed. 1947) ; 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 156 (2d
ed. 1956).

112 GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS

113COLO. REV.STAT. § 153-2-1(2)

(1963).

114Reference shall be had to the husband's disposing of his property and the rights of
the wife, since this is the normal context of the cases, though the rules announced
would be the same if the positions of the husband and wife were reversed.
115 Wilson v. Lowrie, 77 Colo. 427, 236 Pac. 1004 (1925).
"nThuet v. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 260 P.2d 604 (1953) ; Wright v. Nelson, 125 Colo.
217, 242 P.2d 243 (1952) ; Norris v. Bradshaw, 96 Colo. 594, 45 P.2d 638 (1935).
1172 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 146A n.1 (2d ed. 1956) ; Phipps, Marital Property Interests, 27
ROCKY MT. L. REv. 180, 191 (1955) (for a listing of provisions in each state).
8
11
COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-5-4 (1963) (the prescribed share is one-half).
119Griffith v. Sands, 84 Colo. 456, 271 Pac. 191 '(1928); Larison v. Taylor, 83 Colo.
430, 266 Pac. 217 (1928) ; Childers v. Baird, 59 Colo. 382, 148 Pac. 854 (1915).
120 Smith v. Simmons, 99 Colo. 227, 61 P.2d 589 (1936); Dunham v. Armitage, 97
Colo. 216, 48 P.2d 797 (1935) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 79 Colo. 487, 247 Pac. 174
(1926).
121 Rea, Election to Take the Statutory Share, 29 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 506, 523 n.96
(1957).
122Moedy v. Moedy, 130 Colo. 464, 470-71, 276 P.2d 563, 566 (1954); Bostron v.
Bostron, 128 Colo. 535, 539, 265 P.2d 230, 232 (1953) ;Thuet v. Thuet, 128 Colo.
54, 60-61, 260 P.2d 604, 607 (1953) ; Phillips v. Phillips, 30 Colo. 516, 519-20, 71
Pac. 363, 364-65 (1903) ; Smith v. Smith, 22 Colo. 480, 486-87, 46 Pac. 128, 131
(1896).
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following statement has often been quoted with approval by the
Colorado court:
There can be no doubt of the power of a husband to dispose absolutely of his property during his life, independently of the concurrence, and exonerated from the claim of his wife, provided the
transaction is not merely colorable, and be unattended with circumstances indicative of fraud upon the rights of the wife. If the disposition of the husband be bona fide, and no right is reserved to
him, though 3made to defeat the right of the wife, it will be good
against her.1
In Ellis v. Jones the court laid down the proposition that intent to
deprive the wife of her rights was irrelevant, saying:
One cannot give away land without depriving his heirs of it. He is
presumed to intend the consequences of his own acts. He must
therefore be regarded as intending to deprive his heirs of what he
gives away; but all agree that he may give. Is it not, then, evident
that the intent is irrelevant, that if the deed is genuine, it is valid,
but that if it is a mere pretense it is invalid?
In other words, if
124
colorable, it is invalid, otherwise valid.
Other courts took this same position.'25 A colorable deed was defined
as one which is "counterfeit, feigned, having the appearance of truth
. ..not really intended as a deed."" This would mean that "fraud"
and "colorable" apply only to those transactions which are not really
what they purport to be, a sham or trick. If so, the only time the
wife would have any claim against the property transferred would
be when the property was still a part of the husband's probate estate.
Her rights would be no greater than the executor or any other party
interested in the estate. The only possible additional protection she
might have would be a subjective one - the tendency of the court to
look more closely at a transaction in which the wife's rights were
involved.
The often quoted statement from Kerr'27 to the effect that the
husband must reserve no interest to himself is also in doubt. In
Thuet v. Thuet'8 the transfer was upheld against the claim of the
surviving husband though the grantor retained a lifetime use, possession and control of the property, transferring the remainder by
irrevocably delivering a deed to a third party, with instructions to deliver the deed to the grantee only upon the grantor's death. 2 '
220 (1872).
Ellis v. Jones, 73 Colo. 516, 517, 216 Pac. 257, 258 (1923).
125Moedy v. Moedy, 130 Colo. 464, 471, 276 P.2d 563, 566-67 (1954); Norris v.
Bradshaw, 96 Colo. 594, 597, 45 P.2d 638, 639 (1935).
126 Ellis v. Jones, 73 Colo. 516, 517, 216 Pac. 257, 258 (1923).
127 KERR, FRAUD AND MISTAKE 220 (1872).
123 KERR, FRAUD AND MISTAKE
124

128128 Colo. 54, 260 P.2d 604 (1953).
129

See Moedy v. Moedy, 130 Colo. 464, 276 P.2d 563 (1954) ; Million v. Botefur, 90
Colo. 343, 9 P.2d 284 (1932).
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Thus, it would appear today that the wife is not in a position to
assert her statutory rights against a completed transfer, despite the
fact it was made with the intention of defeating her rights, and despite the fact the husband retains possession and control during his
lifetime.
The next question, logically, is what are the wife's rights if the
husband reserves a right to revoke the inter vivos disposition which
he has made. The Thuet case contained a warning, saying it would
have decided otherwise had the grantor retained a power of revocation. But, the transfer involved was not one in trust. A transfer not
in trust, if revocable, would not be a completed transfer. The property would remain in the husband's probate estate, against which
his wife could assert her statutory claim.13 This does not reach the
problem of her rights when the husband has a power of revocation
over a transfer in trust.
While the concept that a revocable deed does not convey any
present interest is true with regard to a transfer of a legal interest by
deed,131 this concept has been deemed inapplicable to transfers in
trust. 32 The beneficiary of a trust receives immediately a vested equitable interest, even though subject to being divested by revocation.'33
Though the validity of the revocable trust as nontestamentary is
established in Colorado, 3 ' the question of the rights of the wife in
the trust property remains open. In Richard v. James,'35 the trust was
attacked by the wife claiming her statutory share. The court upheld
the transfer against her claims, though it was in effect subject to a
power of revocation through a clause making the res subject to the
debts of the settlor upon his death. However, the court did not treat
the question of revocability, confining its comments to the fact there
was no indication the husband had intended to use the debt clause to
defeat the trust. The court dealt with the trust as irrevocable (which
it purported to be), and therefore, did not reach the problem of the
wife's rights in property held under revocable transfers in trust.
130 See Shores v. Shores, 134 Colo. 319, 303 P.2d 689 (1956) ; Falbo v. United States
Nat'l Bank, 116 Colo. 508, 181 P.2d 1020 (1947) ; Johnson v. Hilliard, 113 Colo.
548, 160 P.2d 386 (1945) ; Barnes v. Spangler, 93 Colo. 254, 25 P.2d 732 (1933) ;
Hardy v. Carrington, 87 Colo. 461, 288 Pac. 620 (1930); Thomas v. Thomas, 70
Colo. 29, 197 Pac. 243 (1921).
131 Ibid.
132 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 571 (2d ed. 1956) ; King, A Reappraisalof the Revocable Trust,
19 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 1, 3 nn,20 & 21 (1946). For a discussion of differences between gifts inter vivos and transfers in trust, see Schenkein, Widow's Right in Colorado to Set Aside Husband's Inter Vivos Transfer, 26 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 180, 187
(1954).
133 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 57.1 (2d ed. 1956).
134 Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667 (1958).
135 133 Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956).
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In Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht 3 ' the trust was attacked
by the settlor's wife, but the attack was on the ground that the trust
was testamentary in nature. The court held otherwise. There was
no alternative assertion by the wife that she was entitled to exercise
her statutory claim against the trust property even if it were deemed
nontestamentary."3 ' So, the question in Colorado remains open. However, the cases provide little reason to believe that the wife's rights in
the trust property will be recognized. On the contrary, they seem to
indicate that if the trust is deemed nontestamentary, it will be deemed
a valid, completed inter vivos transfer against the wife. 3
There is some authority and respected opinion that the wife
should not be precluded from asserting her rights simply because for
other purposes the trust would be valid as nontestamentary.' 9 While
no one would feel that the wife should be deprived of some right to
share in trust property over which the husband had a power of revocation, with control and enjoyment during his lifetime, it can be
argued that the solution lies in legislation. That is to say, in order to
preserve the conception of a revocable living trust as a valid, nontestamentary device, the decisions with regard to the wife's rights
should be consistent with those holding such trusts nontestamentary
in their creation and operation. When the wife's rights depend, as
they do in Colorado, on the property's being deemed a part of the
husband's probate estate, she should be precluded from reaching
trust property not in his probate estate. 4 '
It would seem a statute relating to the wife's rights in the trust
property would be appropriate. In 1947 Pennsylvania enacted the
following statute for the wife's protection:
A conveyance of assets by a person who retains a power of appointment by will, or a power of revocation or consumption over the
principal thereof, shall at the election of his surviving spouse, be
treated as a testamentary disposition so far as the surviving spouse
is concerned to the extent to which the power has been reserved,
but the right of the surviving spouse shall be subject to the rights of
136

137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667 (1958).

137 See 30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 517, 520 (1958).

138For a thorough and analytical examination of all aspects of the wife's statutory
share, see Rea, Election to Take the Statutory Share, 29 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 506
(1957).
130Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co.,
144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944) ; 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 57.5 (2d ed. 1956)
(arguable that though the creation of a revocable trust is not so far testamentary as
to be invalid under the statute of wills, it is so far testamentary as to allow the wife
to recover a distributive share) ; Rea, Election to Take the Statutory Share, 29 ROCKY
MT. L. REV. 506, 543 (1957).

140And certainly after Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667
(1958), there is no doubt but that the trust property is not a part of the probate
estate.
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any income beneficiary whose interest in income
becomes vested in
141
enjoyment prior to the death of the conveyor.

Such a statute would protect the wife without unnecessarily confusing the clear conception of the validity of the revocable trust which

now prevails in Colorado.
III.

UNFUNDED OR NOMINALLY FUNDED TRUSTS

A. Facts of Independent Significance and Incorporationby Reference
For a number of reasons the owner may not desire to place a
substantial amount of his property in the trust while living, yet does

desire to have such a trust as a receptacle to take property from his
will. He will not have the advantages which ordinarily inure to the
benefit of the settlor from the operation of the trust during his lifetime, but will have the advantages of the trust as it operates in a postdeath manner. There are two doctrines of the law of wills, incorporation by reference,142 and facts of independent significance," which
are applicable to pouring over property from a will into a previously
created inter vivos trust.
Without doubt, if the testator spelled out in his will the terms
of the inter vivos trust, he would have created a valid trust - a testamentary trust."' The testator would not have given property to the
inter vivos trust, but simply would have created a testamentary
trust, identical in terms to the previously created living trust. The
continuing supervision of the trust would be in the court having probate jurisdiction.'
However, if the testator attempts to devise or bequeath property
to a previously created trust, a different problem arises. The objection to such a disposition is that the trust, which is not an instrument
executed in accordance with the statute of wills, is going to control
the ultimate disposition of the property which it receives. It appears
to be a disposition of property owned at death not made in accordance with the requirements of the statute of wills. It is at this point
that the theories of incorporation by reference and facts of independent significance come into play.
If the testator, in lieu of repeating the terms of the living trust
tit. 20, § 301.11 (Purdon 1950). The conveyance is to be treated
'as" testamentary for this one purpose; it is not made testamentary. It also protects
persons who start to receive income before the settlor's death. This seems entirely
proper, since the wife should share only in that property which her husband enjoyed
throughout his life, and not in that property others were enjoying. See Joint State
Late Commission Comment, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (Purdon 1950).
42
1 ATKINSON, WILLS § 80 (2d ed. 1953).
143 Id. § 81.
141 PA. STAT. ANN.

144 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956).
5
14 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 152-14-11(3) (1953).
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in the will, simply refers to the trust previously created as an existing
instrument, adequately identifying it by reference, for example to its
title or date of creation, the trust instrument... will be deemed to
have been incorporated into the will. However, since this is tantamount to having repeated the terms of the trust in the will, the trust
47
is testamentary in nature, subject to court control and supervision.
Serious problems arise when an attempt is made to use this
theory to validate a trust which was, in accordance with its terms,
amended after the execution of the will. If the trust instrument were
amended after the execution of the will, when the will became operative upon the settlor's death, the trust instrument which it purported
to incorporate would no longer exist. If the will were deemed to incorporate the trust as amended, the testator would have, in effect,
amended his will other than by codicil in statutory form,' which
This conceptual problem has caused some
amendment is invalid.'
courts to hold the amended trust was not incorporated into the will."'
Of course, if the settlor amended the trust after the execution of his
will, but then executed a codicil to his will, which referred to the
trust as amended, as an existing instrument, the incorporation of the
amended trust would be valid."'
The theory of facts of independent significance has not been
circumscribed by the rigid conceptualistic tenets of the theory of incorporation by reference. "Even though a disposition cannot be fully
ascertained from the terms of the will, it is not invalid if it can be
ascertained from facts which have significance apart from their effect
upon the disposition in the will.""' This doctrine of wills was designed to make valid gifts to classes of persons, or to persons by description, where extrinsic evidence was necessary to determine the
members of the class or the person described. Since it requires facts
which have significance apart from their effect on this determination,
there is not the danger ordinarily present when reference is made to
documents outside the will which are not executed in compliance
with the statute of wills.
1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956) (trust instrument and not the trust which is
incorporated by reference).
147 Id. § 54.1 (doctrine of incorporation by reference not recognized in many states).
No cases were found in Colorado which dealt with the theory.
8
14 COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-5-2 (1963)
(requisites for a will). COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 153-1-1(15) (1963), provides that when the word "will" is used in Chapter 153
of the Colorado Revised Statutes, it shall include a codicil.
149 Freeman v. Hart, 61 Colo. 455, 158 Pac. 305 (1916).
50 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935) ; President
and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232
(1940).
151The same would be true if the trust were amended by a writing executed in accordance with the statute of wills. See Stouse v. First Nat'l Bank, 312 Ky. 405, 245
S.W.2d 914 (1951) ; 1 SCOTT,TRUSTS § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956).
1521 SCOTT,TRUSTS § 54.2 (2d ed. 1956).
146
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Perhaps two examples will serve to illustrate the doctrine and
the distinction it makes. If the testator left property "to those persons
whose names appear in a letter which will be found with my effects
at my death," it is clear that the letter, and the names of the persons
therein, have no significance except as they determine who shall take
property under the will."5 3 Thus, this disposition would be invalid
for failure to comply with the statute of wills. However, if the testator left property "to those persons in my employ at my death," then
this description, and the persons who bear such relationship to the
testator at his death, will have significance apart from the effect
upon the disposition because they would still be the persons in his
employ at his death whether or not the will had been made.5 4 While
each disposition would, in effect, allow the testator to change his
will (in the former, by changes in the letter after execution of the
will, and in the latter by selective hiring and retention of employees),
the possibility of fraud, which the statute of wills is designed to
avoid,'55 is not as likely in the latter case.
When the theory of independent significance is applied to the
problem of pouring over property to a revocable living trust, it is
more helpful in avoiding the conceptualistic difficulties of incorporation by reference when the trust is amended after the execution of
the will. The trust, even as amended, can be said to have independent significance as it exists at the time of the testator's death, apart
from its effect on the ultimate disposition of the property passing
under the will. 5 '
A problem arises when employing this theory if the trust is only
nominally funded during the settlor's lifetime. Can it be said the
trust has independent significance if its nominal funding was only to
create a receptacle for property to be poured over from the will?
Professor Scott thinks it cannot.'57 When this theory is employed,
how many trusts are created, one or two? Will the inter vivos trust
be treated as testamentary or inter vivos after the pour-over? Professor Scott feels that only one trust is created, and that it remains
inter vivos in nature.'58 There is some authority to this effect. 9
1s3

Id. § 54.

154

Id. § 54.2.

5

Id. § 57.2.
6
15 Id. § 54.3.
15

157

Ibid.

158 Ibid.
159

Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 1, 193 P.2d 721
(1948), noted in 22 So. CAL. L. REV. 205 (1949); In State ex rel. Citizens Bank
v. Superior Court, 236 Ind. 135, 138 N.E.2d 900 (1956); In re Estate of York,
95 N.H. 435, 65 A.2d 282 (1949).
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Colorado has solved the problems raised by these two theories with
regard to pour-overs, by statute providing:
(1) By a will, a testator may devise or bequeath property to a trustee of a trust which is evidenced by a written instrument in existence
when the will is made and which is identified in the will, even
though the trust is subject to amendment, modification, revocation
or termination, and irrespective of the value of the corpus of the
trust. Unless the will provides otherwise, the property so beleathed or devised shall be treated as an addition to the trust and
sall be governed by the terms and provisions of the instrument
creating the trust, including any amendments or modifications in
writing made at any time before or after the making of the will
and before the death of the testator, and upon proper delivery of the
property so devised and bequeathed to the trustee as such, the
property so devised or bequeathed shall be no longer subject to
the jurisdiction of the county court. No reference to any such trust
in any will shall cause the assets held under the provisions of such
trust instrument at the time of the death of the testator to be in16
cluded in the property administered as part of the testator's estate.
This statute solves the problem under the theory of incorporation by
reference concerning the subsequent amendment of the trust after
the execution of the will. It eliminates the question raised under the
theory of facts of independent significance about the value of the
trust assets which must be present to make the trust of more than
nominal significance. It eliminates any doubt about the jurisdiction
of the court after the property passing under the will is paid over to
the trustee; it solves the problem of whether the living trust becomes
testamentary when a pour-over is made; and it expressly keeps assets
already in the trust at the testator's death from having to go through
the process of probate.16'
B. Insurance Trusts
Another increasingly common type of unfunded inter vivos trust
is the life insurance trust.'62 It is like the ordinary inter vivos trust
except that the trustee has no duties to perform and there is no property to be managed until the death of the insured.'63 As noted earlier,
life insurance has been held to be nontestamentary in nature as have
life insurance trusts. 6 " The theory of validity is that the trustee, as
60

1 CoLo. REV. STAT.

§

153-5-44 (1963). COLO. REV.

STAT.

§ 153-16-3 (1963)

con-

tains similar provisions for property bequeathed or devised to a charitable trust.
161 See generally Kemp, Recent Colorado Legislation Greatly Enhances the Utility of

Testamentary and Inter Vivos Life Insurance Trusts, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 382,
62

1

386, for a discussion of possible problems of construction which might be raised in
future litigation.

VANCE, INSURANCE § 119 (3d ed. 1951); 50

HARV.

L. REV. 511 (1937).

163 Hawley, The Use of Life Insurance in Planning Small Estates, 25 ROCKY MT. L.
REV. 149, 160 '(1953).
164 Sigal v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 119 Conn. 570, 177 Atl. 742 (1935);
In re Albert Anderson Life Ins. Trust, 67 S.D. 393, 293 N.W. 527 (1940); 46
HARV. L. REV. 818 (1933).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 43

beneficiary of the policy, immediately becomes the trustee of his interest as beneficiary. He may be designated in the beneficiary provisions of the policy as trustee, or he may be a beneficiary who agrees
with the insured to hold his interests in trust." 5
If the insured has no right to change the beneficiary, there is no
question but that the trust is not testamentary, since the trustee has
indefeasibly vested rights as beneficiary of the policy. 66 Where the
insured does have a right to change the beneficiary of the policy, the
minority view follows the theory which supports revocable trusts;
that is, the beneficiary has a vested right, even though subject to being divested, which he holds in trust.'67 While a majority of jurisdictions adopt the view that the beneficiary of the policy has a mere
expectancy interest which will ripen into a property right only upon
the insured's death without his having changed the beneficiary, this
expectancy interest is consistently, nevertheless, found to be a sufficient right to constitute the res of a valid inter vivos trust. 8
Insurance trusts are valid in Colorado,'69 even if there is a right
to change the beneficiary of the policy or to revoke the trust.76 Colorado has passed legislation designed to enhance and facilitate the
creation of insurance trusts (and trusts of proceeds payable under
other contractual arrangements), providing that the owner of the
policy may designate as beneficiary of the policy a trustee named in
any inter vivos or testamentary trust existing at the time of such
designation. 7 ' The statute provides that it is not necessary to the
validity of such a trust that there be any trust corpus other than the
right to receive the designated benefits. Provision is also made for
the designation as beneficiary of a trustee who is named or who is to
be named in, or ascertainable under, the will of the person making
the designation. 7 It also provides that the terms of the trust agreement shall control the extent to which the proceeds of the insurance
13
shall be subject to the debts of the insured if paid to such a trustee.
165 1 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 57.3 (2d ed. 1956).

166 VANCE, INSURANCE § 106 (3d ed. 1951); Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest in a
Life Insurance Policy, 31 YALE L.J. 343, 344 (1922).
167Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 47 A.2d 340 (1946) ; Fidel-

ity Title and Trust Co. v. Graham, 262 Pa. 273, 105 At. 295 (1918); VANCE, INSURANCE § 108 (3d ed. 1951).
168 Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P.2d 841 (1945) ; Gordon v. Portland Trust
Bank, 201 Ore. 648, 271 P.2d 653 (1954) ; VANCE, INSURANCE § 108 (3d ed.
1951).
169 Bosma v. Evans, 96 Colo. 504, 44 P.2d 511 (1935) ; Fee v. Wells, 65 Colo. 348,
176 Pac. 829 (1918).
170 Brown v.International Trust Co., 130 Colo. 543, 278 P.2d 581 (1954).
171 COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-19-1 (1963), as amended, Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 39,
§ 437, at 378.
172
Ibid.
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Thus, even the man of modest means may arrange a trust during
his lifetime for what may be the largest asset he leaves without its
being testamentary in nature and unfettered by the claims of his
creditors.
IV.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Rule Against Perpetuities
The rule against perpetuities is in effect in all states as the common law rule except as modified by statute.17 The rule was made
applicable in Colorado by a statute adopting the common law of
England.' Professor Gray states the rule: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest.'' I The Colorado court,
in some earlier cases, seemed to graft onto the common law rule the
provision that the gestation period is allowed as an automatic extension of the gross period of the rule.'77 However, it would seem that
this unwarranted modification was unintentional, and that Colorado
17 8
follows the rule as stated by Professor Gray.
The rule is applicable to equitable interests as well as legal interests.'79 Therefore, the drafter of the inter vivos trust must always
keep it in mind when drafting the dispositive provisions of the trust.
Colorado applies what has been called "Gray's remorseless construction"' 80 by ascertaining first whether the interest under consideration
is vested or contingent; and, if contingent, the rule is then applied
"remorselessly."'
There is a special question with regard to revocable trusts;
namely, when does the rule begin to run? Does it commence to
measure the period from the date of the creation of the trust, or, on
the other hand, from the date of the death of the settlor, when his
power to revoke ceases? The policy underlying the rule is to prohibit
174 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 200 (4th ed. 1942).
5
17 COLO. REV. STAT. § 135-1-1 (1963).
176 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
177 In re Tritch's Will, 1 Colo. (Nisi Prius) Dec. 42, 44 (1900) ; Chilcott v. Hart, 23
Colo. 40, 59, 45 Pac. 391, 398 (1896).
178 Gray's definition was noted with approval in Miller v. Weston, 67 Colo. 534, 539,
189 Pac. 610, 612 (1920). Though after Miller there was again mention of the
fraction period in Gregory v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 91 Colo. 172, 175, 13 P.2d 273,
274 (1932), it was only "in cases of posthumous birth" and not as an automatic
extension. Dean King felt the courts always meant only to state the common law
rule which permits the inclusion of actual periods of gestation. KING, FUTURE INTERESTS IN COLORADO 109 (1950).
179 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 62.10 (2d ed. 1956).
180 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 629 (4th ed. 1942) ("[Elvery provision in a will or settlement is to be construed as if the Rule did not exist, and then
to the provision so construed the Rule is to be remorselessly applied.").
181 Colorado Nat'l Bank v. McCabe, 143 Colo. 21, 29, 353 P.2d 385, 389 (1960), noted
in 33 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 252 (1961).
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the creation of contingent future interests with remote vesting which
would fetter the marketability of property for too long a period. 8 '
Professor Scott is of the opinion that the policy of the rule is not
violated if the rule begins to run only at the settlor's death; 83 other
authorities,' and what is apparently the sole case on the point take
the same position.' 8 '
Since the revocable inter vivos trust serves as a dispositive instrument, the drafter must keep the rule in mind. Once the problem
of when the rule begins to run has been determined from the nature
of the instrument, the rule's application under the revocable trust
will be the same as under any other dispositive instrument.8 '
B. Manner of Revocation
A trust is not revocable unless the power to revoke is expressly
reserved in the trust instrument.'87 While it is clear that the trust is
valid if such a power is reserved, the question of the effective method
of revocation remains. It would seem to be insufficient simply to
manifest an intention to revoke. Rather, the trust may be revoked
only in the manner specified in the trust instrument. 8
C. The Statute of Frauds
By statute in Colorado any trust "concerning lands, or in any
manner relating thereto" must be created by an instrument in writing
in order to be valid. 88 Of course, a trust prepared by an attorney
would invariably be evidenced by a formal trust instrument whether
or not any interest relating to land were involved. Partial performance will take an oral trust from the operation of the statute. "
With regard to assignments of interests in trusts, Colorado provides by statute that any assignment or grant of any existing trusts
"in lands, goods or things in action" shall be void unless in writing.'
182 Barry v. Newton, 130 Colo. 106, 114-15, 273 P.2d 735, 740 (1954) ; GRAy, THE
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 2 (4th ed. 1942).
1831 Scorr, TRUSTS § 62.10(1)

(2d ed. 1956).

§ 524.1 '(4th ed. 1942); Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638, 662 (1938).

1'4 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

185 Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Von Hamm-Young Co., 34 Hawaii 288 (1937),
noted in 51 HARv. L. REV. 172 (1938).
186 For a discussion of Colorado cases, see KING, FUTURE INTERESTS IN COLORADO,
Ch. 7 (1950).
187 Smith v. Simons, 99 Colo. 227, 230, 61 P.2d 589, 590 (1936).
188 Brown v. International Trust Co., 130 Colo. 543, 546, 278 P.2d 581, 583 (1954)
(where trust instrument provided for revocation by writing delivered to trustees in
the settlor's lifetime, revocation could not be by will).
189 COLO. REV. STAT. § 59-1-6 (1963) ; Kennedy v. Bates, 142 Fed. 5 (1905) ; Griffid v. Sands, 84 Co. 456, 271 Pac. 191 (O98) ; Agnew v. Agnew, 57 Colo. 81.
185 Pac. 259 (1919) ; Farrand v. Beoshoar, 9 Colo. 291, 12 Pac. 196 (1886).
190 Bushner v. Bushner, 134 Colo. 509, 307 P.2d 204 (1957); Vandewiele v. Vandewiele, 110 Colo. 556, 136 P.2d 523 (1943).
19 1COLO. REV. STAT. § 59-1-18 (1963).
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D. Tax Aspects of the Revocable Living Trust
There are no tax advantages to be gained from the use of the
revocable trust." 2 However, neither are there any tax disadvantages,
for all of the tax saving benefits given under the federal and state
revenue codes can be utilized through the use of a revocable trust, as
well as through the use of a will.193 No gift tax will be paid on the
inter vivos transfer of property to the trustee, since the gift, because
of the power of revocation, is incomplete.'94 The transfer will not suffice to take the property placed in trust from the settlor's gross estate
for federal estate tax purposes because of the aspect of revocability. 9 '
If the settlor reserves the income from the trust for life, he will of
course be taxed on the income received.'96 With regard to the Colorado Inheritance Tax, it is provided that where there is a power in a
deed of trust to revoke the trust the property in the trust at the settlor's death is taxable to the settlor's estate to the extent of the unexercised power to revoke. 9 '
V.

ADVANTAGES OF THE REVOCABLE INTER

Vivos

TRUST

There are a number of advantages of the revocable inter vivos
trust. A settlor may retain control and enjoyment of his property
for life, with the advantages of professional management, knowing
he has created a dispositive scheme which will continue to operate
without interruption upon his death.'98 The settlor may "keep his
hand in" by the retained powers, even serving as a trustee.199 The
settlor has the opportunity to see the trust, and the trustees, in operation; hence it allows him to see how his post-death arrangement
for the administration of his estate will operate."' A will can never
afford this chance. Because of the lack of formalities in the creation
of a trust,2"' it is less likely to invite attack by heirs of the settlor. °'
The revocable trust is a good arrangement to provide in advance for
192 Casner, Avoidance of Probate, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 108, 112-13 (1960) ("Thus the
use . . . of an arrangement to avoid probate when . .. [the owner] retains control
until his death must find its attractions in reasons other than avoidance during ...
[the owner's] lifetime of federal income taxes and avoidance on his death of federal
estate taxes." ).
193 Meyer, Non-Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust, 37 DICTA 333, 341 (1960).
94

1

Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1958).
§§ 2036, 2038.

195 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

196 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 676-77.

197 COLO. REv. STAT. § 138-3-10 (1963).
198 SHATTUCK &

FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 85 (2d ed. 1953); Meyer,

Non-Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust, 37 DICTA 333 (1960).
19 1 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 57.6 (2d ed. 1956); Meyer, Non-Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust, 37 DICTA 333, 342 (1960).
200 King, Trusts as Substitutes for Wills, 14 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1941).
201 id. at 4-5.
202 Meyer, Non-Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust, 37 DICTA 333, 334-35 (1960).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 43

the possible incapacity of the settlor, avoiding the concommitant necessity for a conservatorship.2 It provides a means, as any trust, of
protecting the beneficiaries from their own indiscretion, and in the
case of minors may eliminate the necessity for the appointment of a
guardian.'
Perhaps the most notable advantage of the revocable trust is the
avoidance of probate for the property constituting the res of the
trust. By avoiding probate the estate is saved executor's fees, the
executor's attorney's fees and court costs,2" all of which run between
five and ten per cent of the value of the probate estate in Colorado.0 8
The publicity incident to probate is also avoided since the trust is not
a matter of public record as is the will and its attendant probate
papers." 7 The delay of probate is also absent. 8
If the trust encompasses business enterprises of the settlor, they
may continue to operate under the guidance of the trustees without
interruption upon the settlor's death. This result cannot be obtained
by the use of a will, since an executor's duty is to act as a short-term
fiduciary, winding up the operation of businesses and closing the
estate.2"
It has been asserted that advantage also stems from the subjective practice of attorneys to make wills stereotyped in practice and to
use greater imagination and ingenuity in the drafting of trusts.210
An important advantage is that inter vivos trusts are not subject
to court accounting and control procedures. 21 ' This is true even if the
86, 87 (2d ed. 1953).
2o4 Id. at 189.
205 While there may be transfer taxes on stock placed in trust (Internal Revenue Code
Section 4321), they would not be substantial enough to offset the gain achieved by
avoiding probate. Casner, Estate Planning-Avoidance
of Probate, 60 COLUM. L.
REv. 108, 114 (1960).
206Meyer, Non-Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust, 37 DICTA 333, 336 (1960);
Rea, Election to Take the Statutory Share, 29 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 506, 541 n.201
(1957).
207 Though a copy of the trust must be filed in tax offices, they are not open to public
scrutiny as are probate files. Meyer, Non.Tax Advantages of the Revocable Trust,
37 DICTA 333, 336 (1960). Of course, there may be those to whom publicity concerning their financial affairs following death is unimportant, but who are extremely
reluctant to divulge information to attorneys or trustees while alive.
208King, Trusts as Substitutes for Wills, 14 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 1, 4 (1941).
209 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 6 (2d ed. 1956):Although an executor might continue a business for a short while, he could not do so for the length of time or with the facility
of a trustee. In Calkins, Administration of Testate Estates, 29 ROCKY MT. L. REV.
557, 564-65 (1957), it was stated that "if the decedent was engaged in a business
. . . a court order authorizing its continuance should be obtained. The right to continue the business, however, is limited to a 'reasonable time,' in order to provide for
efficient liquidation (Colorado Revised Statute section 153-10-34 (1963)]. This
would seem to require the disposal of the business by the executor, unless the will
gives him power to continue and distribute it on closing the estate."
210 SHATTUCK & FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 89 '(2d ed. 1953).
211 Id. at 195.
203 SHATTUCK & FARR, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK

REVOCABLE TRUST

1966

trust receives a pour-over increment from the will of the settlor. 12
Testamentary trusts are subject, however, to court control with annual
accounting requirements, unless it appears to the court that it was
not the intention of the testator that the court should not continue
the administration of the estate.13
At least with regard to personal property, the law of inter vivos
trusts can be the law of the most liberal jurisdiction with regard to
such trusts, if desired by the settlor, for it has been held that the law
of the situs of the trust property controls the validity and operation
of the trust, and not the law of the settlor's domicile. 14 While at
present Colorado seems among the most liberal of jurisdictions with
regard to the validity of revocable trusts, this factor could be of importance if the position were reversed.
CONCLUSION

Brecht"r

The Von
case unreservedly carries the Colorado court's
imprimatur of validity for a trust created by a formal trust instrument which reserves a life estate to the settlor and a power to revoke
or amend the trust. The opinion acknowledges that the trust may retain its inter vivos nature if the settlor also reserves "additional
powers if he does not go too far." It specifically held that the reservation by the settlor of the "additional power" to veto investments
proposed by the trustee when the amount involved was in excess of
$1,000 "did not go too far."
It is impossible to say what "additional powers" the court had in
mind when it appended its warning. Indeed the cautionary phrase
may indicate simply a feeling that somehow a settlor might retain so
much control the trust would be testamentary in nature.
Concerning "additional powers" which relate to the settlor's
control over investments, clearly no meaningful distinction can be
made between the control by the settlor over investments involving
in excess of $1,000 which existed in Von Brecht, and control over all
investments regardless of value. Similarly, no meaningful distinction
can be made to depend upon whether the settlor merely has a veto
power over investment decisions proposed by the trustees as in Von
Brecht, or whether, on the other hand, investment initiatives must
come from the settlor, and then be executed by the trustee. Thus,
projecting from the Von Brecht case, in Colorado a settlor should be
able to retain complete control over all investment decisions, in addi2 12

2 13

COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-5-44 (1963).
COLo. Rav. STAT.

§ 153-14-11(3)

(1963),

as amended, Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, ch.

39, § 432 at 378.
214 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958),

noted in 72 HARV. L. REv. 695 (1959).
215 Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht, 137 Colo. 88, 322 P.2d 667 (1958).
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tion to his life estate and the power to revoke and amend, without
destroying the nontestamentary nature of the trust.
One can imagine a trust which would allow the settlor to retain
possession of the trust assets, although legal title has been transferred to another as trustee. The beneficiaries other than the settlor
would, of course, have received at the creation of the trust presently
vested interests despite the retained power to revoke. Possession by
the settlor is not in derogation of their equitable title. Indeed, possession may represent nothing more than the only effective way the
settlor may enjoy a retained life estate, for example, if the trust contains a home, paintings, furniture or similar types of property. Surely
then, retained possession is not the reservation by which the settlor
might "go too far."
In order to describe the outer limits of the degree of control
that may be retained, assume the revocable instrument provides that
the trustee shall hold title to the trust property for the settlor for life
with provisions for disposition after his death to others, and also
provides that the settlor shall retain possession of the trust assets,
keep the trust records, and make all decisions, both discretionary and
ministerial, concerning the operation of the trust. The trust, however, is "active" in the sense it will not be executed by the statute of
uses, because the trustee will be required to participate by signing
deeds and other title documents, insurance applications, and similar
papers requiring the assent of the holder of the legal title to the trust
assets. Tie settlor has presently conveyed defeasible equitable interests to the beneficiaries of the trust. There has been an inter vivos
transaction. The reserved control over the trust assets is not in derogation of that present legal title.
Clearly a settlor may create a revocable trust by self-declaration
of trust, as well as by transfer of property to a third person as trustee. The settlor would, as trustee, have complete dominion over the
trust assets. He could also retain a life estate. One may be both the
trustee and a beneficiary of a trust. So long as beneficial interests
exist in others no merger of legal and equitable title takes place."'
True, the settlor holds dominion in a fiduciary capacity in such a
situation. He must exercise his powers as trustee in compliance
with his fiduciary duties. However it would seem that the settlor
who creates a trust by transfer to a third person, but who retains virtually complete control over and possession of the trust assets, might
be held to a fiduciary standard also. One who knowingly participates
in a breach of trust, even though not himself a trustee, is liable to the
beneficiaries of the trust.217
216 1
217

ScoTT,

TRUSTS § 99.1 (2d ed. 1956).

3 id. § 326.5.
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The requirements of the statute of wills are designed to guarantee that the proferred document is in truth the will of the decedent.
The fraud which the statute is designed to prevent is the offering of
a document which is, either in whole or in part, not the will of the
testator.
In any situation involving an inter vivos trust, there is the chance
the document signed by the settlor will be changed after his death,
and an altered or totally new document substituted. The extensive
safeguards of the statute of wills would not be available to deter or
assist in the discovery of such a fraud. The point is, however, that
the likelihood of such a fraud is no greater where the settlor has reserved extensive control over the administration of the trust than
where he has not. Indeed, it is no greater than that which exists
where the trust is irrevocable and the settlor has no control over the
administration of the trust or over the trust assets.
If the owner of property simply gives possession of it to another,
with directions as to its disposition at his death if the latter still holds
it at that time, the relationship of principal and agent exists. The
agency terminates automatically at the death of either the principal
(owner) or the agent (possessor).18 No property interests were intended to pass to those covered by the post-death dispositive scheme
until after the owner's death. The attempted post-mortem disposition
is clearly testamentary in nature and invalid for failure to comply
with the statute of wills. Professor Scott says that "[i]t would seem
that the legal title is in his agent."' 9 This may be true if the owner
transfers legal title to an agent simply in order that the agent might
carry out the purposes of the agency, for example, a sale. In such a
situation the owner is not conveying equitable title to others. Indeed,
he may be retaining it himself. However, if the owner conveys legal
title to another whom he designates as his "agent," but it is made
clear that the "agent" is only to have naked legal title to the property
and is to hold such title for other designated persons, a trust has been
created. Present equitable property interests have been created in
the "other designated persons." If such is the intent, of course, it
makes no difference that the transferee has been denominated an
"agent" rather than a "trustee." The intention of the transferor is to
convey presently an equitable interest in the transferred property to
the designated beneficiaries and he has taken the accepted steps to
accomplish his purpose. A distinction exists, which should be recognized, between a true agency with mere possession, and an "agency"
2181 id. § 57.2; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 120-21 (1958).
219 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 57.2,

at 450 (2d ed. 1956).
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with legal title in the "agent" and equitable title in other designated
persons. The latter are beneficiaries of a valid inter vivos trust.
Thus, it can be argued that the conceptual basis for supporting
revocable inter vivos trusts should be sufficient to support any inter
vivos disposition of legal title, or any self-declaration of trust, where
it appears the settlor intended to create thereby, present interests in
those beneficiaries designated to take following his death. Retained
possession of or control over the trust property, whether or not in a
fiduciary capacity, is not inconsistent with the concept that there are
present interests in the beneficiaries other than the settlor.
It is unlikely this analysis of the theoretical support for the validity of revocable inter vivos trusts will cause attorneys to be so bold
as to advise their clients they may create a trust by conveying legal
title to a trustee, keeping the trustee available only to sign deeds, insurance and other papers. Nevertheless, it seems that logic and presently existing legal doctrines could support the valid inter vivos nature of such a trust.
Clearly Colorado attorneys may offer their clients the prospect
of a revocable trust, with a reserved life estate and virtual control
over investments, as a will substitute. It will provide a flexible estate
planning device, achieving living and post-death objectives desired
by the settlor. Currently, problems would persist concerning marital
rights of a surviving spouse and the rights of decedent's creditors. If
the legislature continues to favor the protection of a spouse's and a
creditor's claim to a decedent's "property," legislation should be
enacted for the protection of both. Technical distinctions concerning
what assets constitute decedent's "property" available for the surviving spouse and creditors, which are sufficient to obviate the necessity
of complying with the statute of wills, are not potent enough to warrant thwarting these social policies.

THE PUBLIC GRAZING LANDS
By
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Mr. Kingery's thesis is that public lands under the regulationof
the Taylor Grazing Act are managed and restored more effectively
than under prior land laws. He develops this idea by tracing the history of public domain which gave rise to the Taylor Grazing Act.
Procedure and the rights granted a grazer under the Act are then
analyzed. The authornext discusses the enforcement and application
of the Act, emphasizing judicial and later legislative approvalfor the
resultant range improvement. He concludes with a discussion of
problems confronting the administrationof the Act by new use demands for public domain.

I.

HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

ANGE wars will probably continue as long as open range
6C)
exists," wrote Circuit Judge Jean Breitenstein in a 1964
opinion involving the federal government's administration of public
lands for grazing.'
The tradition of the open range - uncontrolled use of the public
lands by western livestock men - has meant violence not only between users and would-be users, but violence to the range itself,
caused by overgrazing and consequent damaging erosion.' By custom,
livestock had been permitted to run loose upon the western range.
The federal government, constitutionally the only body able to limit
use of federal land, tacitly suffered the lands to be so used by failing
to grant citizens the right to graze cattle on these lands.4 The result
was open range, described by the Supreme Court as, "[A]n implied
license . . . that the public lands . . . shall be free to the people who
seek to use them where they are left open and unenclosed....
After generations of free and unlimited use, Congress first imposed restrictions on the public grazing lands in 1891, by creating
the National Forests.6 Aims of the act creating National Forests and
objectives of the Taylor Grazing Act,7 passed forty-three years later,
*Member, Colorado Bar; B.A. Cornell University, 1954; J.D. University of Denver,
1965.
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United States, 379 U.S. 879 (1964).
United States v. Thompson, 41 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Wash. 1941) ; 60 YALE L.J. 455,
462 (1951).

3 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
4
5

Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 352 (1918).
Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890).

626 Stat. 1103 (1891), 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1958).
748 Stat. 1269 (1934),43 U.S.C. § 315 (1958).
329
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coincided. The Supreme Court described the purpose of the National
Forests as preservation of forest land from depredation and destruction.' Preservation of the range became a necessary correlative objective, since about a third of the National Forest land was grazing land.
Creation of the forest reserves caused strenuous and violent opposition, both on the range and in the courts? Early in their history,
the western states had enacted "fence laws" declaring that livestock
which inadvertently wandered onto unfenced land not belonging to
their owners could not be regarded as trespassers.'" When the Forest
Service declared that no one could graze his animals on unfenced National Forest land without a permit, many ranchers rebelled. However, the United States Supreme Court in Light v. United States" rejected the rancher's interpretation of the fence law as a license to let
cattle run free, regardless of whose range the animals might stray
onto and regardless of where the rancher might intend them to wander. The Court approved issuance of an injunction prohibiting Light
from grazing his cattle on federal land.
The western federal judges, while sympathetic to the livestock
man, consistently enforced the right of the government to control the
use of its land, a right based on the Constitution's language authorizing Congress to "dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States."" In another case, the Supreme Court held that the
government could deal with its land "precisely as a private individual
may deal with his farming property.""
Nonetheless, the Colorado Supreme Court backed up the rebellious ranchers and specifically rejected Light.4 To do otherwise, said
the Colorado court, would nullify the Colorado fence law. The court
agreed that the fence statute did not apply if the owner has wilfully
8

United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). See also Ex parte Hyde, 194 Fed.
207, 213 (1904).
9 For a vivid account of the Routt County, Colorado, ranchers' early reactions to the
Forest Service, and of a trumped-up criminal charge against a Forest Ranger, see
BURROUGHS, WHERE THE OLD WEST STAYED YOUNG

278 (1962).

The case was

People v. Ratliff, 14th Judicial Court, Routt County, Colorado, June 11, 1909.
0

1 ALASKA REV. STAT. tit. 30, § 03.30.040 (1962); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-341,
24-501 (1956); CAL. AGRi. CODE § 402 (1954); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13-2
(1963); IDAHO CODE § 25-2201 (1948); MONT. REV. CODE § 46-1409 (1961);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 569.450 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-17-1 (1953); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 608.015 (1963) ; TEX. CIV. STAT. 3947 '(Vernon's 1960) ; REV. CODE
WASH. ANN. § 16.60.015 (1962); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 11-532 (1957). But see
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-101 (1949) (local option); N.D. GEN. CODE ANN.

§ 36-11-02

(1960)

(contra); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 4-12-7 and 4-12-9 (1953)

(common law rule, with local option to modify).
11 220 U.S. 523 (1911).

(This case also arose in Routt County, Colorado.)

12 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897).
14 Williamson v. Fleming, 65 Colo. 528, 178 Pac. 11 (1918).
'3
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or wantonly driven his cattle to trespass,"5 but held that if the owner
merely leaves his cattle to drift, although he knows they will trespass
onto government lands, the fence law protects him.8l
New Mexico apparently followed the reasoning of the Colorado
court." Although the New Mexico court cited Light and even though
the fact situation indicates that the owner must have known of a
probable or sure trespass, the court found no liability. Other state
courts, however, interpreted their fence laws differently and followed
the ruling in Light. 8
A related problem which confronted the government on its public lands concerned checkerboard land holdings. Due to these patterns
of alternating public and private ownership, a landowner frequently
could, by fencing his own lands, prevent access to the public domain.
The patterns included juxtaposed public and private lands, alternating holdings of different private owners, and non-adjacent parcels of
leased land alternating with either federal land or land of other lessees. 9 The checkerboards, which originated through grants to railroads as incentives for building lines west and grants to states for the
benefit of schools, have created a headache for the government. The
United States has frequently gone to court to free its lands from these
restrictive fences and the federal courts have consistently held that
a rancher cannot fence his land so as to enclose the public land."0
Although Congress can prescribe rules governing the public
lands, the state may prescribe regulations which do not interfere with
Bell v. Gonzales, 35 Colo. 138, 83 Pac. 639 (1905).
'6Williamson v. Fleming, 65 Colo. 528, 530, 178 Pac. 11, 12 (1919); Richards v.
Sanderson, 39 Colo. 271, 278-79, 89 Pac. 769, 771 (1907).
17Hill v. Winkler, 21 N.M. 5, 151 Pac. 1014 (1915) (trespassing defendant cut down
fence around a well).
18 Dorman v. Erie, 63 Mont. 579, 208 Pac. 908 (1922); Chilcott v. Rea, 52 Mont. 134,
155 Pac. 1114 (1916).
19For examples of cases involving checkerboard patterns of land holdings, see: Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897) ;United States v. Morrell, 331 F.2d 498
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, Chournos v. United States, 379 U.S. 879 (1964); Oman
v. United States, 195 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Chournos v. United States, 193
F.2d 321 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 977 (1952) ;Kunzler v. United States,
208 F. Supp. 79 (D. Utah 1961), appeal dismissed, 307 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1962).
20Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897); Stoddard v. United States, 214
Fed. 566 (8th Cir. 1914) ;United States v. Bernard, 202 Fed. 728 (9th Cir. 1913);
Lillis v. United States, 190 Fed. 530 '(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 726 (1911);
Hanley v. United States, 186 Fed. 711 (9th Cir. 1911); Simpson v. United States,
184 Fed. 817 (8th Cir. 1911) ; Bircher v. United States, 169 Fed. 589 (9th Cir.
1909) ; Carroll v. United States, 154 Fed. 425 (9th Cir. 1907) ; Krause v. United
States, 147 Fed. 442 (8th Cir. 1906) ; Cardwell v. United States, 136 Fed. 593 (9th
Cir. 1905), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 599 (1909); Thomas v. United States, 136 Fed.
159 (9th Cir. 1905).
For a report of a recent controversy in Wyoming and in Congress, see: The Rocky
Mountain News, Oct. 4, 1965, p. 5, cols. 4-5; Id., Oct. 6, 1965, p. 5, cols. 4-5; Id.,
Oct. 7, 1965, p. 55, cols. 1-3; Id., Oct. 8, 1965, p. 40, cols. 2-3; Id., Oct. 10, 1965,
p. 5, cols. 3-5.
15

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 43

and are not inconsistent with the congressional regulations.2 The
states do not have power to confer the right to graze upon the public
lands ;2" they can merely control grazing.23 State controls generally were
of three forms, each favoring various dominant interests in the states :24
legislation to prefer local stockmen over stockmen from other states;
fence laws protecting stockmen against settlers ;25 and legislation protecting classes of livestock growers 6 - especially cattlemen from
sheepmen.2 State courts declared the statutes of the first type those preferring local stockmen - unconstitutional28 but the Supreme
Court upheld fence laws' and the laws discriminating against sheepmen."0 These discriminations found their legal basis in the widespread belief that sheep ruin the range for cattle and that exclusion
of sheep is necessary in order to preserve the range." Even federal
range regulations reflected this preference. 2
The continuing range wars and continuing range deterioration
provided the impetus for enactment of a federal statute to regulate
grazing on the public lands. A fifteen-year political battle over closer
21

McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922) ; Denee v. Ankeny, 246 U.S. 208
(1918) ; Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918) ; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S.
311 (1907) ; Itcaina v. Marble, 56 Nev. 420, 55 P.2d 625 (1936) ; Big Butte Horse
& Cattle Ass'n v. Anderson, 133 Ore. 171, 289 Pac. 503 (1930).
2 Notes 6, 7, and 21 supra. With the establishment of the National Forests and passage
of the Taylor Grazing Act, Congress has pre-empted the field. However an Arizona
court has held that even though the state cannot issue grazing permits for federal
lands [Schell v. White, 80 Ariz. 156, 294 P.2d 385 (1956)], if a Taylor Grazing Act
permit expires and the government fails to act on the renewal application, the state
law governs until the government acts. In Garcia v. Sumrall, 58 Ariz. 526, 121 P.2d
640 (1942), the court held that the former permit-holder was a month-to-month
tenant and could enforce a trespass action against anyone but the United States.
3Big Butte Horse & Cattle Ass'n v. Anderson, 133 Ore. 171, 289 Pac. 503 (1930).
24
Carpenter, The Public Domain in Colorado, 13 RoCKY MTN. L. REv. 296 (1941).
2 The fence laws allowed livestock to graze any place not enclosed by fences; i.e., the
farmer had to fence his fields to exclude grazing animals. See discussion in text at
note 16 supra.
26 Lamoreaux v. Kinney, 41 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1930) ; State v. Brace, 49 Idaho 580, 290
Pac. 722 (1930).
27
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918) ; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311
(1907) ; Lamoreaux v. Kinney, 41 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1930) ; Big Butte Horse & Cattle
Ass'n v. Anderson, 133 Ore. 171, 289 Pac. 503 (1930).
28
People v. McPherson, 76 Colo. 395, 232 Pac. 675 (1925); State v. Butterfield Live
Stock Co., 17 Idaho 441, 106 Pac. 455 (1909) ; Hostetler v. Harris, 45 Nev. 43, 197
Pac. 697 (1921).
29
Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890) ; Lazarus v. Phelps, 152 U.S. 81 (1894) (although not always approving their application by the state courts).
30
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918) (sheep could not graze range previously grazed by cattle) ; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907) (no livestock grazing within two miles of any dwelling.- a measure directed at the ubiquitous sheep).
31-Bacon v.Walker, 204 U.S. 311A
1907 ).
3Dastervignes v. United States, 122 Fed. 30, 31 (9th Cir. 1903). A regulation prohibited grazing of sheep and goats except in areas where rainfall would insure "rapid
renewal of herbage and undergrowth" and allowing grazing by other livestock as long
as "injury is not being done the forest growth and water supply .. "
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federal management of the public lands"3 culminated in enactment of
the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934.11
I1. TAYLOR GRAZING ACT -

ADMINISTRATION

Congress passed the Taylor Grazing Act in order to benefit and
stabilize the livestock industry," to protect grazing rights and privileges,3" and to provide "the most beneficial use of the public range.""'1
To carry out these purposes, the administration of the act is vested in
the Bureau of Land Management. 8 The Bureau's job is to manage
and improve the range by eliminating overgrazing which thereby prevents erosion on public and private lands. As more demands arise for
use of the public domain, the Bureau is also faced with the problem
of selecting the highest or most beneficial use of the public lands. 9
The Director of the Bureau oversees agencies for each of the ten
major public land states."0 A District Manager is in charge of each of
these agencies, which in turn, supervises several grazing districts.
The Act sets up an Advisory Board for each District.4 Holders
of grazing permits elect the members of the District Boards, with each
class of stockmen (cattlemen and sheepmen) represented. The State
Director appoints one additional member-a wildlife representative. 3
The District Advisory Boards make recommendations on a variety of
matters connected with range management.43 As the name implies,
The political machinations leading up to its approval by Congress are discussed in detail by several scholars and government administrators: CALEF & WESLEY, PRIVATE

33

GRAZING AND PUBLIC LANDS (1960); CLAWSON & HELD, THE FEDERAL LANDS:
THEIR USE AND MANAGEMENT 45-47, 81-112 (1957); FoSs, POLITICS AND GRAss

(1960); PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, 214-231 (1951); PENNY
& CLAWSON, ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING DISTRICTS IN THE PUBLIC LANDS 461

(1962).
34 Taylor Grazing Act, note 7 supra.
35 Chournos v. United States, 193 F.2d 321, 323 (10th Cir. 1952); United States v.

Achabal, 34 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Nev. 1940).
Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956); Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98
F.2d 308, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
37 48 Stat. 1269 (1934), 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1959); Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S.
173, 177 (1956) ; Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
Cf. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
38 The Bureau of Land Management (referred to in this paper as the Bureau or as the
BLM) consolidates the functions of the General Land Office and the Grazing Service
under the 1946 Reorg. Plan No. 3, sec. 402(2), effective July 16, 1946.
39See discussion in text note 159 infra.
40 Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah,
and Wyoming.
41 Details of the BLM administrative set-up to adminster the Taylor Grazing Act are
contained in 43 C.F.R. §§ 4110-4115.2 (1965), known as the Federal Range Code.
36

4243 C.F.R. § 4114.1 (1965).

4343 C.F.R. § 4114.1-5 (1965). The framers of the act developed a commendable idea
with the provision to manage the range in consultation with the range users. Such an
arrangement undoubtedly facilitated a more harmonious implementation of the act.
The knowledge and experience which the stockmen brought to the Bureau, interacting
with the formal training and practical experience in range management of the Bureau's
personnel, led to a better understanding of each point of view by the other.
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the function of the Board is strictly advisory; the BLM officials may
accept or reject any of the Board's suggestions or recommendations as
they see fit."
When a rancher applies for a grazing permit the Advisory Board
considers it first" and makes a recommendation to the District Manager, explaining the reasons for any unfavorable reports. " The District Manager issues a tentative decision." If the applicant wishes, he
may "protest" at a hearing before the Advisory Board. After this
formal hearing, the Advisory Board reconsiders its advice and again
reports to the Manager. The District Manager, still free to reject the
Board's advice, issues the final decision.48 If he still disapproves, the
applicant may institute a formal appeal as provided by the Administrative Procedure Act.49
The applicant's rights of appeal under the Administrative Procedure Act do not begin until rendition of the final decision by the
District Manager. This has led to some confusion among applicants,
as it constitutes a hearing after the first adjudication, whereas the
Administrative Procedure Act contemplates hearings held prior to
adjudication." Because of this, the BLM conducts grazing appeals
under rules different from those used to hear other appeals. Frequently, to their misfortune, applicants follow the general Bureau
Hearing Procedures5' rather than those for Grazing Proceedings.5 2
To launch the hearing procedure the appellant sends his appeal,
stating the grounds on which it is based, to the District Manager who
forwards it to the State Director. The State Director, as the adverse
party, may file a motion for dismissal which the appellant may answer." The State Director, after collecting the appeal materials, forwards them to a Hearing Examiner who promptly rules on the motion
for dismissal, if any, and sets a date for the hearing if he has not dismissed the case.
The Hearing Examiner, an officer of the Department of the Interior, holds hearings on all contests of administrative action involving the BLM-controlled public domain. He must conduct the hearing
"in an orderly, impartial, and judicial manner," and has authority to
subpoena witnesses, rule upon offers of proof and relevancy of evi4443 C.F.R. § 4115.2a-1; § 4115.2a-4 (1965).
443 C.F.R. § 4115.2-1(a) (2) (1965).
"43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-1 (a) (4) (1965).
47 Ibid.
4843 C.F.R. § 4115.2-1(b) (1965).
4943 C.F.R. § 4115.2-3 (1965).
5
0 E. L. Cord, dba El Jiggs Ranch, Int. Graz. Dec. 634 (1957).
5143 C.F.R. § 1850 (1965).
5243 C.F.R. § 1853 (1965).
53 43 C.F.R. § 1853.1(d)'(1965).
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dence, make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and render a decision.54 Where possible, the parties stipulate all material facts and
issues involved.
The evidentiary rules used by the Department at hearings are
less stringent than the ones used in the courts and are identical to
those generally accepted for federal administrative hearings."5 Hearsay is admissible, if corroborated by other evidence, 6 and the government uses photographs extensively to demonstrate such things as
overgrazed range, excessive numbers of livestock and illegal entry.
Witnesses testify under oath and may be cross-examined either by
the opposing party or by the Hearing Examiner.
The hearing opens with a brief statement by the government
counsel describing the facts leading to the appeal. The appellant,
having the burden of proof, then offers his case.57 The Examiner
may, with or without motion by the government, then issue summary
dismissal because of insufficiency of the appellant's case. Assuming
the hearing continues and there is a proper showing of interest, " intervenors- usually permit-holders affected by the protested permit
- may present their case. Finally the Director offers his evidence,
"if such a presentation appears to the Examiner to be necessary for a
proper disposition of the matters in controversy ... "'9
The Examiner makes findings of fact and conclusions of law and
writes a decision which he sends to the parties. A verbatim transcript
is taken of all BLM hearings; this record and the decision are available for any appeal." Either party may appeal from the Examiner's
decision to the Director of the Bureau."' Parties file briefs62 and may
request a hearing and oral argument, which the Director may allow
at his discretion."' Under similar provisions either party may appeal
from the Director to the Secretary of the Interior. 4
A curious provision allowing the Director of the Bureau to require the Examiner to "make only a recommended decision" and sub5443 C.F.R. § 1853.3 (1965).
5543 C.F.R. § 1853.5(c)(1965).
56
E. L. Cord, dba El Jiggs Ranch, Int. Graz. Dec. 634 (1957) ; Mrs. Myrtle Colvin, Int.
Graz. Dec. 245 (1941).
575 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1959); E. L. Cord, dba El Jiggs Ranch, Int. Graz. Dec. 634
(1957) ; William Sellas, Int. Graz. Dec. 526 (1950); Leandro Muniz, Int. Graz. Dec.
302, 304 (1942) ; R. B. Hackler, Int. Graz. Dec. 274 (1942) ; King Bros., Int. Graz.
Dec. 114, 117 (1938).
58 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1959) ; Bert and Paul Smith, 67 Int. Dec. 300 (1960) ; Bert and
Paul Smith, 66 Int. Dec. 1 (1959); William S. Young, 66 Int. Dec. 113 (1959).
5943 C.F.R. § 1853.5(c) (1965).
6043 C.F.R. § 1853.7(a) (1965).
6143 C.F.R. § 1853.7(b) (1965).
6243 C.F.R. § 1853.7(b)(1965).
6343 C.F.R. § 1843.5 (1965).
6443 C.F.R. § 1844.1 (1965).
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mit it to the Director for him to adopt as his decision65 has its counterpart in the appeal procedure from the Director to the Secretary. If,
prior to the Director's "promulgation" of his decision, the Secretary
approves it, he may not entertain the appeal, but instead adopts the
Director's decision.66 While these shortcuts sound like an arbitrary
deprivation of the right to appeal, the purpose is to simplify the route
to the courts, i.e., more appellants can obtain judicial review with
fewer departmental appeals and less expense. In grazing cases however, the process has served as a shortcut to nowhere. When used, it
not only deprives the applicant of the complete administrative appeal
procedure, but, since less than a dozen reported appeals have reached
the courts since 1934,67 it seems not to have attained its purpose.
Statements by courts that an order of the Secretary is not judicially reviewable,68 which may have discouraged court appeals, contradict
both the Administrative Procedure Act69 and the Federal Range
Code.70 If the BLM has acted arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts
can examine its action.71 "The Court cannot exercise the agency discretion, but it can inquire into whether that discretion has been properly exercised.'
Only rarely have the courts reversed the Secretary. Most frequently the decision results in an opinion like that in Adams v. United
States,7" in which the court stated: "Since the agency findings are
supported by substantial evidence and since the agency decision is not
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful . . . the trial court properly upheld the agency decision .... ""
Rights acquired under the Taylor Grazing Act may be protected
C.F.R. § 1853.6(b) (1965).
43 C.F.R. § 1844.1 (1965).
67 See Section IV infra.
68 Sellas v. Kirk, 200 F.2d 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1952); United States v. Wiley's Cove
Ranch, 295 F.2d 436, 440 (8th Cir. 1961); Hamel v. Nelson, 226 F. Supp. 96, 98
(N.D. Calif. 1963) ; accord, Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 459 (1920)
(prior to Administrative Procedure Act) ; Ross v. Day, 232 U.S. 110 (1914); Whitcomb v. White, 214 U.S. 15 (1909) ; Quinby v. Conlan, 104 U.S. 420 (1881) ; Jones
v. Ickes, 65 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1933) ; City of Los Angeles v. Borax Consolidated
Ltd., 5 F. Supp. 281 (S.D. Calif. 1933), rev'd on oiher grounds, 74 F.2d 901 (9th
Cir. 1935), affd, 296 U.S. 10 (1935); Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890 (D.
Wyo. 1945), where the court said it could not interfere with what it considered an
abuse of discretion and in which the judge strongly disapproved of the administrative
action [establishment of Jackson Hole National Monument when Congress had refused
to do so].
6960 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1959).
7043 C.F.R. § 1853.8(b) (1965).
7160 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e). Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d 738 (10th
Cir. 1949) ; See also Oman v. United States, 195 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1952).
72 Bedke v. Quinn, 154 F. Supp. 370, 371 (1D. l'daho 1957).
65 43
66

73 318 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1963) (non-grazing case but illustrative of the judicial treat74

ment of appeals from decisions of the Secretary on Bureau hearings).
Id. at 873.
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in the courts against unlawful action by the Secretary. 5 Moreover,
unlawful or ultra vires acts of the BLM officials may be enjoined,
even though the Secretary of the Interior has not been made a party
to the action.76
III.

NATURE OF THE RIGHT UNDER THE ACT

Grazing on the public lands had existed traditionally at the sufferance of the federal government;77 the Taylor Grazing Act replaced
that "right by sufferance" with a "right by permission." The courts
recognize that the right to graze is a valuable one,7" as is the right to
a grazing permit.7" Not only by the terms of the Act,8" but also by administrative and judicial decisions," ranchers who had grazed on public lands prior to the enactment of the law received a preference over
those who had not. Such a preference was approved in McNeil v.
Seaton," in which the court voided application of a Special Rule83
which, by changing the priority period, deprived the plaintiff of his
preference over newcomers to the local ranching business.84 The court
said that McNeil was justified in relying on the preference granted by
Congress and in investing his time, effort, and capital to develop his
stockraising business.
McNeil upholds "adequately safeguarded" grazing privileges85
which, as the dissent points out, seem to amount to vested rights in
continuation of the permit in derogation of the Supreme Court precedents and the Taylor Grazing Act itself.8" As long as the stockmen
5 Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956); McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 931,
933 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
See discussion of these cases in text following, respectively notes 89, 82, and 81 infra.
78 Bedke v. Quinn, 154 F. Supp. 370, 372 (D. Idaho 1957) ; See also non-grazing cases,
e.g. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 936 (1961) ; Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 35 (9th Cir. 1958).
See discussion of a new venue statute in text at note 103 infra.
7 Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 352 (1918) ; Light v. United States, 220 U.S.
523, 535 (1911) ; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) ; Buford v. Houtz,
133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890) ; Lamoreaux v. Kinney, 41 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1930).
78
McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 931, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Osborne v. United States, 145
F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1944).
79
McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d at 934; Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 316
(D.C. Cir. 1938).
80 48 Stat. 1270 (1934) (amended by 61 Stat. 790 (1947)), 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1959).
81 Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 314, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
82 281 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
8 19 Fed. Reg. 8954 (1954).
84 281 F.2d at 937-38. As it turned out in application, McNeil had not lost his rightful
preference. His allotment under the special Rule exceeded that under his old priority
period. McNeil v. Udall, 340 F.2d 801, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
904 (1965). See discussion in text at note 105 infra.
85 281 F.2d at 934, quoting from 43 U.S.C.A. § 315(b) (1959).
86
ld. at 938.
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are given the "privilege"87 of using public lands, each should receive
this privilege under the same conditions; however, the stockman who
has built up his business should have an assurance of continued availability of grazing lands. On the other hand, this right should not
build into a "vested right" for permanent grazing since that amount
may later damage the range or the government might find a better
use for the land.
While the federal courts defined the grazing permit as a preference and a privilege, other courts have considered different aspects.
The rights are sufficiently possessory to be taxable within the meaning of a statute imposing a tax on property of the United States held
under lease. 8 The rights, derived through the United States, prevail
over the aboriginal rights of the Navajos to their traditional grazing
grounds since the Navajos have relinquished their rights to the United
States by treaty. Nonetheless, the Navajos may enforce their rights
against everyone but the United States. 9 The permit holder can recover from the government for damage caused by a forest fire which
spread due to the fault of the government. Since the interest is revocable, it cannot be used to force the state to construct cattle passes
under a limited access highway.9
The holder has an interest of compensable nature by statute, but
only in some respects.92 The courts, in accordance with the Taylor
Grazing Act,93 have stated that a grazing permit creates no vested
property rights. 4 While the government need not pay for the value
of a permit revoked or lost through eminent domain proceedings, it
must pay for the enhanced value to the land caused by an appurtenant
permit. 5 Thus, land with a grazing permit attached is worth more
8

7 Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1938). The right granted

by the Taylor Act permit is a "privilege [which was] a proper subject of equitable
protection against an illegal act."
88 Sproul v. Gilbert, 225 Ore. 442, 359 P.2d 543 (1961).
8
9 Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
90 Wilkinson v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ore. 1960). In this case the permitholder had died, and title to the base land transferred to the plaintiffs. Since the plaintiffs had failed to apply for a permit, they had no rights of recovery for the tort. The
court distinguishes Garcia v. Sumrall, 58 Ariz. 526, 121 P.2d 640 (1942), where the
action was against a third party, not the United States, and the permit had not terminated.
91
Fauske v. Dean, 78 S.D. 310, 101 N.W.2d 769 (1960).
92 56 Stat. 654 (1942), 43 U.S.C. § 315(q) (1965). This allows for compensation for loss
of grazing permits taken for military purposes.
9348 Stat. 1270 (1934) (amended by 61 Stat. 790 (1947), 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1959).
94
United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867 (1951) ;
Fauske v. Dean, 78 S.D. 310, 101 N.W.2d 769 (1960) ; Bassett v. Ryan, 72 Ariz. 383,
236 P.2d 458, 460 (1951). Contra, Bartlett v. Galleppi Bros., 33 F. Supp. 277 (N.D.
Cal. 1940) (dictum).
95United States v. Jaramillo, 190 F.2d 300, 302 (10th Cir. 1951). Followed in State
Highway Comm'n v. Fortune, 77 S.D. 302, 91 N.W.2d 675 (1958). Cf. McDonald v. McDonald, 61 N. M. 458, 302 P.2d 726 (1956), where the government was
renting ranchlands with appurtenant permits and the payments were based on, among
other factors, cancellation of the Taylor Grazing Act permits.
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than the same land would be without such a permit -not only in
sales between private parties,. but also in forced sales to the government. Companion cases in the Tenth Circuit arrived at conclusions,
confusing, but separable on their facts: United States v. Jaramillo"s
held the government liable for the permit value where the permits remained in effect; but United States v. Cox" denied it where the permit was withdrawn as part of the condemnation.
IV.

ATTACKS AGAINST AND OPERATION OF THE ACT

A. Attacks
1. Constitutionality-Indispensable Party.
That no full-fledged attacks upon the constitutionality of the act
developed is probably attributable to the fact that similar Forest Service grazing controls had been approved several times. 8 In addition,
the courts had frequently recognized the unexercised right of the federal government to control the public domain - a right stemming
directly from the ConstitutionY9 The only attempt thus far to attack
the constitutionality of the Taylor Grazing Act failed when several
Oregon sheep raisers missed the opportunity to present their constitutional arguments to a federal court because they could not muster the
jurisdictional amount. 1'
Only a few court attacks on the operation of the act have occurred. Blocking court review were early holdings that the Secretary
of the Interior was an indispensable party to grazing appeals since
the appeals sought action by him through his subordinates.'0 ' In order
to acquire jurisdiction over him, the applicant had to sue in the District of Columbia." 2 Most stockmen found the expense of maintaining
such a suit prohibitive. The 87th Congress rectified this situation by
amending the venue statute to allow suit against the Secretary in any
jurisdiction where the cause of action arose or where the land in ques96 190 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951).
97 190 F.2d 293 (loth Cir. 1951).
98
Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911) ; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506
(1911).
99
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918) ; Buford v.
Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890).
100Gavia v. Donaugh, 93 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1937). If they then took the case to the
state court, it apparently never reached the Oregon Supreme Court.
101 Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28 (1897) ; Richman v. Beck, 257 F.2d
575 (10th Cir. 1958) ; Sellas v. Kirk, 200 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1952).
102McNeil v. Leonard, 199 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mont. 1961) ; Palmer v. Walsh, 78 F.
Supp. 64 (D. Ore. 1948). See, e.g., McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 931, 933 (D.C. Cir.
1960) ; LaRue v. Udall, 324 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Jones v. Ickes, 65 F.2d 197
(D.C. Cir. 1933).
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tion was situated." 3 The rush of appeals Congress expected from the
liberalized venue provisions has yet to materialize: the only reported
appeal since 1962 went to trial in the District of Columbia.'
Only one suit so far has sustained a rancher's claim of arbitrary
handling of a permit application - McNeil v. Seaton."m The Grazing
District in which McNeil's lands were located instituted a Special
Rule which changed the base period for establishing preferences from
1929-1934 to 1948-1952. The court voided the Special Rule as it applied to McNeil, saying, "We see no basis upon which, by a special
rule adopted more than twenty years after appellant had embarked
upon his [livestock raising] venture, he may lawfully be deprived of
his statutory privilege.' "° A prior case, Sellas v. Kirk,"°7 had reached
a contrary result -concluding that promulgation of a Special Rule
was not even judicially reviewable (and that, even if it were, the Secretary was an indispensable party) .' These cases are distinguishable
since McNeil made a showing that the Special Rule discriminated
specifically against him whereas the Special Rule in Sellas applied
U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1962). In recommending the legislation, the Senate report, S.
Rep. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), pointed out:
Frequently these proceedings involve problems which are recurrent but peculiar
to certain areas, such as water rights, grazing land permits, and mineral rights.
These are problems with which judges in those areas are familiar and which
they can handle expeditiously and intelligently.
The Tenth Circuit had offered another solution to the indispensable party dilemma
in Pan American Petroleum v. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649, 653 (10th Cir. 1960). Here
the Secretary was not an indispensable party, where no action was required of him,
and a BLM official had exceeded his authority (in this case by canceling an oil and
gas lease). Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472 (1963), affirms a decision the court says
is in "seeming conflict" with the Pan American case, but the opinion reaches only the
power of the Secretary to cancel a lease, not that of a regional official of the Bureau.
104McNeil v. Udall, 340 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
105 281 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
103 28

106 Id.

at 937. His was a hollow victory. On remand the Bureau found that his rights
under the 1929-1934 preference period amounted to 143 animals, compared with 232
under the subsequent base period. [McNeil v. Leonard, 199 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mont.
1961) ].This probable determination had been recognized in the dissent in the original case [281 F.2d at 938, n.1] McNeil then attempted to assert greater rights in
the Montana District Court, but ran afoul of the indispensable party requirement.
[McNeil v. Leonard, 199 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mont. 1961)). Finally, four years later,
the District of Columbia court rendered the coup d'etet by supporting the BLM's determinations. [McNeil v. Udall, 340 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1964)].
107200 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1952).
108 The Special Rule involved the calculation of the "base" [43 U.S.C. § 315(b) '(1959)1.
For example, grazing areas in the Colorado high mountains are "land base" because
since they cannot be used all year, their use is limited by the amount of land the
rancher has available elsewhere for winter grazing. On the other hand, in the southwestern deserts where use of the federal range is limited by the amounts of water
available to water the animals during the dry season, a "water base" applies. In this
Nevada grazing district he _Advisory Boa.rd, due to special conditions in the district.
had recommended a Special Rule combining the two- 2/3 land and 1/3 water. By
its application, the Board and District Manager reduced plaintiff's allotment from preTaylor Act use of 2500 sheep to 1000 sheep under the Special Rule.
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equally to all permittees." Actually this is a distinction without a
difference since a Special Rule can discriminate individually whether
it changes the base property allowance or the preference period. If
any Special Rule discriminatorily vitiates one rancher's rights while
benefiting another's, the injured party should be given recourse to
the courts.11
2. Mining Claims.
The Taylor Act extends to grazing permits on the surface of unpatented mining claims. Despite broad language in the mineral
laws". and related cases,"' the Tenth Circuit decided that the exclusive right of possession of the surface is limited to mining purposes;
therefore, the government, as title-holder of the land, can control
grazing thereon." 3 Congress confirmed case law to this effect by the
Multiple Use Act of 1955 which specifically awarded to the government control over uses of the surface of unpatented claims other than
4
mining."
The courts have held that the locator has no tort claim for damages caused by grazing under Bureau auspices on the surface of his
mining claim."' Moreover, the government cannot recover damages
for illegal grazing on an unpatented claim which was later patented."'
A holder of an unpatented claim was allowed to recover damages,
109 Wade McNeil, Int. Graz. Dec. 667, 668 (1957). One fact not mentioned by the court
in either case '(and very likely pertinent to the decisions) is that McNeil had operated
under the Act's regulations since 1936; Sellas never had. In fact, he (Sellas) insisted
that the Taylor Act could not curtail the grazing to which he had been accustomed
prior to its enactment:
Mr. Sellas' appeal indicates a fundamental misconception on his part of the
effect which the Taylor Grazing Act has had on his right to use the Federal
range in his livestock operations. This misconception has apparently remained with Mr. Sellas over the years. . . . [I]t appears to be largely responsible for his continued insistence that his grazing operations on the
Federal range must not be changed or curtailed in any manner from what
those operations were on the public domain prior to passage of the Taylor
Grazing Act. ... Wm. Sellas, Int. Graz. Dec. 677, 678 (1958).
510 200 F.2d at 220.
111 17 Stat. 91 (1872), 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1959) (Locators have "exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations .... ").
112 See, e.g., Clipper Mining Co. v. Eli Mining & Land Co., 194 U.S. 220, 226 (1904);
Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 316 (1930).
11 United States v. Etcheverry, 230 F.2d 193, 196 (10th Cir. 1956)("[W)e hold that
under the statute, general grazing rights of the public domain are not included in the
possessory rights of a mining claim."). See also Teller v. United States, 113 Fed. 273
(8th Cir. 1901 ) (timber) ; United States v. Rizzinelli, 182 Fed. 675 '(D. Idaho 1910)
(timber); Ward v. Chevallier Ranch Co., 138 Mont. 144, 354 P.2d 1031, 1033
(1960) (dissent); Coos Bay Timber Co. v. Bigelow, 228 Ore. 469, 365 P.2d 619
(1961) (government can sell timber on claim where no discovery has been made).
But see United States v. Deasy, 24 F.2d 108 (D. Idaho 1928) (timber) (citing the
Teller and Rizzinelli cases as holding the opposite of their actual decisions, and following the purported holdings).
11469 Stat. 368 (1955), 30 U.S.C. § 612(b) (1959).
115 Powell v. United States, 233 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1956).
"6 United States v. Etcheverry, 230 F.2d 193 (10th Cir. 1956).
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not against the government, but against the grazer even though the
latter was operating under a Forest Service permit."' In this case a
Montana statute governed the right of recovery for trespassing animals on "agricultural or grazing land or patented mining claims,""'
but because an unpatented claim was involved, the statute was found
inapplicable. However, the court found the grazer liable for trespass
because of a jury finding that the boundaries of the land involved
were sufficiently well marked to place persons on notice. It is interesting to note that a 1963 amendment to the statute extended its effect to unpatented mining claims."'
3. Tort Claims.
A series of cases brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act 2 '
have established the principle that grazers, in proper circumstances,
can recover damages from the government.' Moreover, a tort action
lies if the Bureau wrongfully aids, allows, abets, or encourages other
livestock operators to use the public domain already granted another." The Tort Claims Act does not apply to claims based on the
exercise or failure to exercise a discretionary function, "whether or
not the discretion involved be abused.' "" Thus, because both the refusal to grant exchange of use permits and the imposition of government carrying capacity standards on a checkerboard landowner .24 are
discretionary actions, they probably are not compensable under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.' Even the granting of a permit to a third
party, where the government knows the animals will trespass, does
not constitute a tortious act." 0
B. Operation

To solve the problem of checkerboard patterns of private and
public land holdings, the Federal Range Code sets up "Exchange of
Use" permits 2 ' where, by negotiation, a holder of alternating parcels
agrees to exchange certain parcels which he holds for certain government lands and to give the government control of his land for grazing
7

11

Ward v. Chevallier Ranch Co., 138 Mont. 144, 354 P.2d 1031 (1960).
§ 46-1413 (1947).

118 MONT. REV. CODE
9

1 MoNT. REV. CODE § 46-1413 (Supp. 1963).
120 Codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1965).

Notes 113 and 115 supra;accord, the Multiple Use Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 982 (1964),
43 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. 1964).
12 Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d 738, 742 (loth Cir. 1949).
12 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) *(1948).
124 See textual discussion of checkerboard land patterns following note 18 supra.
125United States v. Morrell, 331 F.2d 498 (loth Cir. 1964).
,2,t ., Chournos V. Uited Statcs, 1,93 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. , -)Kuzlcr v. TTited
121

States, 208 F. Supp. 79 (D. Utah 1961), appeal dismissed, 307 F.2d 511 (10th Cir.
1962).
12 43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-1(h)

(1965).
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purposes. As a result, the government allows him to graze on government land and he allows the government permittees to graze upon
his land. The same arrangement is used when the permittee owns
non-contiguous segments of base lands which alternate with Taylor
Grazing Act land. Exchanges are made to enable the holdings to be
contiguous.
Administrative problems in these exchanges arise from the BLM
principles of range management. The landowner seeking the exchange must agree to the Bureau-established grazing practices. Concerned with a profitable livestock operation, he frequently calculates
a higher grazing capacity than does the Bureau, whose concern centers
on restoration and maintenance of good range. If be refuses to agree
to the Bureau's levels of grazing, the BLM can refuse to issue exchange permits. His property thereby becomes useless: cattle cannot
graze on his unfenced land without trespassing on government land;
if they do, the Bureau will prosecute for trespass. Therefore the
Bureau has him cornered - he must either graze according to the
carrying capacity as determined by the BLM or not graze at all.
Much of the litigation in the past ten years has arisen because the
BLM has begun a re-evaluation of its lands. Its appropriations have
quadrupled in the past ten years; it no longer needs to farm out the
responsibility for administering the permit program to ranchers' cooperatives.128 During this recent re-evaluation, it has surveyed the
range and made significant reductions in grazing on some overstocked lands."'
Judging by these actions of the Bureau, criticisms of the Bureau
for poor range management are sound."' The agency has taken steps
to further reduce grazing; the number of animals on the federal range
dropped from fourteen million in 1949 to twelve million in 1962.
This reduction seems a steady trend and allows the range to recover
from years of misuse. The livestock operators are realizing the purpose of government controls over grazing by the improvement in the
range.' The improved range will eventually increase carrying capacities which must in turn be subject to strict scrutiny to ensure its
carrying the maximum number of animals per acre. Even so, demands
See, e.g., Wade McNeil, Int. Graz. Dec. 667, 64 Int. Dec. 423 (1957). The South
Phillips Cooperative Grazing District issued grazing permits to take the load from the
underfunded and undermanned BLM.
19McNeil
v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Wade McNeil, Int. Graz. Dec.
667, 64 Int. Dec. 423 (1957). See text following note 105 supra.
130 CALEF, PUBLIC GRAZING AND PUBLIC LANDS (1960) ; Note, Management of Public
Land Resources, 60 YALE L.J. 455 (1951).
131 See United States v. Thompson, 41 F. Supp. 13, 15 (E.D. Wash. 1941), noting the
improvements in range managed by the Forest Service, particularly the 95% increase
in carrying capacity. See also Rocky Mountain News, June 9, 1965, p. 5, cols. 1-3,
and The Denver Post, June 11, 1965, p. 22, cols. 1-2, to the same effect.
128
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on the BLM for other uses of the public lands may limit the land
available for grazing.
V.

ATTEMPTS AT ENFORCEMENT BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The first extensive litigation under the act occurred when a permittee attempted to enjoin issuance of temporary licenses and collection of fees under the act. After the government failed in its attempt
to block the suit,"' the Nevada Supreme Court declared that a blanket
fee for all grazing districts, as temporarily set by the Land Office,
was not consistent with the requirement of the act that the fees be
reasonable,'33 since range conditions varied from one grazing district
to another.'34 The United States Supreme Court disagreed and held
that Congress had ratified the temporary blanket fee system by using
the money collected therefrom for range improvement. 3' The permanent fee system subsequently adopted, provided a blanket fee for all
districts. Disposition of this litigation also reversed a decision by a
Nevada federal judge which had voided the fees. 3"
The Bureau has successfully enforced provisions of the act
through injunctions, 3' contempt actions,'38 trespass actions,"" and
under the authority of state statutes." However, a dispute involving
a group of Navajo Indians on the one hand and the Bureau and its
white permittees on the other resulted in a rare setback for the government in its administration of the Taylor Grazing Act.'
The
controversy began when certain grazing land adjacent to the Navajo
Indian Reservation in southeastern Utah was incorporated into the
Monticello, Utah, Grazing District. The Navajos continued to graze
their animals on this land which they claimed as their prehistoric
aboriginal home and grazing land. Before the permittes had won
132 United

States v. Dewar, 18 F. Supp. 981 (D. Nev. 1937) ; Dewar v. Brooks, 16 F.
Supp. 636 (D. Nev. 1936).
3348 Stat. 1270 (1934) (amended by 61 Stat. 790 (1947)), 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1959).
14 Brooks v. Dewar, 60 Nev. 219, 106 P.2d 755 (1940).
n5 Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354 (1941). The appropriations coincided with the provisions for disposal of permanent fees under 43 U.S.C. § 315(i) and (j), which the
Court cited in approving the temporary fees.
13" United States v. Achabal, 122 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1941), reversing 34 F. Supp. 1 (D.

Nev. 1940). In Brooks v. Dewar, 60 Nev. 219, 106 P.2d 755 (1940), the Nevada court
cited this federal district court decision as influential.
1 7 Kenndey v. United States, 119 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1941).
138 United States v. Montgomery, 155 F. Supp. 633 (D. Mont. 1957).
139 Richman v. Beck, 257 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1958); United States v. Hosteen TseKesi, 191 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1951) ; Alton Morrell & Sons, 72 Int. Dec. 100 (1965).
140 United States v. Hatahley, 220 F.2d 666 (D. Utah 1955), rev'd, Hatahley v. United
States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
The iitigation involved the following cases, chronologically: United States v. Rosteen Tse-Kesi, 93 F. Supp. 745 (D. Utah 1950), rev'd, 191 F.2d 518 (10th Cir.
3

1951); Young v. Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862 (1952); United States v.

Hatahley, 220 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1955), rev'd, Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S.
"1

(1956).
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two court attempts to remove the Indians' stock from BLM land,"'
the Indians had returned to their reservation. Since the Indians continued to graze their animals on this land, the permittees next prevailed upon the Bureau and the San Juan County Commissioners
to gather up the Navajo livestock under the authority of the Utah
Abandoned Horse statute.'43 The Bureau field men seized animals
they claimed were abandoned and shipped them to a Provo packing
house. The Navajos then sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act 44
and prevailed in the Utah District Court at a trial described by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals as having been conducted "in an
atmosphere of maximum emotion and a minimum of judicial impartiality . . .""' The Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment, holding
that by proceeding under the Abandoned Horse statute the BLM
officials had acted in harmony with the Taylor Grazing Act. Moreover, the court concluded, despite provisions in the act for levying
fines on livestock owners who failed or refused to remove their
animals from lands under Taylor Act administration, the Utah
statute covered an entirely different subject - those animals abandoned by their owners. 4 '
The Supreme Court reversed. 4 7 Noting that "[U]nauthorized
grazing on the federal range and the removal of trespassing livestock is expressly provided for by section 161.11 (b) "8 of this [Fed'
eral Range] Code,"149
the Court declared that "both the written
notice and failure to comply are express conditions precedent to the
employment of local procedures. The code is, of course, the law of
the range, and the activities of federal agents are controlled by its
provisions."' 50 A conflicting state statute applied discriminately
cannot be used by Bureau agents. The Court found liability and
reversed because the government agents knew that the horses had
not been abandoned; in fact, they knew who the owners were:
"[Tlhe government agents were not exercising due care in their
enforcement of the federal law.. .. The agents proceeded with complete disregard for the property rights of petitioners."''
United States v. Hosteen Tse-Kesi, 191 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1951); Young v. Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862 (1952).
143 UTAH CODE ANNO. §§ 47-2-1 to -7 (1953).
144 For other tort claims suits see text at note 120 supra.
145 220 F.2d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 1945).
14
6 Id. at 672.
47
1 Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
148 Now 43 C.F.R. § 4112.3 (1956).
49
1 Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 177 (1956).
142

'50Id. at 178.
151 Id. at 181.
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MANAGING THE LANDS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

The claims under the Tort Claims Act illustrate the dilemma
which confronts the BLM and the courts in grazing cases. On the
one hand the Bureau must manage the public domain for the benefit
of the public by improving the range and preventing overgrazing
and consequent erosion of the public lands. On the other hand, the
public lands have been, and will continue to be, a mainstay of the
livestock industry of the West. When the ranchers have their permitted grazing reduced, either their expenses go up or their production goes down.
While the rancher and the Bureau parry over grazing permits,
other pressures are building up for use of the public land. The
West is developing into a more urban community, and demand for
use of the public lands now comes not only from the traditional
users like the livestock owner, logger, and miner, but also from urban
residents such as the hiker, fisherman, hunter, and scientist. The
BLM is finding that it must satisfy the needs of more and more
people."' The grassland in western Colorado, eastern Oregon, or
mid-Nevada will not remain remote, unwanted, and unattractive.
The Taylor Grazing Act directs the BLM to manage its lands
"in order to promote the highest use of the public lands ....
"1, The
act authorizes the Secretary to exchange public lands for private
lands, within or without the boundaries of the grazing districts, and
to issue a patent for the exchanged land if:
1. The land received by the United States is of at least equal
value;
2. the land received is within the same state, or else within a
distance of not more than 50 miles in the adjacent state
nearest the base lands; and
3. the exchange will benefit the public interest.5 4
The first two requirements are mechanical problems which the administrative agencies and the courts are accustomed to handling. The
third one is both a judicial and a legislative issue. Does the "public
interest" as used in the Taylor Grazing Act mean public interest in
grazing or a broad public interest, not restricted to grazing and conservation - the multiple use benefit?
In the 1963 case, LaRue v. Udall,"5 the court held that "public
152 Hochmuth, Government Administration and Attitudes in Contest and Patent Proceedings, 10 RoCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAw INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 467 (1965).
15348 Stat. 1269 (1934), 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1959).

15448 Stat. 1269 1272 (1934), 43 U.S.C. §§ 315, 315g(b) (1959).
15 324 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Since one of the findings of the Secretary was that

the public interest in grazing was benefitted by the exchange, the judge objecting to
a broad interpretation of "public interest" concurred in the holding.
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interest" means the latter. In this case the Secretary had found the
public interest under the act was not restricted to grazing and conservation, but rather included reclassification of lands within the
grazing district and opening such lands to uses other than grazing
if they were more beneficial. 5 ' Since the act also provides that the
granting of a permit does not create any right, title, interest, or estate
in the lands, a permit holder in the land to be exchanged could not
protest the withdrawal of his privilege.15
Subsequent to this case Congress has recognized the changed
circumstances by enacting two measures directed at the issues discussed by the court in LaRue. A Public Land Law Review Commission has been appointed to review all the laws on public lands 58 and
one of its particular targets will be the welter of legislation governing the Bureau of Land Management and especially that dealing
with its authority to issue patents and grazing permits. Also, the
Public Land Law Review Act15 and the Multiple Use Act of 1964160
have extended to the BLM principles which had been previously
established for the National Forests by the Multiple Use Act of 1960.
Thus, Congress in passing these acts has indicated a desire to encourage land use in harmony with the criteria set up by the Outdoor
Recreation Resources Commission and also to manage all the federal
land so as to benefit the entire public. Consequently, the recent public debate over whether the public lands should be disposed of as
rapidly as possible or retained in the "public interest" has temporarily been settled in favor of the public interest in multiple use.
The Taylor Grazing Act fits into the multiple use framework.
Multiple use includes not only consumptive use of land such as mining, timber production and the like, but also non-consumptive uses
(uses not compatible with the long-held idea of rapid disposal of the
public lands) such as fish and wildlife development, recreational
uses, wilderness preservation, watershed protection - and grazing.
The Taylor Grazing Act seems to have little need for revision.
The Public Land Law Review Commission should investigate permit
evaluation in eminent domain proceedings, reasonable grazing fees,
156

Id. at 430.

157 48 Stat. 1270, 1272 (1934), 43 U.S.C. §§ 315(b), (f)

(1959).

15878 Stat. 982 (1964), 43 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. 1964).
159 ibid.

160 78 Stat. 986 (1964), 43 U.S.C. § 1411 (a) (1965). The Multiple Use Act directs the
Bureau to protect its vast holdings for either disposal or retention. The disposal criteria are predicated on county zoning. For retained land, the act lists the following
criteria for management: grazing; fish and wildlife development; industrial development related to resource production (although it cannot be developed if the land
passes to non-federal ownership); mineral production; occupancy in harmony with
protection of resource values; outdoor recreation; timber production; watershed protection; wilderness preservation; or preservation of other public values.
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and the need for an impartial Hearing Examiner system. In addition it should affirm the definition of public interest, as contained
in the majority opinion in LaRue; not only in relation to the Taylor
Grazing Act, but also in relation to the total federal public lands
program.
The principles approved by Congress in the Multiple Use Act
of 1964 recognize the change in the West since the days of the open
range in the last half of the nineteenth century. The Public Land
Law Review Commission should follow this declaration of policy
in examining the mass of legislation surrounding the public lands
and in recommending which laws shall govern the public domain in
the last half of the twentieth century.

NOTES
THE COLORADO DEAD MAN STATUTE

A

LTHOUGH the dead man statute in Colorado is older than
the state itself and has been an issue in scores of decisions by
the supreme court, neither its long existence nor its frequent appearance in the courtroom has contributed significantly to making it
a commonly understood doctrine. The statute's underlying concept
of excluding the testimony of interested persons' and parties to the
action' existed at common law, and the rule was applied whether the
adversary was living or dead? It was reasoned that one who had an
interest in the outcome of the suit would have a strong motive to
distort the truth, and therefore should not be allowed to take the
stand to further his own purposes.
In England the disqualification for interest remained until the
middle of the nineteenth century when it was done away with in its
entiretI, but in this country the reform was less successful.' It was
argued here that allowing parties and interested persons to testify
would work harshly in controversies over transactions when one
party to the transaction had died and the other survived.' And so, as
the various states abolished the common law incompetency based on
interest, they enacted statutes, commonly called "dead man statutes,"
retaining the former rule when one of the parties was deceased at
the time of the trial.' It is not surprising, then, that the dead man
statute has been called a vestigial remainder of the common law
rule that a pecuniary interest renders the testimony of a witness in1

competentJ
The common law rule came to an end in Colorado in 1870,
when a witness's interest in the outcome of the case was removed by
1 Combs v. Howard, 131 S.W.2d 206, 212 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
22 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 577, at 693 (3d ed. 1940).
3 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 121, at 546 (1957).
4 2 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 695 (rule against interested persons abolished

in 1843; disqualification of parties eliminated in 1851).
McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE § 65, at 142 (1954).
6Rich v. Hunter, 135 Fla. 309, 185 So. 141, 145 (1938):
The purpose of [the dead man statute] . .. was to remove the commonlaw disability arising from interest, except where one of the parties to the
transaction or communication was, at the time of the hearing, dead, insane,
or a lunatic. In those cases the disabilities arising from interest, imposed by
the common-law are retained by the statute; but the statute disqualifies those
only who were disqualified by the common-law.
7
Kamp v. Hargis Bldg. Co., 238 S.W.2d 277, 282 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
8Territorial Laws of Colorado 1870, p. 63.
5
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legislation as a bar to his testifying,' except in cases within the scope
of the dead man statute. Since 1881 this exception for the dead man
statute has been the springboard for much litigation," and the dispute continues today." The dead man statute itself is currently found
in Colorado Revised Statutes, section 154-1-2 (1963), where the
pertinent portion provides:
No party to any civil action, suit or proceeding, or person directly
interested in the event thereof, shall be allowed to testify therein, of
his own motion, or in his own behalf . .. when any adverse party
sues or defends as ... the executor or administrator, heir, legatee or
devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian or trustee of any
such heir, legatee or devisee; unless when called as a witness by such
adverse party so suing or defending, and except in the following
cases; [Here follows a list of seven exceptions which will be dealt
with in Part IV, infra.] (Emphasis added.)
Since the statute was adopted nearly verbatim from an Illinois statute, 2 it is often helpful to refer to Illinois decisions when attempting
to construe the statute or predict the course which the Colorado court
may take in the future.is
I.

PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE

In the middle of the nineteenth century when the various jurisdictions were enacting their respective versions of the dead man
statute, the fundamental purpose of such statutes was said to be "to
prevent a person who was, or who might be assumed to be, a partisan witness from giving his version of a transaction with another
who was deceased and could not speak.'"" This idea of placing the
living and the dead upon terms of perfect equality still finds a good
deal of support today," and the Colorado court has said that the
dead man statute is "only a regulation to secure mutuality in the action itself."' 6
This concern for mutuality is at times carried to such extremes
that one questions whether justice is, in fact, being served. The Colorado court on one occasion rejected the only testimony tending to
establish a promissory note executed by a party who died prior to
9

The act has been codified and is presently found in COLO. REV. STAT. § 154-1-1
(1963): "All persons, without exception, other than those specified in sections 1541-2 to 154-1-8 may be witnesses. Neither parties nor other persons who have an
interest in the event of an action or proceeding shall be excluded ..
'( Palmer v. Hanna, 6 Colo. 55 (1881).
11Sussman v. Barach, 401 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1965).
12 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 2 (Bar ed. 1963).
13 In re Shapter's Estate, 35 Colo. 578, 585, 85 Pac. 688, 691 (1906): "The rule is
well settled that in adopting the statute of another state we adopt the construction
given it by the courts of that state."
14Abbott v. Doughan, 204 N.Y. 223, 97 N.E. 599, 600 (1912).
15 In re Repush's Will, 257 Wis. 528, 44 N.W.2d 240 (1950).
1' Fadam v. Midcap, 112 Colo. 573, 578-79, 152 P.2d 682, 684 (1944).
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trial, since the sole witness had a pecuniary interest, even though the
court recognized that it was quite possibly preventing the establishment of an honest defense. 7 A doctrine which leads to such results
is not defensible, even when the avowed purpose is to protect "estates,
widows and minor heirs, who without some rule of evidence of this
kind, would find themselves at the mercy of any unprincipled
debtor."18

It would seem then, that the purpose of the dead man statute
could be categorically stated as follows: (1) to prevent unjust claims
against decedents' estates; (2) to place the living and the dead on
equal terms; and (3) to protect widows and children. While such
attempts at justifying the statute have been vigorously attacked,"9
the fact remains that the statute exists, and practicing attorneys must
be aware of its requirements and scope.

II.

THE STATUTE INVOKED

-THE

REQUIREMENT

OF THREE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS

In order to invoke the statute to exclude the testimony of a
witness, there are three necessary elements, all of which must be
present: (A) The witness must be a member of a class which is
rendered incompetent by the statute; (B) The party against whom
the testimony is offered must belong to a class protected by the
statute; and (C) The testimony itself must be of a nature forbidden
20
by the statute.
A. Classes of Persons Excluded From Testifying
1. Interested Persons

There are actually two classes of persons which are rendered
incompetent by the Colorado statute: (1) parties to a civil action
where the adverse party represents a decedent; and (2) persons directly interested in the result of that action. The exclusion of testimony of "interested" witnesses has no doubt been the foundation of
more litigation than any other single aspect of the dead man statute.
It has been said, in general, that the true test of the interest which
will disqualify a witness is whether he will "by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment, gain or lose, pecuniarily, or
[whether] the record will be legal evidence for or against him in
some other action, as an establishment . . . of the matters about

which he is offered to testify."'" It is not surprising that this re17Williams v. Carr, 4 Colo. App. 363, 367, 36 Pac. 644, 645 (1894).
18 Ibid.
19 See discussion pp. 363-65 infra.
2097 C.J.S. Witnesses § 132, at 557 (1957).
21 Id. § 170, at 609.
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quirement of "direct pecuniary gain or loss" has been often mentioned in the Colorado courts.22
The directness requirement is of particular importance. The
distinction between direct and indirect interest was carefully pointed
out in the case of Eder v. Methodist Episcopal Church Ass'n,2 where
the representatives of several churches sought the admission to probate of a will allegedly executed by one Martin Eder, deceased, naming the several churches as beneficiaries of his estate. The court allowed the attorney for the proponents of the alleged will to testify
relative thereto since his fee was not contingent on the outcome of
the case; it allowed the members of the several churches to testify
since "the privilege of attending public worship does not . . . disqualify a witness,"2 but it excluded the testimony of the other named
beneficiaries under the will since they would gain directly if the will
were established. 5
It will be noted that the attorney and the members of the church
would not have gone home from the trial one penny richer or poorer
regardless of the outcome of the case, i.e., there was no direct pecuniary interest. It is true that establishment of the will would have
caused the church members to gain indirectly, and it might be contended that they had sufficient motive to distort the truth and should
have been disqualified as witnesses. However, to disqualify a witness on these grounds would be to confuse incompetency with lack
of credibility. The fact that a witness may be biased or prejudiced is
not enough in itself to make him incompetent under the dead man
statute if he is not, in fact, in a position to gain or lose directly." It
must also be noted that whereas neither the attorney nor the church
members could have filled their own pockets by establishing the will,
that is precisely what the named beneficiaries would have been able
to do, and it was this direct interest which resulted in the exclusion
of their testimony.2'
22

E.g., Eder v. Methodist Episcopal Church Ass'n, 94 Colo. 173, 29 P.2d 631 (1934);
Love v. Cotten, 65 Colo. 593, 179 Pac. 806 (1919) ; Allen v. Shires, 47 Colo. 433,
107 Pac. 1070 (1910); Smith v. Smith, 22 Colo. 480, 46 Pac. 128 (1896); Salkregg
v. Thomas, 27 Colo. App. 259, 149 Pac. 273 (1915).
23
94 Colo. 173, 29 P.2d 631 (1934).
24 Id. at 180, 29 P.2d at 634.
25Ibid.
26

Paschall v. Reed, 320 Ill.
App. 390, 51 N.E.2d 342, 344 (1943):
[T]he interest which will disqualify a witness to testify in a suit involving an
administrator must be legal, certain and immediate interest, and such interest
must be direct, certain and vested. Otherwise it does not disqualify him, and
the interest in such event goes only to the credibility of the witness and not to
the competency of such witness.
21In Lee v. Leibold, 102 Colo. 408, 79 P.2d 1049 (1938), the court pointed out the
distinction between straight fees and contingent fees as bearing on "directness" of
the interest. The former do not make the attorney a party in interest within the terms
of the dead man statute, but a contingent fee does bring him within the scope of
the statute.
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Another type of "interest" problem has been presented by a
series of cases involving witnesses who have a relationship to a business which is a party to the litigation. Stockholders of a national
bank have been held incompetent to give testimony on behalf of the
bank to establish a claim against the estate of a decedent,28 and
stockholders of a corporation were excluded as witnesses in a similar
case.' In both cases the court reasoned that since the stockholders
are the legal owners of the corporation, a direct gain of the corporation is a direct gain of the owners. Obviously, mere employees of
the corporation would have no such direct interest in the outcome
of the litigation."
Not unlike the problem of persons who have a business relationship to a business which is a litigating party, is the question which
arises where the witness is a relative of one of the parties to the action. In Colorado, a relative of a party has been held not to be directly interested and has been treated as any other witness. The wife
of a legatee has been held competent as a witness to support the
will,3 ' and a wife has been declared a competent witness in her husband's behalf to establish his claim against a decedent's estate. 2 Certainly, if a spouse is competent, a more distant relative should not be
barred by the statute, and the supreme court has so held. 3
Just as the courts are concerned with whether or not the witness's interest is so direct that the judgment will actually put money
in his pocket or take it therefrom, so also, a great deal of emphasis
is placed upon the degree of certainty with which it can be determined that the gain or loss will, in fact, result. Thus, those who
might be beneficiaries under a subsequent will if a prior will is disproved do not have a sufficiently certain interest to preclude their
testimony at the will contest.34
While a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the action is always
sufficient to render a witness incompetent, mere interest in the subject matter of the litigation is not, by itself, sufficient. 5 Thus, where
the plaintiff attempted to establish a contract made with a person
2

8 Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 49 Colo. 393, 113 Pac. 483 (1911).

Gilmour v. Hawley Merchandise Co., 21 Colo. App. 307, 121 Pac. 765 (1912).
Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 102 Colo. 392, 79 P.2d 1045 (1938).
31 In re Hatfield's Will, 21 Colo. App. 443, 122 Pac. 63 '(1912); accord, White v.
Bower, 56 Colo. 575, 136 Pac. 1053 (1913).
32 White v. Christopherson, 46 Colo. 46, 102 Pac. 747 (1909).
33
Burnham v. Grant, 24 Colo. App. 131, 134 Pac. 254 (1913).
34
Hughes v. Williams, 300 111. App. 108, 20 N.E.2d 860 (1939). But see Brantner v.
Papish, 109 Colo. 437, 126 P.2d 1032 (1942), where the court believed it evident
that the children of the deceased would inherit her estate if the will were disproved,
and consequently excluded their testimony.
35
Popejoy v. Bahr, 67 Colo. 385, 176 Pac. 947 (1919).
2
30
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since deceased,36 the supreme court held that it was error to exclude
the testimony of a witness who had a case pending which involved
the same contract. The court pointed out that the witness would be
interested only in the validity of the contract, not in the outcome
of the particular suit. "In order to disqualify a witness, his interest
.. .must be in the event of the particular case, and not merely in
the question to be decided therein.""
It has been seen that the interest must be both direct and certain
if the testimony of the witness is to be rejected. Apparently, a third
requirement, which has received little attention, is that the interest
cannot be nominal. Only one Colorado case has dealt with this requirement. 8 Where a testator's nephew had been "cut off" with a
legacy of one dollar, he was allowed to testify as to the validity of
the will since "[the] dollar bequest could not reasonably be considered as conferring a material interest upon [the nephew] .... 39
It would seem that this case poses a somewhat provocative precedent
since the court has left itself open to future determination of the
monetary value which is necessary before interest exists. Is it an absolute value or a value relative to the entire estate? Should it matter whether the legatee is wealthy or poor? The line must be drawn
somewhere, but there has, as yet, been no indication of what will be
done.
In all of the cases discussed thus far, the interested witness has
always been excluded when offered to testify in an action where his
testimony would directly benefit him. It should be noted here that
the dead man statute itself provides that the witness shall be barred
only when he testifies "of his own motion, or in his own behalf.''40
Thus, where the witness testifies against his own interest, the statute
is not a bar.4 The logic employed here is no doubt similar to that
which created the exception to the hearsay rule when the out-of-court
declarant makes statements against his own interest.' If the witness
is willing to testify under oath to facts adverse to him financially, he
is presumed to be telling the truth.
2. Parties
Interested witnesses are not the only persons disqualified by the
dead man statute; parties to the action are also excluded. The Colo38

Love v. Cotten, 65 Colo. 593, 179 Pac. 806 (1919).

37Id. at 596, 179 Pac. at 807.
3
8 Lamborn v. Kirkpatrick, 97 Colo. 421, 50 P.2d 542 (1935).

3 Id. at 424, 50 P.2d at 54440
CoLo.REV. STAT. § 154-1-2 (1963).
41 Sussman v. Barash, 401 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1965) ;In re Thomas' Estate, 144 Colo. 358,
42

356 P.2d 963 (1960).
See generally MCCORMICK,

EVIDENCE

§§ 253-56 (1954).
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rado court first invoked the statute in 1894,' saying: "[N]o party is
allowed to testify of his own motion where the adverse party defends
as an heir, etc., of a decedent .... ." The statute has since been referred to on numerous occasions." Although most of the matters
litigated involve claims against a decedent's estate, the statute is
equally applicable where it is the estate that makes the claim. 5 It
would appear, then, that any party to an action is automatically incompetent where the adverse party represents a decedent's estate.
But what of situations where the individual is named as a party
but is neither a necessary party to the action nor a real party in interest? He is technically a party to the action, but he has no direct and
certain interest in the outcome thereof. The Colorado court addressed
this problem in Klein v. Munz," where it was said:
[T]his statute was not intended to, and does not, permit an executor to join an uninterested person as a party defendant and thereby
deny him the right to testify. Certainly the interest of such defendant must be shown before the bar of the statute may be invoked.4"

The court has taken a similar stand where the person whose testimony was excluded was a necessary party but not a real party in
interest:4 8
There is a vast difference between those who are required to be
made formal parties, or those who have no personal interest in the
result of the controversy, and those who are required to be made
parties because of the respective personal and property interests
involved in the issue to be determined .... 4

It becomes obvious from this discussion that the disqualification of
parties is really a result of their being "interested" persons.
Although the Colorado court has not dealt squarely with the
problem, it would appear that if a person is, in fact, a proper party
to the action, the accompanying fact that the plaintiff's motive in
making him a party was merely to prevent him from testifying for
his co-defendant will not prevent the application of the disqualifying
statute." However, the mere naming of a person as a party could
never be enough to invoke the statute against him if he is never
served with process and therefore does not appear as a party. The
43

Carpenter v. Ware, 4 Colo. App. 458, 461, 36 Pac. 298, 299 (1894). The statute
referred to is the predecessor of CoLo. REV. STAT. § 154-1-2 (1963).
44Reiter v. Pollard, 75 Colo. 203, 225 Pac. 222 (1924); Temple v. Magruder, 36 Colo.
390, 85 Pac. 832 (1906); accord, Young v. Burke, 139 Colo. 305, 338 P.2d 284
(1959); In re Eder's Estate, 94 Colo. 173, 29 P.2d 631 (1934) ; Stratton v. Rice,
66 Colo. 407, 181 Pac. 529 (1919).
5Keeler v.Hoyt, 57 Colo. 120, 140 Pac. 191 (1914).
4687 Colo. 223, 286 Pac. 112 (1930).
471d. at 225, 286 Pac. at 113.
4
BRisbry v. Swan, 124 Colo. 567, 239 P.2d 600 (1951).
49
1d. at 577, 239 P.2d at 606.
50
Sullivan v. Corn Products Ref. Co., 245 111. 9, 91 N.E. 643 (1910).
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Illinois court has so held. 1 Similarly, it has been established in Colorado that where an action has been commenced and one party subsequently dies, the executors of his estate have the right to be substituted as parties notwithstanding the consequent effect of the ex52
clusion of witnesses under the statute.
A misunderstanding of the statute has resulted in some confusion as to whether or not the administrators, executors, heirs, etc., are
themselves competent to testify. The wording of the statute is relatively clear in this regard. It provides specifically that no party or
interested person shall testify where "any adverse party" represents
a deceased person. It follows from this language that neither the
administrator nor executor is to be barred from testifying, but
that only those persons and parties "adverse" to the administrator
or executor shall be disqualified from testifying. In general, "an
executor or administrator is usually a competent witness where he is
a party in his representative capacity, at least where he is a witness
on behalf of the estate he represents.""3 The Illinois court has so
held with respect to both administrators 4 and heirs. 5 This is not to
say however, that one who represents a deceased person is never
rendered incompetent by the dead man statute. Fact situations present themselves where the party adverse to the administrator or heir
also represents a decedent, and in such a case the statute would disqualify both parties.
B. Classes of Persons Protected
The dead man statute provides that the following persons shall
receive its protection: "the executor or administrator, heir, legatee
or devisee of any deceased person, or ... guardian or trustee of any
such heir, legatee or devisee.'"'" This list is neither long nor complex, and it leaves little room for doubt or argument. Any person
who sues or defends in one of these capacities is within the scope of
the statute, and all others are outside of its protection. Where a
party is within a protected class and his co-party is not, the latter may
not invoke the statute. 8 Thus, the statute does not actually make the
51 Sankey v. Interstate Dispatch, Inc., 339 11. App. 420, 90 N.E.2d 265 (1950).
52

Butler v. Rockwell, 14 Colo. 125, 23 Pac. 462 (1889).

53 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 155, at 596 (1957).
54 Bailey v. Robison, 244 Ill. 16, 91 N.E. 98, 100 (1910): "The disqualification under

the statute is not against the party suing or defending as administrator, but against
the party suing or defending adversely to the administrator."
55 Weiss v. Beck, 1 Ill. 2d 420, 115 N.E.2d 768, 774 (1953): "It is not the heir who
is disqualified from testifying under the Evidence Act, but it is the party adverse to
the one suing or defending as an heir that is disqualified."
5
in re Shapter's Estate, 35 Colo. 578, 85 Pac. 688 (1906).
57
COLo. REV. STAT. § 154-1-2(1) (1963).
58 Haffner v. Van Blarcom, 84 Colo. 565, 569, 272 Pac. 621, 622 (1928): "[T]he
protection of the statute extends only to adverse parties within the designated class
and not to their co-parties not within such class."
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witness incompetent for all purposes, and where there are multiple
defendants, only some of whom represent decedents, the witness's
testimony will be admitted as against those defendants who are not
legal representatives or heirs of a decedent. 9 However, the mere
fact that such a person could be joined as a party defendant will not
remove the disqualifying effect of the dead man statute where the
only adverse party actually named in the suit represents a decedent's
estate."0
Not only is the protection of the dead man statute limited to
the legal representatives of deceased persons, but that representative
capacity must be alleged and proved before the protection of the
statute may be invoked. This rule was established in the leading
case of Prewitt v. Lambert,6 where the court stated that when a person sued individually undertakes to defend as an administrator, he
must establish by positive averment and proof at a preliminary proceeding that he is the administrator and thereby is entitled to the
protection of the statute.
There has been some question raised concerning the availability
of the protection of the dead man statute to partnerships and corporations following the death of a partner or corporate officer. In
the case of a corporation, the statute apparently does not bar the admission of statements made by a corporate officer which are binding
on the corporation even though the officer dies prior to trial."2 This
conclusion is perhaps best explained by the fact that the officer is
not a real party in interest, and, therefore, any protection to which
his administrator would be entitled if sued alone should not extend
to the corporation." Where partnerships are concerned, the protection available is specifically controlled by statute,64 and the
distinguishing factor determining admissibility is whether one or
more of the surviving partners were present at the time of the
59

Watson v. Woodley, 71 Colo. 391, 207 Pac. 335 (1922); accord, Sauer v. First
Nat'l Bank, 75 Colo. 119, 224 Pac. 227 (1924) (defendant defended in her individual as well as representative capacity) ; Gabrin v. Brister, 65 Colo. 407, 177 Pac.
134 (1918) (defendant was sued as executrix and in individual capacity); Nesbitt
v. Swallow, 63 Colo. 194, 164 Pac. 1163 (1917).
6
0Creev. Becker, 49 Colo. 268, 112 Pac. 783 (1911).
6119 Colo. 7, 34 Pac. 684 (1893).
62
Garden of Gods Village v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286, 294 P.2d 597 (1956).
63 It would appear that Colorado is definitely in the minority in its holding that a corporation is not within the class of protected persons. 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 212, at 654
(1957).

6 COLO. REv. STAT. § 154-1-4 (1963):
Conversation of deceased partner. - In any action, suit or proceeding, by
or against any surviving partner or joint contractor, no adverse party or person adversely interested in the event thereof, shall be rendered a competent
witness to testify by virtue of section 154-1-1, to any admission or conversation by any deceased partner or joint contractor, unless some one or more of
the surviving partners or joint contractors were also present at the time of
such admission or conversation.
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original conversation or transaction. The Colorado court has held
that where the surviving partner who was so present is also defending as the legal representative of the deceased partner's estate,
the decedent's admission or conversation is admissible against the
defendant in his capacity as surviving partner and inadmissible
against him in his representative capacity." The only limitation imposed is a proper jury instruction relating to the purposes for which
the testimony is being admitted. It is obvious that this interpretation
has diluted the effect of the dead man statute in those fact situations
where a surviving partner is also the representative of his deceased
associate since it allows the jury to hear the evidence regardless of
the fact that the adverse party represents a decedent. A similar problem results where the court admits the testimony in cases where the
decedent's representative has a co-party who is not protected by the
dead man statute.
C. Testimony Excluded
It should be noted at the outset, when addressing the problem
of the testimony excluded by the dead man statute, that it is really
the witness who is excluded, not his testimony. The statute does not
render any evidence, as such, incompetent. It simply bars proof of
certain matters by particularwitnesses: "[T~he reason for rejection
of the testimony necessarily is the incompetency of the person, not
the testimony.''6" In any given action, there may be nothing objectionable about any particular evidence coming in, provided it is given
by a competent witness.
Furthermore, the disqualification extends only to testimony relating to facts occurring before the death of the decedent.67 If the
witness is, in fact, an interested person or a party to the suit, and if
the testimony he desires to give on his own behalf is related to facts
which occurred prior to the decedent's death, "the character of his
his testimony and the subject matter about which he testifies are totally unimportant.''8
There has been some question as to the effect of a writing introduced on behalf of a witness otherwise rendered incompetent by
the statute. The court has distinguished between two types of writings: (1) self-serving statements written by the witness himself; and
(2) statements written by persons other than the witness. The former are incompetent and are therefore not admitted, particularly
65Savard v. Hcrbe..
66

I Colo. App. 445, 29 Pac. 461 (1892)

Balla v. Sladek, 381 Pa. 85, 112 A.2d 156, 160 (1955).
67
Keeler v. Hoyt, 57 Colo. 120, 140 Pac. 191 (1914).
6
8Jones v. Henshall, 3 Colo. App. 448, 451, 34 Pac. 254, 255 (1893).
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where they were written after the death of the decedent. 9 The latter
are admissible, provided they are properly authenticated, but the incompetent witness cannot himself verify them.7" This is a perfect example of the rule that while the evidence itself may not be incompetent, the witness may be.
A somewhat different problem is presented where the offered
writing is a book account. Colorado Revised Statutes, section 1541-3 (1963) provides that any party or interested person is allowed to
testify as to his book accounts and entries therein, but it has been
held that this enabling statute is neither an amendment of, nor an exception to, the dead man statute.7' The result is that while the account books themselves are admissible if the proper preliminary
proof is given, the witness who is rendered incompetent by the dead
man statute cannot give that preliminary proof.72
III.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

Just as the statute makes no distinction regarding the type of
testimony which it will exclude, neither does the nature of the action affect the working of the statute. The prohibition is the same
in equity as in law,73 although it has no application in criminal cases
since the wording of the statute specifically limits it to "civil actions."
There is no reason to believe that the Colorado court would disagree
with the general rule that the dead man statute covers the competency of witnesses in any civil proceeding, regardless of form or
class, before any tribunal, whether the action be legal or equitable.74
IV.

OBJECTIONS AND CROSS-EXAMINATION

In order to avail himself of the protection of the dead man
statute, a party must make a timely objection on the grounds of incompetency,75 and failure to make such an objection waives it. Where
69 Butler v. Phillips, 38 Colo. 378, 392, 88 Pac. 480, 484 (1906): "The claimant being
disqualified as a witness by virtue of [the dead man statute] . . . , no self-serving
statement made by him in the form of a letter could be competent evidence."
7
OCarpenter v. Ware, 4 Colo. App. 458, 36 Pac. 298 (1894) (letters written to his
children by one since deceased; held, widow not competent to verify said letters).
71 Wilson v. Warner, 83 Colo. 280, 282, 264 Pac. 657, 658 (1928): "Had it been the
intention of the Legislature to make book accounts also an exception, it would have
included them among the others." Accord, Oswald v. Dawn, 143 Colo. 487, 354 P.2d
505 (1960).
72
Haines v. Christie, 28 Colo. 502, 66 Pac. 883 (1901).
73
Williams v. Carr, 4 Colo. App. 368, 36 Pac. 646 (1894); Whitsett v. Kershow, 4
Colo. 419 (1878).
7497 C.J.S. Witnesses § 133, at 564 (1957).
75
Faden v. Midcap, 112 Colo. 573, 577, 152 P.2d 682, 684 (1944): "It is incumbent
upon the party seeking to take advantage of the incompetency of a witness to interpose an objection on that ground, in the absence of which the objection is deemed
waived and the witness is properly allowed to testify." Accord, Rigsbry v. Swan, 124
Colo. 567, 239 P.2d 600 (1951) ; Fister v. Fister, 122 Colo. 432, 222 P.2d 620
(1950); Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 49 Colo. 393, 113 Pac. 483 (1911); Cree v.
Becker, 49 Colo. 268, 112 Pac. 783 (1911) ; Temple v. Magruder, 36 Colo. 390, 85
Pac. 832 (1906) ; Jones v. Henshall, 3 Colo. App. 448, 34 Pac. 254 (1893).
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situations arise in which a person is competent to testify to some
matters and incompetent as to others, the objection should not be
made until he is asked to testify to the matters as to which he is incompetent. 8 However, if the objection is made when the witness
takes the stand, "the party tendering him should state what he proposes to prove by him, so that the court may know that it is proper."77
So that his objections may be timely, counsel must know at what
point in time the witness becomes incompetent. In the case of an
"interested" witness, from what point in time must the interest have
existed? Apparently, interest in the event of the suit must be determined as of the time the testimony is offered rather than at the time
the action was filed. 8 If the witness has a disqualifying interest at
the time he is questioned in the courtroom, an objection is timely and
proper. Similarly, when a party to an action dies during its progress
prior to the introduction of the testimony objected to as incompetent,
the objection is proper since "incompetency at the time the witness
79
is sworn is the test.
The party entitled to the protection of the dead man statute can
waive it not only by failing to make timely objection, but also by
himself calling the otherwise incompetent witness to testify." Furthermore, once the witness becomes competent in this manner, the
competency extends to any and all testimony pertinent to the issues
of the case," and he is not limited to the specific topics about which
his adversary questioned him. And if the witness is rendered competent to testify at one trial, the competency obtains at subsequent
trials of the same cause."
Cross-examination of a witness incompetent under the dead
man statute can have the same effect as calling that witness to testify." However, cross-examination must bring out facts to which the
witness would otherwise have been incompetent to testify before it
7

sParker v. Hilliard, 106 Colo. 187, 193, 102 P.2d 734, 736 (1940).

77Ibid.
78

Miller v. Hepner, 136 Colo. 48, 314 P.2d 604 (1957).
7997 C.J.S. Witnesses § 138, at 577 (1957).
80
COLO. REv. STAT. § 154-1-2 (1) (1963) provides that a witness who would otherwise be incompetent under the dead man statute is free to testify "when called as a
witness by such party suing or defending."
81
Allen v. Shires, 47 Colo. 433, 436, 107 Pac. 1070, 1071 (1910): "[W]hen . . . a
disqualified witness is called by the adverse party and examined by him as a witness
upon certain matters pertinent to some of the issues in the case, such witness is
thereby rendered competent for all purposes." Accord, Jerome v. Bohm, 21 Colo.
322, 40 Pac. 570 (1895) ; Warren v. Adams, 19 Colo. 515, 36 Pac. 604 (1894).
82 Finch v. McCrimmon, 100 Colo. 315, 67 P.2d 623 (1937).
83 Stender v. Cunningham, 123 Colo. 5, 10, 225 P.2d 52, 54 (i950):
We are unable to escape the conclusion that by cross-examination of [the]
proponent concerning conversations and transactions occurring prior to the
death of the decedent, the proponent was thereby rendered competent to testify
for all purposes and that the inhibitions of the statute do not apply.
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will have the effect of lifting the bar of the statute. Merely crossexamining a witness to such an extent as to disclose his interest and
consequent incompetency is not a waiver of the right to object to the
witness's competency. 4
V.

STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS

The dead man statute in Colorado is subject to seven exceptions
which are found in Colorado Revised Statutes, section 154-1-2
(1963), subsections (1)-(7). The first of these provides quite
simply that parties and interested persons shall not be barred from
testifying to any fact which occurred subsequent to the death of the
deceased person." The clarity of this exception allows it to speak
for itself, and it has been upheld in several decisions.86
The second exception relates to situations where an agent of the
deceased testifies for the administrator (or executor, heir, etc.) regarding a conversation or transaction between that agent and an opposing party. It is provided that such testimony by the agent makes
the adverse party competent to testify to that same conversation or
transaction. 7 Obviously, since the deceased's lips are no longer
sealed, due to his agent's appearance to speak for him, the need for
equality between the living and dead no longer requires that the adverse party remain silent. However, the adverse party's testimony
must be confined to facts concerning the same transaction or conversation to which the agent has testified. If it can be shown that
the agent's testimony relates to something other than a specific
transaction or conversation, the exception does not apply.8 Although
no cases can be found on point, it would seem logical that this latter
statement is applicable to all statutory exceptions dealing specifically
with "transactions" or "conversations."
The third exception allows the adverse party to testify where
the administrator himself takes the stand, or an interested person
does so in his behalf, and testifies to a conversation or transaction
84 Cordingly v. Kennedy, 239 Fed. 645 (8th Cir. 1917).
8 Coo. REV. STAT. § 154-1-2(2) (1963): "In any such action, suit or proceeding, a
party or interested person may testify to facts occurring after the death of such
deceased person."
8
6E.g., Eder v. Methodist Episcopal Church Ass'n, 94 Colo. 173, 29 P.2d 631 (1934);
Kitts v. Hill, 89 Colo. 186, 300 Pac. 610 (1931); Tourtellotte v. Brown, 18 Colo.
App. 355, 71 Pac. 638 (1903).
87
COO REv. STAT. § 154-1-2(3) (1963):
When . . . any agent of any deceased person, shall testify in behalf of
any person suing or being sued, in either of the capacities above named, to
any conversation or transaction between agent and the opposite party or parties
in interest, such party or parties in interest may testify concerning the same
conversation or transactions.
8Stratton v. Rice, 66 Colo. 407, 181 Pac. 529 (1919) (dated deposit slips and checks
in deceased's handwriting offered by administrator to show deceased's location at a
certain time did not constitute a "transaction" or a "conversation").
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between the deceased and the opposite party." Here again, the adverse party's testimony must be limited to the specific transaction or
conversation about which the administrator or interested person
testified.
Under the fourth exception, the adverse party can testify when
a witness who is neither a party, an interested person, nor an agent
of the deceased, testifies to a conversation or admission by that adverse party prior to the decedent's death, but not in the decedent's
presence." A simple example will help to clarify this exception.
Where an administrator brought an action for money owed by the
defendant to the deceased, the administrator introduced into evidence a letter from the defendant to an heir-at-law written prior to
the death of the decedent. 1 The heir-at-law authenticated the letter.
Analyzing these facts in light of the requirements of the fourth exception, it can Ie seen that: (1) the witness was not a party, an interested person, or an agent of the deceased; (2) the letter was written and sent prior to the decedent's death; and (3) the letter was
not written or received in the decedent's presence. Having thus satisfied the requirements of the exception, it would not be error to allow
the defendant to testify in rebuttal. The court so held.
The fifth exception permits the adverse party to testify when
the deposition of the deceased has been introduced into evidence at
the trial, but the testimony is limited to matters contained in the
deposition. 2 The exception applies only where the deceased's legal
representative is the one who introduces the deposition. 3 Nor is it
enough that it merely be shown that the deceased's deposition was, in
fact, taken; it must actually be introduced at the trial.
89

154-1-2(4) (1963):
When . . . any such party suing or defending, or any person having a
direct interest in the event of such action, suit or proceeding, shall testify in
behalf of such party so suing or defending, to any conversation or transaction
with the opposite party or parties in interest, then such opposite party in interest shall also be permitted to testify as to the same conversation or transaction.
90
COLO. REV. STAT. § 154-1-2(5) (1963):
When . . . any witness not a party to the record, or not a party in interest, or not an agent of such deceased person, shall testify in behalf of any
party in such action, suit or proceeding, to any conversation or admission by
any adverse party or parties in interest, occurring before the death and in the
absence of such deceased person, such adverse party or parties in interest may
also testify to the same admission or conversation.
91
Denver Nat'l Bank v. McLagen, 133 Colo. 487, 298 P.2d 386 (1956).
92
COL REV. STAT. § 154-1-2(6) (1963):
When . . . the deposition of such deceased person shall be read in evidence at the trial, any adverse party or parties in interest may testify as to all
matters and things testified to in such deposition by stuch deceased person,
and not excluded for irrelevancy or incompetency.
93 Levy v. Dwight, 12 Colo. 101, 107, 20 Pac. 12, 15 (1888): "IT]he introduction of
such testimony by the living party will not make such party a competent witness in
his own behalf."
94
1d. at 103, 20 Pac. at 14.
CoLo. REV. STAT. §

1966

DEAD MAN STATUTE

The sixth exception provides that if the adverse party or interested person made an admission to, or had a conversation with, or
knows of things connected with, the decedent, he can testify thereto
notwithstanding the fact that the conversation, admission, or other
fact occurred prior to the decedent's death, provided a member of
the decedent's family over sixteen years of age, or an heir, legatee
or devisee over sixteen years of age was present at the time and is
now present to testify, or can be procured for the purpose of giving
such testimony." The rationale here is that the relative, heir, legatee,
or devisee will adequately represent the interests of the estate to
avoid any danger of the adverse party's working a fraud. Thus, the
exception will usually be utilized by the court where it finds the witness to the transaction is representing the estate within the "spirit of
the statute.' '1
The seventh and final exception seems to have been seldom invoked in the Colorado courts. It merely provides that if a defendant
has ever been required to testify regarding his having concealed the
will or other property of the deceased, the written record of such
testimony is admissible on the defendant's behalf if it relates to the
estate of the decedent."? There has been no construction of this exception by the supreme court.
CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding its adoption by nearly all of the states, the
dead man statute has been the target of severe criticism since its inception, and its attackers have insisted that it excludes far more valid
claims than false ones. It has been contended that the restriction
should be relaxed and that methods of investigating truth be substi95

COLO.REV. STAT. § 154-1-2(7)

(1963):

[A)ny adverse party or parties in interest may testify as to any conversation
or admission, or as to all matters and things connected with the subject matter
of said action, suit or proceeding, and which conversation and admission and
matters and things, occurred before the death and in the presence of such deceased and also in the presence of any member of the family of such deceased
person over the age of sixteen years, or in the presence of any heir, legatee or
devisee of such deceased person over the age of sixteen years; provided, that
such member of the family, heir, legatee or devisee as the case may be, is
present at the hearing of said action, suit or proceeding, or whose testimony
is or may be procurable at such trial.
96
Walker v. Walker, 131 Colo. 328, 281 P.2d 1010 (1955); Koch v. Gamier, 110
Colo. 562, 136 P.2d 673 (1943) ; Brantner v. Papish, 109 Colo. 437, 126 P.2d 1032
(1942).
COLO. REv. STAT. § 154-1-2(8)

(1963):

When the defendant in any such suit has previously been required to testify under the provisions of section 153-5-20 or section 153-10-42, the testimony so given if reduced to writing, or the stenographic minutes thereof, so
far as the same relates to the estate concerning which or for the benefit of
which such suit is brought, and is relevant to the issue in such suit and competent under the general rules of evidence, may be read in behalf of such
defendant.
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tuted. Thus, it has been suggested that cross-examination, the scrutiny of witnesses by the court and jury, and the power of circumstantial evidence to discredit the oral testimony of an interested witness are sufficient to uncover any fraudulent scheme which may be
afoot. 8
It may well be that Jeremy Bentham touched on what is the real
heart of the current arguments against the dead man statute when he
questioned the basic logic of any rule which excluded the testimony
of interested persons:
Does it follow, because there is a motive of some sort prompting
a man to lie, that for that reason he will lie? That there is danger
in such a case is not disputed; but does the danger approach to
certainty? This will not be contended. If it did, instead of shutting
the door against some witnesses, you ought not to open it to any.
An interest of a certain kind acts upon a man in a certain direction
opposite to the path of duty; but will he obey the impulse? That
will depend upon the forces tending to confine him to that pathupon the prevalence of the one set of opposite forces or the other.
All bodies on or about the earth tend to the centre of the earth; yet
all bodies are not there. All mountains have a tendency to fall into
level with the plains; yet, notwithstanding, there are mountains. 99

The question, then, should be not whether a witness has an interest
in the outcome of the suit, but rather whether, under all the circumstances, it is likely that his interest will affect the competency of his
testimony and whether sufficient safeguards have been provided to
prevent this potential danger. To continue to uphold the dead man
statute as a necessary means of maintaining perfect equality between
the living and the dead is to confuse theory with practical effects.
As Professor Wigrnore has so ably pointed out, the theory of incompetency based on interest is reducible in its essence to a syllogism,
both premises of which are quite obviously fallacious:1 first, whenever persons likely to give false testimony are offered as witnesses,
the only proper safeguard against a false decision is total exclusion
from the stand; second, persons having a pecuniary interest in the
outcome of a suit are likely to give false testimony; therefore, such
persons should be totally excluded. The first premise simply fails to
recognize the alternatives available and their proven effectiveness
(e.g., cross-examination, careful scrutiny of the witness by the court
and jury, and the effect of circumstantial evidence to discredit the
testimony of an interested witness), while the second premise overlooks Bentham's appropriate acknowledgement of the fact that a
man's actions will be determined by the interaction of his impulse
to lie, with the forces which tend to counter-balance such an im9

STaft, Comments On Will Contests In New York, 30 YALE L.J. 593, 605 (1921).
9 7 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 393 (Bowring ed. 1827).

100 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 576, at 686 (3d ed. 1940).
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pulse, not the least of which is the moral influence of the oath, and
the feeling of futility in attempting to perpetrate a fraud in the face
of vigorous cross-examination by opposing counsel and careful scrutiny by the judge and jury.
A number of states have already recognized the basic illogic of
the dead man statute and have implemented alternative schemes for
dealing with cases involving transactions, one party to which had
died. In Oregon and New Mexico' no recovery is allowed if based
on the adverse party's sole testimony. There must be corroboration
of some sort. In Connecticut, Virginia, and Oregon, the adverse
party's testimony is admitted along with any writings or declarations
of the deceased party which relates to the same subject."° New
Hampshire and Arizona exclude the adverse party's testimony except
when the court feels that injustice will result from such exclusion. 3
The Connecticut statute, in particular, has won wide acclaim from
the practicing attorneys in that state, as well as approval from more
than 80o of the judges," 4 thereby indicating that experience has
shown it to be valuable.
It is submitted that the Colorado General Assembly would be
well-advised to re-evaluate the actual merits of retaining the dead
man statute in light of what would appear to be a discrepancy between the common law theory on which the statute is founded and
the practical realities of its operation.
Lowell

101 Id. § 578, at 697.

Ibid.
Id. § 578, at 698.
1l4 Id. § 578(a), at 699.
1l2
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J. Noteboom

THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLICE OFFICER'S
RIGHT To ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT
IN COLORADO

T

HE history of Colorado law concerning the rights and liabilities
of an officer in making an arrest without a warrant can best be
described in one word - bewildering. This state of affairs has been
brought about by at least three factors:
1. Reliance upon ill-defined and partially out-moded common
law with a paucity of interpretative cases;
2. Attempts to mend the common law with a statutory patchwork that is less than complete;
3. Unexplained legislative adoption of an Illinois statute' without mentioning, in the Colorado statute's legislative history,
whether the Illinois interpretative case law was also adopted.2
This omission may have significant ramifications.
It is the purpose of this Note to show the past and present status
of the law and the pitfalls to be overcome in the further development
of the police officer's right to arrest without a warrant.
The problem of determining what constitutes an arrest is outside
the scope of this discussion and therefore it shall be assumed that an
arrest has actually been made.
I.

THE 19TH CENTURY EVOLUTION OF ARREST WITHOUT
A WARRANT IN COLORADO

At the outset of its statehood, Colorado officially adopted the
English Common Law:'
The common law of England, so far as the same is applicable
and of a general nature, and all acts and statutes of the British parliament, made in aid of or to supply the defects of the common law
prior to the fourth year of James the First [1607] . . . shall be4
considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority.
Therefore, any omission in the area of Colorado arrest law may be
supplied by the common law. "May" is appropriate because, as the
cases construing the above statute indicate,5 it is not always easy to
ICompare

COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-2-20 (1963), with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 342

(1874).
2 COLO. SENATE LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 1078, S. Bill No. 251 (1955).

3 COLO. REv. STAT. Ch. 16, § 1 (1868).
4
COLO. REV. STAT. § 135-1-1 (1963).
5 See the cases annotated under COLO. REV. STAT. § 135-1-1 (1963).
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determine when the common law is "applicable and of a general
nature."
Before going on to specific Colorado statutory and case law it
will be useful to review the basic rudiments of the common law regarding a policeman's right to arrest without a warrant. No attempt
will be made to discuss the technical and complicated distinctions of
the common law,' but rather the basic majority rules will be skimmed:
1. An officer could arrest for a felony or a breach of the peace
committed in his presence, or to prevent the immediate commission of such a crime.'
2. Regarding out-of-presence crimes, an officer could arrest
only for a felony and then only when he had reasonable
grounds for believing that a felony had been committed and
that the person arrested was guilty of the felony.8 If the officer were mistaken as to the commission of the crime or as
to the person arrested, he would still be exempt from liability
if his actions were based on "reasonable cause."
3. For a misdemeanor not amounting to a breach of the peace,
the majority common law rule was that an officer could not
arrest without a warrant regardless of whether it was perpetrated in or out of his presence.9
Turning to specific statutory law, Colorado first delineated an
officer's responsibility in this area by adopting an arrest-without-awarrant statute in 1861.o This statute, as it was originally enacted,
still stands today. It reads:
When any felonious offense shall be committed, public notice
thereof shall be immediately given in all public places near where
the same was committed, and fresh pursuit shall forthwith be made
after every person guilty thereof by sheriffs, coroners, constables,
and all other persons who shall be by any of them commanded or

summoned for that purpose."'

The statute is as significant for what it does not say as for what
it does say. For example, the specific reference to "felonious," by
implication, excludes misdemeanors from its scope. Furthermore, the
statute makes it the officer's duty to engage in fresh pursuit. Nothing is said about the common law right of an officer to arrest on
"reasonable grounds" for a long-past felony not committed in his
presence; nor is anything specifically mentioned concerning breaches
of the peace.
6 PROSSER, TORTS §
"Id. at 135.

26, at 134 (3d ed. 1964).

8 ibid.
9Id. at 136.
10 Colo. Sess. Laws 1861, § 157, at 326.

11COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-2-2 (1963).
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These unanswered questions were at least partially settled by
the 1891 case of Union Depot & R.R. v. Smith.'2 The defendant arrested the plaintiff for violating a city ordinance in the defendant's
presence. The defendant, claiming to be a duly appointed police officer, contended that he had the right without a warrant to arrest a
person committing a misdemeanor in his presence. The court, after
concluding that the defendant was not a police officer, said:
It is otherwise with an officer. He may arrest when he has
reasonable grounds to suspect that a felony has been committed, and
justify by proof of a ground which the law deems reasonable....

This rule has never been extended so as to protect the officer in case
of an arrest for misdemeanor .... Where the rights of a police officer to arrest for a misdemeanor have been conceded, it has not
been held to include an authority broad enough to embrace arrests

for violations of municipal ordinances. To justify the arrest by an
officer for an offense of this description, a statute must be found

clothing the officer with the right, which must be exercised under
the circumstances designated by the enactment .... A statute upon
this subject has been enacted in this state, and doubtless a policeman

would be authorized to make an arrest for a violation of a municipal ordinance where the offense was committed in his presence. 3
The 1877 statute referred to in the Union Depot case stated, "The
duty of the chief and other officers of the police ... shall be, to apprehend any and all persons in the act of committing any offense
against the laws of the state or ordinance of the city .
"..""
This
statute plus the Union Depot interpretation extended the officer's
common law right by allowing him to arrest for a misdemeanor, or
breach of a city ordinance committed in his presence.
Five years later in Newman v. People," the court reinforced
these rights by saying:
Indeed were this statute not in existence, it would be, as we have
already intimated, the official duty of the sheriff, where he knows
or sees that a criminal offense is being committed, without warrant, and upon view, to arrest the offender and to seize and take

into custody the subject of the crime. .....1
These changes reflect a growing awareness of the impracticality
of distinguishing between a felony and a misdemeanor for purposes
of arresting without a warrant. 7 This impracticality is illustrated by
Colorado's shoplifting statute. 8 Shoplifting articles valued at less
than one hundred dollars is a misdemeanor on the first or second offense while shoplifting articles worth more than that amount is a fel'1 Union Depot & R.R. v. Smith, 16 Colo. 361, 27 Pac. 329 (1891).
13Id. at 365, 27 Pac. at 331.
14 COLO. GEN. LAWs ch. 100, § 77 (1877).

'5 Newman v. People, 23 Colo. 300, 47 Pac. 278 0896.
16 Id. at 310, 47 Pac. at 282.

op. cit. supra note 6, at 136.
18 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 49-5-29 (1963).

17 PIROSSER,
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ony."9

If it had been illegal to arrest for an "in presence" misdemeanor,
an officer seeing a man grasping a wristwatch and running away from
a shopkeeper would have been faced with a difficult decision. If he
had arrested and the watch had been worth less than one hundred
dollars, he probably would have arrested for a misdemeanor which
was beyond his authority; if the watch had been worth more than
one hundred dollars, the officer would not only have had a right but
a duty to arrest. The avoidance of this type of problem by granting
the officer the right to arrest for an in-presence misdemeanor is a
logical expansion of his common law right, necessary because of the
present-day difficulty in readily determining whether an offense is a
felony or a misdemeanor.
However, at this point in Colorado history, the necessity of distinguishing between a felony and a misdemeanor remained as to outof-presence offenses since neither the statute nor the case law extended to the officer the right to arrest for out-of-presence misdemeanors or violations of city ordinances.
By the turn of the century, the police officer's rights and liabilities regarding arrest, as declared by the common law plus statutory
and case modification, were as follows:
1. Concerning a felony, the same rights existed as at common
law. He could arrest whether the crime was committed
within or without his presence, and he was not liable if his
mistake as to the person or commission of the crime was
"reasonable."
2. Contrary to the majority common law rule, the officer had
the right to arrest for violations of city ordinances and misdemeanors committed in his presence. However, without a
warrant he could not arrest for these same offenses when
they were committed out of his presence.
3. Since the statute enlarging the common law right to arrest
for in-presence crimes said nothing about the corresponding
liabilities ,20 it is not clear whether the officer would be immune from liability for a reasonable mistake as to the person arrested or the commission of the misdemeanor. Since
this immunity from liability did not exist at conmon law
and statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly
construed, 1 it seems likely that the officer mistakenly but
reasonably arresting for a misdemeanor would have been
liable. The practical ramifications of this result are again
19 Ibid.
2

0 COLO. GEN. LAWS ch. 100,

§ 77 (1877).

21 Stowell v. People, 104 Colo. 255, 258, 90 P.2d 520, 521 (1939).
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illustrated by the shoplifting hypothetical. If the officer
had been "reasonably wrong" as to the actual commission
of the crime or the guilt of the person arrested, and the
watch had been worth more than one hundred dollars, he
would not have been liable. If, on the other hand, the
watch had been worth less than one hundred dollars, he
would have been liable unless it were the shoplifter's third
offense.
At the turn of the century, while Colorado had made some
progress toward more realistic and workable laws in the area of
arrest, important problems and questions remained unsolved.
II.

RECENT RAMIFICATIONS

The first significant changes resulted from the enactment of a
1955 statute which reads:
[Aln arrest may be made by an officer or by a private person without warrant, for a criminal offense committed in his presence; and
by an officer, when a criminal offense has in fact been committed,
and he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person to be
arrested has committed it.22 (Emphasis added.)
Before analyzing the effect of this statute, one source of justifiable confusion must be removed. The 1955 case of Johnson v.
Enlow,' although mentioned in the annotation following this statute,"4 is merely a restatement of the law existing prior to its enactment; 5 it is not an interpretation of the statute.
The use of the word "criminal" rather than "felonious" in the
statute is very significant because "criminal offense," as defined by
Colorado case law, includes misdemeanors26 and violations of city
ordinances 7 as well as felonies. Thus the statute established the
right of an officer to arrest for a misdemeanor or violation of a city
ordinance committed without as well as within his presence. No
longer is the officer taking the risk of arresting a person for an
offense committed out of his presence which later turns out to be
a misdemeanor. Furthermore, regardless of the type of offense
committed, the officer is now relieved from liability for mistakenly
arresting the wrong person if he had reasonable cause for believing
the person was the guilty party, provided the offense was in fact
2 COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-2-20 (1963).
3 Johnson v. Enlow, 132 Colo. 101, 286 P.2d 630 (1955).

2

Ibid.
The cause of action in the Johnson case arose in 1952 while the statute wasn't enacted
until 1955. In addition, neither the attorneys' briefs nor the supreme court's decision
mentioned the statute.
26 Hoffman v. People, 72 Colo. 552, 558, 212 Pac. 848, 851 (1923).
24

25

2

Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
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committed. This holds true whether the misdemeanor was committed within or without the officer's presence. In these areas the
statute makes needed progress in enlarging the officer's right to
arrest.
In spite of this progress, the statute raises vitally important
questions. One problem, beyond the scope of this paper, results
from the fact that the ordinary citizen's right to arrest without a
warrant has been radically increased.28 The plain words of the
statute indicate that a citizen may arrest for any "in-presence" criminal offense.'
Remembering that "criminal offense" encompasses felony, misdemeanor and a violation of a city ordinance, the plain words of
the statute confer the right on one citizen to arrest another, when
an offense has been committed in his presence, for making too much
noise and thus disturbing the peace, for failing to license a dog or
for over-parking!
A second problem, and one of great consequence to the police
officer, is the fact that the plain words of the statute require that
the offense must in fact have been committed in order to justify the
arrest, thereby invalidating the old common law rule that an officer
need have only reasonable grounds for believing that a felony had
been committed." Not only is this change clearly contrary to the
great weight of American authority,3' but it also places an enormous
and unrealistic burden on the arresting officer, as illustrated by the
following hypothetical: An officer happens into a dark alley and
finds a known criminal going through the pockets of an unconscious
well-dressed man. The criminal is caught and arrested. Several
days later it is learned that the man suffered a heart attack and
injured himself in the fall. The man testifies that he asked the
criminal to get his digitalis pills from his pocket. It is clear that
there was reasonable cause to believe an offense had been or was
being committed; yet, because no offense was in fact committed,
the officer is subject to civil liability for false arrest.
A third problem, that of statutory construction, is raised in
determining the ramifications of the "in fact" language of the
statute. It is possible that the "in fact" words of the statute can be
circumvented, as has been suggested," by holding that the legislature intended that an officer's common law immunities would sur2 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 135.
29
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 39-2-20 (1963).
30 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 135.
31 5 AM. JUR. 2d Arrest § 25 (1962).

32 Scott, Criminal Law and Procedure, Highlights of the 1955 Legislative Session, 28
RocKY MT. L. REv. 69'(1956).
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vive and that the statute would merely extend additional rights. On
the other hand, the statute's unequivocal "in fact" language and
the absence of any language preserving the officer's immunities33
seem to counterbalance the strict construction accorded to statutes
in derogation of the common law.
Ultimately, the question of statutory construction must be resolved by determining the legislative intent. In determining this
intent, the legislative history of the statute is vitally important.
Colorado Revised Statutes, section 39-2-20 (1963) is an adoption
of an 1874 Illinois statute. 4 When Colorado adopts the statute of
a sister state, a presumption arises that it also adopts the sister
state's interpretative case law existing at the time of the adoption."
This may be a particularly strong presumption when an Illinois
statute is adopted." If this presumption holds, the Illinois case law
manifests the Colorado legislative intent. Unfortunately, because
Colorado keeps only minimal records of the legislative history leading to the enactment of its statutes, there is no competent evidence
supporting or rebutting this presumption. 7
In 1964 the latter two problems were squarely met by the defendant's brief in the Colorado case of Boyer v. Elkins. 8 The Boyer
brothers, defendants in a civil suit, were being sued for assault and
battery of two police officers who had attempted to arrest them for
misdemeanors and city ordinance violations committed out of the
officers' presence. The Boyers' counsel did not dispute the officers' right to arrest for violation of a city ordinance or misdemeanor
that was in fact committed out of their presence. Instead, they
argued that the arrest was illegal because they had not committed
any offense before the attempted arrest, and that the statute clearly
states the arrest is only legal if a "criminal offense" has in fact been
committed. Therefore, because the arrest was illegal, they claimed
33
34

COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-2-20 (1963).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 342 (1874).

Hoen v. District Court, 412 P.2d 428, 430 (Colo. 1966); Warner v. People, 71 Colo.
559, 208 Pac. 459 (1922) ; Russell v. Jordan, 58 Colo. 445, 447, 147 Pac. 693, 694
(1915).
S }Hoen v. District Court, 412 P.2d 428, 431 (Colo. 1966) ; Hallett v. Alexander, 50
Colo. 37, 50, 114 Pac. 490, 495 (1911) ; Houlahan v. Finance Consol. Min. Co., 34
Colo. 365, 368, 82 Pac. 484, 485 (1905); Bradbury v. Davis, 5 Colo. 265, 269
(1882).
37 COLO. SENATE LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 1078, S. Bill No. 251 (1955). It is interesting to note that the late Senator Wilkie Ham, a co-sponsor of the statute, was formerly an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Illinois for six years. Senator Ham also taught
criminal law and evidence for six years at Marshall Law School in Chicago. It is hard
to resist the conclusion that Senator Ham was aware of the Illinois interpretative case
law existing at the time he sponsored the statute. Colorado Legislative Directory at
28 (1963).
-"Brief for Appellant, p. 34, Boyer v. Elkins, 154 Colo. 294, 390 P.2d 460 (1964).
3
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the defendants were within their rights in resisting the officers.
Furthermore, the defendants vigorously stressed that reasonable
grounds for believing an offense had been committed was not
enough to justify an arrest. 0 Authority for this contention was
based on the construction problem raised by the statute. The defendants argued:
C.R.S. 39-2-20 . . . apparently was copied from the Illinois
law . . . . The construction placed on this statute by the Illinois
courts prior to the enactment of the same statute in Colorado in
1955 is entitled to great weight and is at least strongly persuasive
upon the courts of this state for the reason that the presumption is
that the law was enacted in the light of the construction given it by
41
the courts of the state from which the statute was taken.

The defendants then set forth the Illinois interpretation:
The Illinois courts before and since 1955 have construed their
statute to mean that unless a criminal offense has actually been

committed or attempted, the arrest is unlawful no matter if the officers acted under reasonable belief and in good faith. The language
of both the Colorado and Illinois statutes is specified, 'when a
criminal offense has, in fact been committed .... ,42 (Emphasis

added.)
The defendants cited numerous cases proving the Illinois interpretation. 3
Counsel for the arresting officers, interestingly enough, made
no attempt to dispute defendants' use of the Illinois case law as
authority for interpreting the Colorado statute.44 However, the
officers' counsel cited, in addition to Colorado Revised Statutes,
section 39-2-20 (1963), section 211.1 of the Revised Municipal
Code of the City and County of Denver which is directly contrary
to the statute in that it allows an officer to "arrest any person found
under circumstances which would warrant a reasonable man in believing that such person had committed or is about to commit a
crime."'" The plaintiffs, for good reason, never directly argued that
4'Id.at 43.
41 Id. at 35.
42d.

at 36.
37. The defendants stated:

'3Id. at

In a recent case, McKendree v. Christy... in applying the rule set forth
in early cases, the court stated . . . 'These cases interpreting this section [Sec.

657] are clear in holding that where an officer makes an arrest without a
warrant for an alleged crime which has not been committed in his presence,
such arrest is illegal if the crime has not actually been committed . . . in such
case the absence of malice or the presence of probable cause constitutes no defense. 19 J.L.P. False Imprisonment, Pay. 5; Levin v. Costello, 214 Ill. App.
505; Wood v. Olson, 117 I11.
App. 128; Markey v. Griffin, 109 Ill. App. 212.'
44Brief for Appellee, p. 33, Boyer v. Elkins, 154 Colo. 294, 390 P.2d 460 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee].
451d. at 34.
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the municipal ordinance should prevail over the state statute, but
the implication is clearly there."6
The mention of the city ordinance was somewhat surprising,
since the landmark case of Canon City v. Merris47 established that in
an area of statewide as well as local concern, the state statute prevails over a corresponding municipal ordinance even though the
offense was committed within the municipality. Merris held that
drunken driving was a matter of statewide concern; certainly the
right to arrest without a warrant is on an equal par.
After this nuance, the officers' counsel turned to a definition
of "reasonable cause," the second necessary element in an arrest
without a warrant. As the statute plainly states, not only must the
offense have in fact been committed, but the officer must also have
reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested is the guilty
party. Due to the lack of Colorado cases in this area, the plaintiffs
were forced to rely on out-of-state cases. 8 It should be noted that
the word "reasonable" is subject to varying definitions. 9
The plaintiffs also raised the definitional specter of another
important word -

"presence."

This definition can vary

-

from

what an officer actually sees, to knowledge afforded him by any of
his senses.5"
Finally, the plaintiffs said, in effect, that if any doubts remain,
the officers were justified in making the arrests because the defendants committed actual offenses after the arrival of the officers and
in their presence." Thus, the plaintiffs afforded the court an opportunity to avoid determining whether the statute only validates an
arrest when an out-of-presence offense has in fact been committed
- all the court had to say was that, in this case, offenses were in
fact committed.
The Colorado Supreme Court, instead of availing itself of the
opportunity to interpret the statute and thus clarify the officers'
right to arrest without a warrant, chose - perhaps with good
reason - to avoid the major issues.
While quoting both the contradictory laws, the court did not
indicate whether it relied upon the Colorado statute or upon the
Denver Municipal Code. 2 As previously mentioned, Denver, unlike Colorado, allows the arrest solely on the ground of probable
4Ibid.
41 137 Colo. 169, 182, 323 P.2d 614, 621 (1958).
48

Brief for Appellee, p. 38.

49 36 WORDS AND PHRASES 448 (1962).
6

0LA FARE, ARREST 236 (1965).
51 Brief for Appellee, p. 72.
52 154 Colo. at 300, 390 P.2d at 463.
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cause regardless of whether an offense has in fact been committed.
The court also refrained from defining either probable cause or
presence. In addition, the court failed to mention whether or not
Illinois case law is governing in interpreting this statute. As previously shown, the question is of extreme importance in the area
of citizen's as well as police arrest without a warrant.
Ultimately, the court, by holding that an offense was in fact
committed, was able to avoid deciding whether probable cause as
to the crime's commission would have been sufficient to justify the
arrest.
The only progress made by Boyer was in solidifying the previously known rules that a criminal offense committed outside the
presence of an officer includes a misdemeanor or violation of a city
ordinance as well as a felony and, as to the person, the officer need
only have reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested
was the guilty party. 3
It is interesting to speculate concerning the reasons for the
court's reluctance to decide the major problems. It is submitted
that the evidence was so strongly weighted toward adopting the
Illinois interpretation, and thus the "in fact" requirement, that it
would have been very difficult for the court to have adopted any
other interpretation. Realizing this, and not wishing to so drastically burden the arresting officer, the court may have decided to
ignore the problem in the hope that realistic legislative change
would be forthcoming, as recently happened when the same statute
was repealed in Illinois."4 It seems fair to conclude that the criticisms leveled at the Colorado statute5 are not eliminated by Boyer.
In 1964, the hoped-for change was partially realized by a statute
applicable only to county courts :5"

A summons and complaint may be issued by any peace officer
for an offense constituting a misdemeanor which was committed in
his presence or, if not committed in his presence, concerning which
he has reasonable grounds for believing was committed in fact and

was committed by the person charged."

(Emphasis added.)

53 Id. at 301, 390 P.2d at 462.
4 Smith-Hurd ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 107-2 (c) (1964): "A peace officer may arrest a person when: He has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed an offense." The Committee Comments following this revision
are illuminating: "[Slubsection (c) adopts the federal rule, and that of many other
jurisdictions, that an arrest without a warrant may be made on reasonable grounds
that the person has committed or is committing an offense, and not on the basis that
'an offense has in fact been committed,' which is almost impossible for an officer to
determine ...
"
s Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of Search and Seizure Practices, 34
RocKy MT. L. REV. 150, 157 (1962).
56
57

Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 45, § 55, at 429.
Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 45, § 59, at 430.
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Realizing that a summons per se is not considered an arrest,"
the officer is placed in the anomolous position of being absolved
from liability if he is reasonably wrong regarding the commission
of the misdemeanor if he merely issues a summons, but is liable for
this reasonable mistake if he arrests for the same offense. There is
also a distinct possibility that stopping and detaining a person for
the purpose of writing and issuing a summons constitutes an arrest.
The 1965 case of Gonzales v. People,5" is helpful in defining
probable cause. The court, after determining that probable cause
and reasonable grounds are substantially equivalent in meaning, set
forth a realistic and workable definition when it said: "Indealing
with probable cause, one deals with probabilities. 'These are not
technical; they are factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act.' "60
However, the "reasonable cause" language relating to the commission of the crime creates a pitfall for the unwary in both the
language in the case"' and the headnotes on arrest. 2 Taken together, they seem to indicate that an officer is justified in making
an arrest when he has reasonable grounds for believing that a crime
has been committed (assuming he also has reasonable grounds for
believing that the person arrested was the guilty party). A close
analysis of Gonzales and three subsequent cases63 indicates that
probable cause, as to both the crime and the person arrested, is only
considered after it has been established that a crime was in fact
committed.
The Gonzales case involved an arrest without a warrant followed by a search for and seizure of narcotics on the person of the
defendant. In appealing the conviction, defense counsel argued
that the officers did not have probable cause for believing that a
crime had been committed and therefore the arrest and the ensuing
search and seizure were illegal.84 The officers' reasonable grounds
for believing that the defendant was the guilty party and the fact
that the crime was actually committed were not disputed.
58 Colo. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 45, § 67, at 432; Hart v. Herzig, 131 Colo. 458, 464, 283
P.2d 177, 180 (1955).
59
398 P.2d 236 (Colo. 1965).
60 Id. at 239.
81 Id. at 238. "Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge . . . are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or isbeing committed."
2

6 1d. at 236.

6 Lavato v. People, 411 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1966) ; Gallegos v. People, 401 P.2d 613
(Colo. 1965); Wilson v. People, 398 P.2d 35 (Colo. 1965).
64 398 P.2d at 238.
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The supreme court held that the arrest was valid because the
officers had reasonable grounds for believing that a crime had been
committed.' By implication, however, the court was actually holding that probable cause as to the commission of the crime is only
considered after it has been established that a crime was in fact committed. In other words, the in fact commission is still a condition
precedent to lawful arrest without a warrant.
Wilson v. People," decided on the same day, illustrates this
principle. In this case, although the actual commission of the crime
was established, the court held that the arrest was illegal because
the officers did not have reasonable grounds for believing that a
crime had been committed.
Later cases of Gallegos v. People" and Lavato v. People"
had essentially the same fact patterns and demonstrated the same
principle. In both cases a crime had actually been committed and
the court was primarily concerned with determining whether the
officers had probable cause for believing that a crime had been
committed.
The thread running through all four of the preceding cases is
apparent: The actual commission of a crime had been established
and the court was only concerned with analyzing the additional requirements necessary for a valid arrest without a warrant.
III.

PRESENT STATE OF THE LAw

Summarizing the present state of Colorado law relating to an
officer's right to arrest without a warrant, we find that:
1. An officer's common law right to arrest only for a felony
or breach of peace committed in his presence or a felony
committed out of his presence has definitely been extended
to all other types of offenses - misdemeanors, breaches of
the peace and violations of city ordinances - whether they
were committed in or out of his presence. This is a major
advance as the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is often technical and artificial." Today the officer is
no longer handicapped by having to categorize a crime
before deciding whether or not he has the right to make
an arrest.
2. Regardless of the type of offense, the officer need only
65

Id.at 239.
"398 P.2d 35 (Colo. 1965).
67401 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1965).
68411 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1966).
69

PROSSER, TORTS § 26, at 134 (3d ed. 1964).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 43

have reasonable grounds for believing the person arrested
committed either the "in" or "out-of-presence" offense.
3. As to the offense itself, it is not absolutely clear whether
reasonable cause precludes liability for arresting for an
out-of-presence offense or if it must in fact have been
committed. A literal reading of the statute, the adoption
of the Illinois wording, plus the supreme court's reluctance
to come to grips with the problem indicate the latter. If
this is true, the officer's common law right to arrest for a
felony based on mere reasonable cause has been drastically
restricted. This restriction would be a major and unfortunate abrogation of common law rights and will needlessly
handicap an officer; he would probably be overly hesitant
in arresting for an offense committed out of his presence.
4. Also, if an offense must in fact have been committed to
validate an out-of-presence arrest without a warrant, the
wording of the statute indicates that this same standard
extends to in-presence offenses as well. Again, with respect
to a felony, this would be a drastic and unnecessary curtailment of an officer's common law right. However, the possibility of a variable standard should not be overlooked.
Reasonable cause as to the commission of an in-presence
offense might validate the arrest while for an out-ofpresence offense in fact commission would be necessary.
From the preceding, it is obvious that clarification is necessary.
Realizing that realistic change must enable the police officer to
effectively fulfill his duties, and at the same time afford protection
to the individual, one major change should be made: The requirement of an "in fact" commission of an offense should be abolished
and the officer should have the right to arrest when he has reasonable cause for believing that any type of offense has been committed.
This standard should apply whether or not the crime was committed
in or out of the officer's presence.
The present state of confusion must be rectified as soon as
possible. Since the courts seem demonstrably loathe to clarify the
situation, legislative action is imperative.
Chet Walter

IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF FITNESS FOR HABITATION IN SALE OF
RESIDENTIAL DWELLINGS

O

NE of the oldest doctrines in the field of law is the rule of caveat
emptor in real estate sales. Under this doctrine there are no implied warranties either of title or quality.' However, in recent years
this doctrine has come under attack. The purpose of this note is to
examine the reasons for the doctrine of caveat emptor, discuss its
status today, and discuss some of the problems that arise when the
doctrine is abandoned in the sale of homes.
I.

REASONS FOR THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR

Several reasons have been advanced in support of the doctrine.
First, it has been stated that the vendor and purchaser are dealing at
arm's length; therefore, the purchaser has the opportunity to inspect
and require an express warranty if he so desires.' Second, it has been
said that there could be no certainty or stability in the real estate field
if caveat emptor did not apply.' The third reason given is that a deed
made in full execution of a contract of sale merges the terms of the
contract therein, thereby cutting off any liability of the seller.'
The first reason has been criticized on the ground that it simply
does not recognize the realities of the situation. Most defects that
would be covered under an implied warranty would be latent and
hence not discoverable upon inspection, even assuming that the purchaser had the ability to make a proper inspection. With the advent
of the mass-production home builder, it is highly unlikely that a
purchaser could convince such a builder to give him an express warranty because of the superior bargaining power of the builder-vendor
in this situation.
The second reason, upon close analysis, is no reason at all be-

17

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 926, at 797 (3d ed. Jaeger 1963); Bearman, Caveat
Emptor in Sales of Realty -Recent
Assaults on the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541,
542 (1962) ; 51 ILL. B.J. 498, 499 (1963).

2 Hill Sand & Gravel Co. v. Pallottine Fathers House of Studies, Inc., 220 Md. 526,
154 A.2d 821, 825 (1959) ; Fegas v. Sherrill,

218 Md. 472, 147 A.2d 223, 227

(1958) ; see Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [19311 All E.R. 93 (K.B.).
3

Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 46 N.J. Super. 293, 134 A.2d 717, 719 (1957),

wherein it is stated that "an element of uncertainty would pervade the entire real
estate field. Real estate transactions would become chaotic if vendors were subjected
to liability after they had parted with ownership and control of the premises."
4 Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963).

5 Bearman, supra note 1, at 545; see Haskell, The Case For an Implied Warranty of
6

Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEo. L.J. 633, 651 (1965).
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
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cause exemption from liability should not be granted merely because
the extent of the liability will cause uncertainty. Chaos has not resulted in the field of chattel sales,' although implied warranties are
in effect in nearly all states with respect to such sales.8
The fallacy of the third reason was recognized by the Colorado
Supreme Court in Glisan v. Smolenske' where the court held that the
delivery of the deed constitutes only part performance of the sales
contract, and other matters, including implied warranties, remain
obligatory.
II. EROSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
The first exception to the caveat emptor rule was made by dic0 In that
tum in an English case, Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd."
case the plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant for
the purchase of a lot and house that was under construction at the
time of the agreement. After completion of the house, the plaintiff
occupied it but was forced to leave under medical advice because a
serious dampness penetrated the house. The court found an express
warranty under which it held the defendant liable. However, the
court went on to say, by dictum, that when one is purchasing a house
that is completed at the time of the sale there is no implied warranty
of fitness for habitation, since the purchaser has ample opportunity
to inspect the house and discover any defects that may be present,
and if the purchaser wants a warranty, he may obtain an express one."
But, the court said the case is quite different when one contracts to
purchase a house that is in the process of construction at the time of
the agreement, since it is clear that the purchaser is buying the house
to live in and has no opportunity to inspect; therefore, there should
be an implied warranty that the house will be fit for habitation. 2
The dictum in the Miller case, that there is an implied warranty
when the house is purchased in the process of construction, has become the rule in England"3 and in some jurisdictions in the United
States."4 However, most jurisdictions still cling to the traditional
7

Id., 207 A.2d at 326.

8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, 315.

9153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963).
10 [1931] All E.R. 93 (K.B.).

1 Id. at 96.
12 Ibid.
13Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., [1937] 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A.): The court had trouble
with the reasoning found in the Miller case but applied the rule to a substantially
completed house. Jennings v. Tavener, [1955] 2 All E.R. 769 (Q.B.).
14
Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Weck v. A:M Sunrise
Constr. Co., 36 Iii. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 ( 1962 ); JoSe-Balz Co. v. DeWitt,
93 Ind. App. 672, 176 N.E. 864 (1931); Minemount Realty Co. v. Ballentine, 111
N.J. Eq. 398, 162 Atl. 594 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932); Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103
Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957); Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla.
1963) ; Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
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rule of no implied warranties in the sale of real property."5 The only
statutory authority on the point is in Louisiana, which has adopted

the doctrine of redhibition, in effect establishing an implied warranty in the sale of real property as well as chattels. 6
This distinction between finished and unfinished houses is unsound. The fundamental principle underlying the doctrine of implied warranty is reliance. The home buyer,
is admittedly unskilled in the mysteries of house construction and
must therefore rely heavily upon the superior skill and training of
his builder-vendor. Inspection will be of little use ... in protecting
the vendee, both because of the expense and because the defects are
usually hidden. Though the vendor-vendee relationship may not be
technically a fiduciary one, the trust placed in the vendor coupled

with the relative helplessness of the vendee make it one. 7
Therefore it follows that if the purchaser is relying upon his vendor's
skill it makes little sense to distinguish between finished and unfinished houses.
The unreasonableness of this situation was first recognized in
the Colorado case of Carpenter v. Donohoe'8 where the court extended the doctrine of implied warranty to a completed house. In
that case plaintiffs brought suit against their builder-vendor for damages suffered when the completed house they purchased from the
builder-vendor developed severe cracks in the foundation, making
the house unsafe for occupancy. After discussing the cases applying
the implied warranty doctrine to unfinished houses, the court went on
to say:
That a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house
which is near completion than would apply to one who purchases
a new house seems incongruous. To say that the former may rely
15E.g., Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961) ; Allen v.
Reichert, 73 Ariz. 91, 237 P.2d 818 (1951); Walton v. Petty, 107 Ga. App. 753,

131 S.E.2d 655 (1963) ; Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Il. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780
(1963) (which distinguished lWeck, supra note 14) ; Tudor v. Heugal, 132 Ind.
App. 579, 178 N.E.2d 442 (1961) (which did not mention Jose-Balz Co. v. DeVitt,
supra note 14) ; Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 322, 262 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup.
Ct, 1965) ; Steiber v. Palumbo, 219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959).
16 LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 2520-48 (1952).
17 Bearman, supra note 1, at 574. The argument of reliance was first raised by Waesche,
J., dissenting in Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 46 N.J. Super. 293, 296, 134 A.2d
717, 720 (1957), af'd on other grounds, 26 N.J. 330, 139 A.2d 738 (1958). Judge
Waesche stated:
Since the defendant was in the business of erecting houses to sell, it represented that it possessed a reasonable amount of skill necessary for erection of
a house. This representation was impliedly made to whomever purchased from
the defendant a house erected by it for the purpose of selling. Such a representation is indispensable to effectuate the sale of a house erected by a developer for the purpose of selling. Otherwise there would be no sales. A person in
the business of building houses to sell is fully aware that a purchaser relies
upon such an implied representation. Since the defendant impliedly represented
that it possessed a reasonable amount of skill requisite for the erection of a
house, it follows that it also impliedly represented that the house was erected
in a proper and reasonably workmanlike manner.
18 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
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on an implied warranty and the latter cannot is a distinction without a reasonable basis ....
We hold that the implied warranty doctrine is extended to include agreements between builder-vendors and purchasers for the
sale of newly constructed buildings, completed at the time of contracting. There is an implied warranty that builder-vendors have
complied with the building code of the area in which the structure
is located. Where, as here, a home is the subject of sale, there are
implied warranties that the home was built in workmanlike manner
and is suitable for habitation. 19
New Jersey has followed Colorado in the case of Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc.2" In that case the defendant builder-vendor, a
well-known mass developer of homes specializing in planned communities, contracted with the purchaser prior to completion. In 1958
the purchaser moved in and occupied the house until 1960 when he
leased it to the plaintiff. The sixteen-month-old son of the plaintiff
was injured by hot water from the bathroom faucet. The cause of the
injury was alleged to have been the failure of the builder-vendor to
include in the hot water system a mixing valve to prevent excessively
hot water from flowing from the faucets. The plaintiff brought suit
on breach of warranty and negligence. The court found that the defendant was negligent, and in addition, found the defendant liable
either on the basis of breach of an implied warranty or on strict liability, considering both remedies equally applicable.2 The fact that the
contract was entered into prior to completion of construction was not
considered significant by the court; the court was primarily concerned
with imposing an implied warranty in the sale of new houses. Although the suit here was for bodily injury, the court will certainly
include economic injury within the protection of the warranty. In
discussing implied warranty the court states:
When a vendee buys a development house from an advertised
model . . . he clearly relies on the skill of the developer and on its
implied representation that the house will be erected in reasonably
workmanlike manner and will be reasonably fit for habitation. He
has no architect or other professional advisor of his own, he has no
real competency to inspect on his own, his actual examination is, in
the nature of things, largely superficial, and his opportunity for obtaining meaningful protective changes in the conveyancing documents prepared by the builder-vendor is negligible. If there is improper construction such as a defective heating system or a defective
ceiling, stairway and the like, the well-being of the vendee and
others is seriously endangered and serious injury is forseeable. The
public interest dictates that if such injury does result from the defective construction, its cost should be borne by the responsible developer who created the danger and who is in the better economic
19 Id. at 83, 388 P.2d at 402.
-044 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
21 Id., 207 A.2d at 325.
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position to bear the loss rather than by the injured party who justi22
fiably relied on the developer's skill and implied representation.
It can be seen, therefore, that the underlying reason for the ap-

plication of implied warranties to the sale of houses is the reliance
of the purchaser upon the builder-vendor's skill and knowledge that
the house was constructed properly. As was pointed out by the court
in the Schipper case, the purchaser has no recourse but to rely. Therefore, if the trust which the purchaser has placed in the builder-vendor
is abused by him when he builds a house with defects, it would be
manifestly unjust to absolve the builder-vendor of liability.
III.

PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE APPLICATION OF
IMPLIED WARRANTIES

By extending the doctrine of implied warranty several problems
are created. The first problem concerns the nature of the seller.
Should a person who is not engaged in the business of selling real
estate be bound under a theory of implied warranty? It will be recalled that in both Carpenter and Schipper the sellers were buildervendors. It has been argued that the doctrine should be extended to
a seller who is merely a private owner selling his residence on the
ground that the question ultimately becomes one of whether or not
the purchaser has received what he has bargained for. Considered
in this light it makes no difference whether the seller is a professional
or an amateur.2 4 However, this argument fails to consider that the
basic principle underlying the doctrine of implied warranty is the
reliance of the purchaser upon the seller.2" In the case of the amateur seller there should be very little reliance upon him because he
has no expert knowledge or skill. Both the seller and purchaser
stand on equal footing. Neither party is in any better economic position to bear the risk of loss, as is the case with a builder-vendor. If
the seller misrepresents the property the purchaser may bring an
action for fraud or misrepresentation. It appears, therefore, that
liability should be limited under the doctrine to builder-vendors.
This conclusion is in accord with the application of implied war26
ranties to chattels.
A closely related problem to that discussed above is whether the
doctrine should be limited to sales of new property only, or whether
it shaould be extended to include sales of used property. In both

Carpenter and Schipper the homes were new. Since it was concluded
22 Id., 207 A.2d at 325-26.
24

Haskell, supra note 5, at 649.
Ibid.
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above that the doctrine should apply to builder-vendors only, extending the doctrine to used property will have little effect because most
used property is sold by private owners. In a case decided after Carpenter, the Colorado Supreme Court expressly refused to extend the
doctrine to used houses.2" However, where the seller of the used
property has actual knowledge of any defects, it would not be unreasonable to require him to warrant that there are no defects to the
best of his knowledge other than the ones he has disclosed.
It is suggested that there should exist an implied warranty running against the builder even though the house has been sold if, had
the house not been sold, the original purchaser would have had a
cause of action. This suggestion is based upon the belief that the
builder-vendor should not be relieved of his liability merely because
his purchaser has sold the house. Also, the element of reliance is
present since the second purchaser is influenced by the fact that the
house is relatively new and therefore relies upon the builder for the
assurance that the house is suitable for habitation.
The next problem involves the relationship of the parties.
Should there be privity of contract between the person suffering the
injury and the one who is held liable for the injury? In Carpenter
there was privity; however, it will be recalled that in Schipper there
was no privity. In that case the court stated:
[I]t seems hardly conceivable that a court recognizing the modern
need for a vendee occupant's right to recover on principles of implied warranty or strict liability would revivify the requirement of
privity, which is fast disappearing in the comparable product liability field, to preclude a similar right in other occupants likely to be
injured by the builder vendor's default.2
It may be argued that the doctrine of privity should be retained because if it is not, the vendor will be subjected to liability for a neverending period. However, this problem can be eliminated by the
establishment of a statute of limitations. The setting of a time limit
within which an action must be brought presents a difficult problem.
The Louisiana Civil Code has a one-year statute of limitations, beginning with the date of the sale, on all actions of implied warranty,
both real and personal property. 9 The Uniform Commercial Code
has a four-year statute of limitation for actions based upon breach of
implied warranty."0 A suggestion has been made that the statutory
period should be one year, beginning at the time the deed is delivered
or the vendee takes possession, whichever occurs first, on the ground
2 H.B. Bolas Enterprises, Inc. v. Zarlengo, 400 P.2d 447 (Colo. 1965).
28 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314, 328 (1965).
29
30
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that one year represents a full seasonal cycle which should bring out
any defects existing at the time of the sale. Defects which appear
later are more likely to be due to ordinary wear and tear."
The question ultimately resolves itself into a policy decision in
which conflicting interests must be balanced. The period must not
be unduly long because it would place an intolerable burden upon
the builder-vendor and could likely lead to chaos in the field. However, the period must be of sufficient length to enable the purchaser
to discover the defects within the time allowed. A possible solution
would be to have varying statutes of limitation for different defects.
For example, a longer period could be established for a defect arising
from the failure to meet building code requirements, such as the
failure to construct a proper foundation, than for a defect which
arises from an unforeseen circumstance, such as water seeping into a
basement due to a rising water table. The decision is legislative in
nature and should be made by the legislature rather than by the
judiciary.
Another difficult problem raised is the establishment of the
standard to be used to determine if the warranty has been breached.
In the Schipper case the court said, "indetermining whether the house
was defective, the test admittedly would be reasonableness rather
than perfection.''32 In the field of chattels the Uniform Commercial
Code uses the test of whether or not the article will pass in trade
without objection,"3 meaning the goods must be of a comparable
quality to that generally accepted in that line of trade. 4 Either or
both of these tests would be a suitable standard, since they are flexible and can be applied to individual cases with little difficulty.
A buyer should not be protected as to defects that upon examination should be discovered. This is the Code rule with respect to
chattels.3 5 The difficulty arises as to the degree of competence that
is to be the standard to which the buyer is to be held. A reasonable
suggestion has been made that the buyer be held at least to the
standard of competence and skill which he in fact possesses; otherwise, the buyer should be held only to that knowledge that would be
gained from an inspection by a reasonable nonexpert."6
Once it has been determined that the seller is liable under an
implied warranty, the amount of damages to be awarded the buyer
must be computed. There are two logical possibilities as to what
Bearman, supra note 1, at 576.
32 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965).
33
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2)(a).
31

34 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, comment 2.
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should be used as the measure of damages: (1) Damages awarded
shall be the amount necessary to correct the defect; (2) Damages
awarded shall be the difference between the value of the property
without the defect and the value of the property with the defect. It
is submitted that if the property is capable of repair, the cost of the
repairs should be used. If the property cannot be repaired so as to
bring it back to the condition that was bargained for because of
physical impossibility or disproportionately high cost of repair, then
the second method should be used as the means of measuring damages. In this way the purchaser will be returned to the position for
which he bargained.
The application of the doctrine of implied warranty does not
bar one from also asking for relief under the traditional doctrine of
fraud or misrepresentation. It has been held that there need be no
election between the two remedies since both are based upon an affirmance of the contract." The significance of this holding occurs
in a jurisdiction which does not recognize the doctrine of implied
warranty. One may bring an action under both theories, thereby
allowing the court to apply the doctrine in that jurisdiction if it so
chooses; but, if the court refuses, one may still recover on the basis
of fraud, assuming sufficient proof thereof has been offered.
CONCLUSION

It appears that the trend is toward applying implied warranties
to sales of real property, and this trend is justified.38 As Professor
Jaeger states in Williston on Contracts, "it would be much better if
this enlightened approach were adopted with respect to the sale of
new houses for it would tend to discourage much of the sloppy work
and jerry-building that has become perceptible over the years."39 As
a result of the extension of the doctrine by the courts, legislation may
be required to solve some of the problems, particularly the problem
involving the statute of limitations; builders may be forced to disclaim warranties or include limited express warranties to limit their
potential liability; but in any event, liability may be avoided by building a house that is suitable for habitation, which is ultimately the desired result.
Charles A. Ramunno.
37

Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
38 See Bearman, supra note 1 ; Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for
a Particular Purpose, 37 MINN. L. REV. 108 (1953); Haskell, supra note 5; Note,
51CORNELL LX
389 (19466); 5 DE PAUL L. REV. 263 (1956) ; 5 ILL. BJT 08
(1963) ; 18 MD. L. REV. 332 (1958) ; 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 528 (1958) ; Note, 26 U.
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(1953).
39 7 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 926a, at 818 (3d ed. Jaeger 1963).
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